TYPES OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT

IN CRITICISM AND RECONSTRUCTION

A comparative study of Ghazālī's *Tahāfut* and *Iḥyā'*,
Ibn Taymiyah's *Radd*, Shāh Walīy Allāh's *Ḥujjat*

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PREFACE

This work is presented to the reader in the hope that it will be treated as an introduction to Islamic Thought. In so far as that subject is far from having been established at the present time, the general plan of my introduction to it remains necessarily amorphous. Apart from this extenuating circumstance, however, I would be *prepared to run the risk of* (or to accept responsibility for) having scant regard for *form* if the individual problems which have received my attention in this work could be entitled to attention in general. For instance, the book will have served its purpose well if only my analysis succeeds in demonstrating the solid core of philosophical speculation in IUD, or in rehabilitating KRM as a genuine contribution to Islamic philosophy.

Notwithstanding any inherent limitations of its subject, it is curious for a book to play off its main theme ('text') against the explanatory apparatus or the 'notes' in it so that the former should retain some advantage over the latter in only a mechanical sense. Of such imbalance the present work is not entirely free. However, its accessories have been rationalized in many other ways. For instance, they have been divided into Notes and Appendices in accordance with their length and substance. Both these parts have been numbered in independent and continuous series. These enter into my cross-references where, in order to avoid discrepancies between my type-script and the renumbering of its pages in print, I do not refer to the pages of this work. (If, therefore, I do refer to *pages* in a bibliocentric part of it, I mean the pages of the book under consideration. For instance, 'p. 152' in note 96 means that particular page in KRM).

The 'bibliocentric' character of this study also accounts for the inevitable use of abbreviations. Although my list of the abbreviations includes more than a dozen books, it is but a few (4 or 5) of them that stood in need of such a device. In their case, however, the need would brook no denial. As regards the transliteration of the names of books (as of other Arabic words), diacritical marks have been supplied here in the vast majority of cases—i.e. with the exception of words like Islam or Arab. But I have chosen not to italicise Arabic words as a rule, for the foreign character of most of them might already have been indicated by the diacritical marks.

My thanks are due to the two Institutes of Islamic Studies (at Montreal and Aligarh) with which I have had the honour to be associated. Professor W. C. Smith and Dr. 'Abd al-'Alīm the Directors of the two learned bodies, have provided in generous measure the moral encouragement and the material incentive without which this work could hardly have been complete. I have also profited by the advice or the criticism of my colleagues at these Institutes some of whom have gone through parts of my type-script.

S. A. K.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Bib.	Bibliography (in this work).
BMS	*Bayān muwāfaqat ṣarīḥ al-ma'qūl li ṣaḥīḥ al-manqūl* (Ibn Taymiyah).
Con.	*The Concept of Human Nature in Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah and its Relation to Shāh Walīy Allāh's Doctrine of Fiqh* (Sabih Ahmad Kamali).
Etf.	English translation of Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* (Sabih Ahmad Kamali).
GAL	*Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur* (C. Brokelmann).
HAB	*Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* (Shāh Walīy Allāh).
IUD	*Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* (Ghazālī).
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.
KIT	*Kitāb al-Ishārāt w'al-Tanbīhāt* (Ibn Sīnā).
KRM	*Kitāb al-Radd 'ala al-Manṭiqiyīn* (Ibn Taymiyah).
KS	*Kitāb al-Shifā* (Ibn Sīnā)
MIm	*Mi'yār al- 'Ilm* (Ghazālī).
Qrn.	The Holy Qur'ān.
SB	*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī.*
TF	*Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* (Ghazālī).
TT	*Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (Ibn Rushd).

INTRODUCTION

I. In writing this introduction, I may be permitted to speak not so much of the substantive part of the present work, as of a problem to which the latter has literally introduced me. Concerning the actual contents of the present work I have little to say by way of introductory exposition. They are self-explanatory as far as they go; and if they do not go far enough, no amount of prolegomenal rationalization will help them. Unlike them, however, the great problem that has arisen out of them is neither too good nor too poor for rationalization. This is the problem of the subject of the 'typical' books I have analysed. I have identified that subject (Islamic Thought) in terms that imply some depreciation of the popular or traditional conception of those books. Unless tainted with arrogance, such an implication would scarcely call for an apology or defence. But I am not unwilling to recognize the responsibility it entails. An attempt like mine to place some books in co-ordinate relationship to Islamic Thought presupposes that the latter is an intelligible unit of study or a subject in its own right. Such a relationship having been postulated (if not proved) in my analysis, it is fit and proper that I should give an account of its fundamental presuppositions. In so doing, I shall give expression to conclusions reached in the course of what now happens on my part to be a long and arduous struggle to think out the precise connotation of Islamic Thought.

II. The present work came into being (1955) as a short introduction to my English translation of Ghazālī's TF. In that form, it had made an attempt to study Ghazālī's refutation of Philosophy in comparison with some other books related to it in the literary tradition of the Muslim world. My interest in such a study had arisen out of the general character of my work at the Institute of Islamic Studies in McGill University, Montreal (Canada). It has since come to be the source of the distinction I make between Islamic Thought and 'pure' Philosophy (in the Muslim world).

I had chosen TT, KRM, HAB and some writings of modern Muslim authors for such a study. Although my knowledge of

these books was none too profound or accurate at that time, it was not difficult for me to see that they were amenable to the methods I sought to apply to them. To begin with, the two *Tahāfuts* of Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd are related to each other *by nature* (as the obverse and reverse sides of the same medal)—because (not in spite) of the conflict that divides them. In like manner, Ghazālī's *critique* is naturally related to KRM, in that each book is a refutation (of views on more or less the same kind of subject). As far as HAB is concerned, I must confess to some misgivings as to what it shared in common with TF. However, I had a feeling that a number of critics in our own day, who had compared the authors of the two books (if not the books themselves), were not very far from the truth.

The publishers who brought out my translation (1958) chose to do without the introduction. It came back to me on what then seemed to be its way into oblivion. I had no plans for renewed attention to it, my time currently being taken up with an extended study of the philosophy of Shāh Walīy Allāh.[1] On completion of that study, however, I found it interesting to look into a suggestion[2] that the abortive introduction might be rewritten in the form of a possible contribution to periodical literature. I began to feel that the project to which my attention had been drawn could prove to be an apt sequel to my work on Walīy Allāh. Indeed, my preoccupation with the latter thinker had been rewarded with such clarity in understanding him that it was not only possible but also obligatory upon me to attempt a reassessment of his many-sided relationship to Ghazālī.

As a matter of fact, my work on Walīy Allāh had led me to discover in Ghazālī's IUD the connecting link between his TF and Walīy Allāh's HAB. Should the reader be prepared at this point to bear with me in using the names of these books in rapid succession, I would like to point out that, in spite of vast differences between them, HAB and IUD are related to each other in the same way as TF is related to KRM. If, therefore, I wanted to make a comparative study of TF and HAB, all I had to do was to demon-

1. *Con.* (See Bib. *sub nom* "Kamali").
2. Made by Professor W. C. Smith, Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal.

strate something more than formal or superficial affinities between TF and IUD.

This, then, happened to be my starting-point when I began to revise the old 'introduction.' And it was also the beginning of my conception of the problem of Islamic Thought. A new section on IUD was the first thing I added to the revised work. It was completed in the few months I spent in Montreal after the completion (1959) of my dissertation on Walīy Allāh. Later on (Winter 1959-60), I added some other chapters so that the work could be considered for publication by the Institute of Islamic Studies in the Muslim University at Aligarh (India) with which on my return from Canada I had come to be informally associated.

As I have said, my views on the TF-IUD relationship represented the personal factors which diverted my interest from the 'pure' philosophy in TF to its place in the context of Islamic Thought. These were supplemented by an objective factor as well. In translating the book at first and in 'introducing' it later on, it had been my problem to define where I stood in relation to Dr. Simon Van den Bergh's scholarly work on Ibn Rushd.[3] This distinguished Orientalist had made a valuable study of Ghazālī as a part of his over-all project. His translation of the Ghazālī text had been of considerable help to me in the revision of my own translation. His *apparatus criticus* acted both as a deterrent and encouragement to me. Even if I could follow his example in dealing with TF in the context of Philosophy in general, it would be no use duplicating a job so well done by him. But if I were to speak of the book with reference to its influence upon Islamic Thought, I could hope to throw some light on questions heretofore unexamined with clarity and success.

What I eventually succeeded in presenting to the Aligarh Institute (1960) was the first and tentative draft of "a study in types of Islamic Thought". Having now left Ibn Rushd out of consideration, it treated TF, IUD, KRM, and HAB as 'typical' books. In order to bring this ('typical') quality into focus, I had tried to compare those books with the meagre and unpretentious

3. See Bib. *sub nom.*

output of 'the unworthy successors' (of my authors) in modern times. The severity of my criticism on the latter placed me under an obligation to indicate in precise terms what it was that I criticised, and how its possible modification or improvement could change and ennoble its possessors.

A little less than two years (1960-61) have elapsed between the preparation of the first draft and the final revision (beginning 1962) whence the work has emerged in the form in which now it is presented to the reader. During this period, it was my privilege to act as an amaneunsis to an author on Ḥadīth.[4] I have consequently tried to redefine my idea of Islamic Thought in the light of the conclusions at which I arrived in the course of this valuable opportunity of acquainting myself with the sources and the problems of Ḥadīth. In the meantime, my renewed association (on a formal basis) with the Institute of Islamic Studies at Aligarh has made it possible for me to study the problem of Islamic Thought not only as a part of my theme in the present work, but also as a subject whence my formal appointment at the Institute may possibly derive its name and substance.

III. I will say just a few words about the structure of the present work. The first chapter is devoted to Ghazālī's TF and IUD. Neither book has been treated at great length. The section on TF survives from the old 'introduction.' I have decided to keep it merely because it happened to be my starting-point. It is brief because it illustrates how the restoration of a book like TF to Islamic Thought is bound to be a slow and laborious process. As regards the section on IUD, brevity is to be explained by some other factors. It was none of my business to summarize or otherwise to reproduce the contents of a book of such magnitude. All I could do was to reconstruct the sequence of its argument as a whole. The iconoclastic thing that has come out of the reconstruction offers post-dated justification for the brevity to which I had resorted.

What I have had to say on Ibn Taymiyah forms by far the longest chapter in the present work. It has had some success in

4. See *Hadith Literature* by Professor M. Z. Siddiqi, Calcutta University Press, 1961.

imposing order and coherence upon the contents of a loosely organized book (KRM). Ibn Taymiyah's views on Logic have suffered on account of the disproportionate success and fame of his treatment of some other subjects. He is conspicuous by his absence in almost all the major works on 'pure' Philosophy (in the Muslim world). In the English sources in particular, his logical theory has not received the attention it deserves. There can be no doubt but that this theory represents a very significant contribution to the famous logical discipline that prevailed in the Muslim world for long ages. Moreover, the book (KRM) also recapitulates some of the most notable features of the academic organization and the text-bases of that discipline. Above all, it is enlivened by the author's indomitable and relentless attention to the conflict between Aristotelian logic and Islamic Thought. I have taken care to place in relief the concrete evidence of that attitude.

The pages I have devoted to Shāh Walīy Allāh have been taken over (*mutatis mutandis*) from my previous work in which I had dwelt upon the various aspects of his thought at much greater length. Actually, Chapter III in the present work reproduces (in part) three of the five chapters of the earlier monograph.[5]

From my presentation Walīy Allāh's theory of social development may emerge as the sum and substance of his contribution to Islamic Thought. Although my adaptation of this particular topic has been made with an eye to the contingencies of my way into print, I am willing to accept the consequences of the choice. It is possible to think that the problems of History and Society should (by slow degrees or through an ascertainable number of premises) have come to be accepted by Walīy Allāh as an adequate medium for the expression of his basic attitude towards Islam. The Irtifāqāt (periods or stages of social development) form the prolegomena to the system of Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh). That system is the concrete manifestation of the inner essence of the Islamic life and character. The apprehension of that character must precede its realization which constitutes the (act of) Faith. Through some propositions like these, then, Walīy

5 The second chapter of *Con.* is the only one I have used here *in extenso*.

Allāh may have come to the conclusion that his outlook on life and History represented his contribution to Islamic Thought.

Finally, my fourth chapter is but a part of a fairly extensive amount of writing I had devoted to the problem of the 'typical' character of my authors. Much of that investigation has had to be dissevered from the present work so as not to be submitted for publication. In some of the sections that follow here I shall state conclusions to which the argument had led me in my eliminated chapters. They have lost relevance to the present work precisely because they form an introduction to my conception of Islamic Thought. In any case, it will be useful to summarize them here because it may be years before I could hope to reduce them to a system.

IV. To the stop-gap summary of my eliminated chapters I would like to prefix some remarks on Ghazālī. Not only have his books introduced me to the problem of Islamic Thought, but he himself stands out as an author hard to appreciate unless one should have recognized Islamic Thought as a subject in its own right.

Ghazālī has been an enigmatic figure to many of his critics. Elsewhere[6] the reader will find a reference to Ibn Rushd's perplexity over the fact that Ghazālī identified himself with so many classes of men, but that the identification is never complete or definitive. In our own day, some great Ghazalians have confined there perplexities to their investigations into the chronological sequence of Ghazālī's writings.[7] All such investigations are directed towards a new interpretation of Ghazālī's intellectual activity in the light of (a) the elimination of the spurious writings attributed to him and (b) the reconstruction of the historical sequence of those which are reasonably authentic. Whatever may be the chances for the continuance of this kind of research in the future, and however successful it may be, the shape of the Ghazalian cor-

6. See note 5, Chap. 1.

7. See W. Montgomery Watt, "The authenticity of the works attributed to al-Ghazālī", JRAS, London 1952, pp. 24-45. Also see Maurice Bouyges, *Essai* (on the chronology of Ghazālī's works), ed. by Michel Allard, Beirut 1959 (reviewed in the *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, Leiden, May-July 1962, p. 188).

pus even as we have it at present calls for renewed effort on our part to redefine our ideas of the man and his work.

I venture to submit that all such attempts are bound to be frustrated unless we could take steps to obviate the disproportion or incommensurability that tends increasingly to widen the gap between our knowledge of Ghazālī and our idea of the place of his work in general. In order to make any progress in understanding him, it is necessary that one should have contrived to cover equally extensive ground by way of redefining his subject. What hitherto we know of him has not been independent of what we think of the subject that claimed his attention. But the equilibrium now tends to break down as a result of the inner readjustment of its two arms. The subjects of Ghazālī's intellectual activity have come to be regarded as independent and specialized disciplines to which his own contribution may therefore appear to have been peripheral.[8] But there must be something to which his contribution represented an achievement of the highest order. The old equilibrium must be saved or reconstructed so that we might evolve (if we did not already have) a subject to which Ghazālī may be related more intimately and successfully than he is related to the special 'sciences' of the Muslim world. In such a reconstruction the loose ends of my own argument in the present work will be seen to meet. For the rediscoverable subject of Ghazālī's intellectual activity as a whole has unfolded itself in the interstitial problems of his progress from TF to IUD.

That subject is Islamic Thought, and the process that led Ghazālī from one of these books to the other is its *locus classicus*. In some other parts of this introduction I will try to show how the development of Islamic Thought in pre-Ghazalian times provides the necessary tools of analysis through which the TF-IUD *continuum* may be described as a turning-point in the history of the subject. Suffice it here to indicate in a general way that, by virtue of the conception of the 'sciences of Religion' (*'ulūm-al-dīn*) he has evolved in IUD, Ghazālī has a place together with Imām Bukhārī and Imām Shāfi'ī—as one of the exponents of what may

8. Cf. his role in Muslim philosophy or in Fiqh as it is conceived at the present time.

be called the developing and deepening self-consciousness of the Muslim mind.[9]

V. It is interesting to recall that my investigations into the the problem of Islamic Thought had opened with what may be called a 'history of the future.' Obviously, such a thing defies all criticism and discussion. In speaking of the future, all you can do is to trust your mind and express its impressions in clear and emphatic terms. In the later phases of my investigations, however, I realized that one's idea of the future may be admissible in so far as it sums up one's understanding of the past. This coincided with a change in my circumstances which permitted of the reorientation of my problem to methods of research—as set over against its projection into the *terra incognita* of the future.

As I have said, it was my endeavour to compare the achievements of my authors with the analogous but inferior output of the modern exponents of Islamic Thought. My depreciation of the latter involved some consideration of the possibility of improvement upon it. Confining my attention to the intellectual activity of Muslims in India and Pakistan, I realized that the changes which had taken place in recent years made it possible for the Muslim mind to aim at richer and nobler forms of self-expression. I found it necessary to assign at least some positive contents to this possibility.

In so doing, I realized that these 'forms of self-expression' could be meaningful only on the basis of self-possession and spontaneity. Islam has a right to demand that its followers should not confuse the contingencies of their behaviour with (the act of) Faith. In other words, the thoughts which may be devoted to Islam should arise out of an original vision of things or facts related to Islam. They should not form a pretext for a Muslim's personal attitudes towards things in which he may be interested in fortuitous or egocentric fashion.

Much of the thinking activity of Muslim authors in recent times seems to have been lacking in originality in this (religious)

9. Also see an Urdu article on Ghazālī's *Kitāb al-madnūn bihi 'ala ghayr ahlihi* the present writer has written for the *Majallah* of the Institute of Islamic Studies, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh (1962).

sense of the term. Calculated to spell out their response to the Western civilization, it satisfied the demands of their instinct for self-preservation. The way in which it has been brought to bear upon Islam was therefore quite unoriginal. In fact the idea of Islam that emerged from it was nothing but an image of the West —worked out in inverse proportion or magnified detail.

Fortunately, such a pathetic loss of originality may not be characteristic of the new forms of self-expression. For one thing, the Western phenomenon now tends to die out as a political force —so that it may be granted a new lease of life as a cultural tradition which has been the most congenial to the spirit of the Modern Age.

Cosmological speculation appeared to be another element likely to drop out. I could visualize Muslims in the role of men of Science. Nor would it be difficult to imagine that this development should be traceable to Islamic influences upon the educational and cultural forces that might have been at work in their society. But I was not prepared to maintain that the Cosmology that had found its way into Islamic Thought in the past might be developed still further in lieu of scientific activity. There is little future for Islamic Thought (or for any other religious tradition) in competing with Science in that field. Nor is Religion quite so poor or weak to-day that it should try to make some isolated parts of its world-view saleable to Science.

The elimination of some of its conventional themes left Islamic Thought sufficiently intact to be identified with its moral teachings. The emergent notion of this redemptive significance of Morality seemed to be relevant to those parts of the Islamic classics in which attempts have been made to discover and utilize principles for the classification of men and for the evaluation of their character. While the judgments expressed in these classical sources have seldom been acceptable to the persons subjected to them, the interests and the methodology in which they had their origin mark an admirable feature of Islamic Thought. It occured to me that some of the most difficult problems of the Muslim community in modern times would be clarified (if not completely solved) as a result of their realignment with such characteristic interests and methodology. For instance, the realignment would induce hard thinking on the problem of human relations as exemplified by the

contact or confrontation of a very large number of groups or individuals. I analysed this variety into the following components:

i. Relations of the members of the Muslim community *inter se* (with special reference to Excommunication as a sanction within the community);

ii. Relations of the Muslim community with such groups as:—

(a) the fraternal religious communities;
(b) the men of Science;
(c) and political leaders.

I visualized that this reorientation (to human relations) would find its fulfilment in an Islamic interpretation of the philosophy of Democracy and of the ideals of the United Nations. Of all the intellectual forces which dominate the international scene to-day, I had looked upon these two as the most significant and congenial to the Muslim mind. On my showing, the ideals of the United Nations form an antithesis to the great Islamic principle that virtue can be made out of the ineradicable necessity of War or some other measures destructive of human life. I had hoped that the sweeping character of the contradiction between the Islamic conception and its antithesis would prove to be a stimulating factor rather than a paralysing influence on the Muslim mind.

As regards Democracy, it was my feeling that the difficulties and dangers with which the democratic nations are confronted at the present time would impress upon the Muslim mind the lesson of its own history—made all the more inescapable in the vivacity of repetition. Perhaps the worst part of the story of Ideals is that, at the time of the political decline of their supporters, the whole system of the categories of moral judgment with which they operated becomes an anachronism or a sham. The implications of this sad reflection were so disturbing that I turned to spread them out over more than one phase of the foreseen career of the Muslim mind. Taking my cue from the complexity of the Avicenna-Ghazālī relationship in the history of Islamic Thought, I tried to imagine how the example of the two thinkers could be followed in our own day—in an adventure that would be comparable to the debate which took place between them (in respect of the versatility of genius and the alternation of the inward and outward course of thought and feeling that may be essential to the task),

VI. Now to pass on to the problem of Islamic Thought. The 'history' of the future which has been summarized in the preceding section had in fact caused me to look back to the past as the source when a historical entity like Islamic Thought derives its analysable character and its objective forms.

It is possible to imagine that a systematic study of Islamic Thought in the foreseeable future should begin with an account of the sources ,when one can obtain the raw material for one's definition of the subject. At least two major sources of this kind must be recognized. One of them is indigenous to Islam, whereas the other is external. The former includes all those interpretations of the subject which may have made their appearance in the Muslim world from time to time. The other includes similar factors outside that area. It so happens that the Western tradition of Orientalism represents the external interpretations in the most impressive form. Now, the Muslim interpretations of the subject are likely to be a part of the substance of the subject. It would be superfluous for an investigator to give them a place in his preliminary discourse. All he can do in that part of the inquiry is to discuss Orientalism.

It is not possible to make too many generalizations about this tradition. Various factors and phases in the life of the West have determined the course of its development. However, one thing that may be said in all fairness and with reasonable certainty is that the West knows itself much better than it has been able to know Islam. In this sense, Orientalism is dwarfed into insignificance in comparison with the extra-ordinary self-knowledge that is possessed by the West. Not unaware of the contrast, Orientalism has been at pains to justify its distinctive role. In this attempt it seeks to exalt itself above the contemporary manifestations of the Western self-knowledge. (The underlying assumption here seems to be that even though an Orientalist may not be comparable with the greatest leaders of thought in the West, he is a wiser man than the contemporary specialists who uphold the cultural or academic traditions founded upon the epoch-making teachings of those leaders). Moreover, it tends to criticise the *fundamental divisionis* as a hypothesis based on insufficient data. For in essence, Orientalism is committed to the belief that the knowledge it has gathered will not only enlarge the Western outlook,, but will also enrich and

refine the spirit of the West. In so far as the spirit of the West is susceptible of refinement, Orientalism will not too readily grant the superior merit of the leaders of Western thought whose minds were powerful but whose vision was circumscribed.

In proportion to the strength and sincerity of its commitment will Orientalism succeed in explaining the Islamic phenomenon from intimate knowledge of its inner motivation. (The best preparation for the knowledge of others consists in clarifying one's attitude towards the immediate conditions of one's own character or individuality). This kind of knowledge, which does look like emerging as an acceptable object of endeavour from some of the most recent trends in Orientalism, will be eminently qualified to lend substance to a new definition of Islamic Thought.

The story of the Western reaction to Islam[10] is varied and long. The first turning-point to which it came coincided with the 'new birth' of the European nations. In the ages that followed, historical research and scholarly criticism gradually replaced the naive expression of what in essence was an emotional attitude. The next turning-point seems to have been reached in the first half of the present century—with the rise of forces which threatened the political supremacy of the West. The new phase that has opened out is sufficiently marked by freedom and insight that its spirit should henceforth develop in accordance with the demands of its own character. A number of factors point to the conclusion that this development is possible (if it may not already have begun). Orientalism is no longer in a mood to look down upon the religiosity of its Muslim audience (or to dissociate itself from that of its Christian participants). It has learnt to isolate the Islamic life as an analysable whole that may be explained by reference to its intrinsical significance or indigenous causes. This is a big step in the direction of the ultimate recognition of the Muslim world as a source of independent or even international principles of civilized behaviour. Still more remarkable is the fact that the Islamic elements in the historical personality of some of the Western nations are now recognizable—not only from the statistical point of view, but in the context of those things which involve

10. Recently studied in Norman Daniel's *Islam and the West: the Making of an Image*, Edinburgh University Press 1960.

value-judgments and give expression to the proud self-consciousness of a people.[11]

But there are limits beyond which the Western mind cannot go.[12] *Nor would it seem to be necessary that it should do so.* The important thing here to note is that the knowledge of *limits* involves comprehension of the limiting factors. An Orientalist may decide not to go beyond a point because further progress will change or debase his character. This requires a clear idea of the *alien factors* whose influences are unwelcome to him. In thinking of its limits, therefore, Orientalism explains the distinctive features of the Islamic life. This constitutes the Western definition of Islamic Thought.

VII. Let us divide the whole subject (Islamic Thought) into three parts—*reason, substance* and *meaning*. Of these, the first has been studied by the Orientalists. The second is to be derived from the Islamic classics. There remains the third. What shall we say of it? Does it not behove the modern Muslims to address themselves to it?

11. What here I have in mind is a recent interpretation of Spanish history which recognizes "dualism between consciousness and conduct" as a clue to "the permanent and universal quality of Spanish civilization". On this view, Spain differs (even in a derogatory sense) from Britain or France, in that "it has not befallen any other great civilization to live for century after century feeling all the while that the very ground under its feet was missing, and creating at the same time such first-class values". This characteristic (*Vivir desviviendose*) divides the two periods of Spanish history (before and after 711 A.D.) as the accidental and essential parts of the historical existence of the Spanish *ethos*. In the latter part, the Spanish character has received powerful influences from the Islamic civilization. Hence a Muslim like Ibn 'Arabī (1165-1240) is more akin to it than a Christian like Isidore of Seville (577-636). See *The Structure of Spanish History* by Americo Castro. Translated into English by Edmund L. King. Princeton University Press 1954. Pp. 94, 30, 69, etc.

12. Cf. Montgomery Watt (*Islam and the Integration of Society.* International Library of Sociology & Social Reconstruction, London 1961. P. 275):

> Suppose that (perhaps as the result of another world war in which all other religions were seriously weakened) Islam became the dominant religion throughout the world and that its rivals gradually faded away, could this be regarded as a satisfactory integration of world society? The answer would seem to be that it would not be completely satisfactory....

There is no reason why one should answer this question in the negative. But if the answer be in the affirmative, it will be necessary to show what justification there may be for the tertiary role to be assigned to the modern Muslims.

The justification may come from the *vital* character of their relation to Islam. The modern contributions to Islamic Thought within the Muslim world can be *meaningful* because the subject is of vital importance to the contributors.

One speaks of 'vital' interests both in the sense of their actuality and their immediacy. The former sense is to be given to the word when modern Muslims are contrasted with their predecessors in the Muslim world; the latter, when they are contrasted with contemporary Western scholars.

On this interpretation, however, it will be necessary to recognize that neither the classical Muslims nor the Western scholars can be considered as completely or absolutely devoid of vital interests (in Islam). To the former, this subject was of vital interest—even though the fact that their example is a thing of the past should have changed *meaningfulness* into *substantiality.*

In like manner, the *reasoned* contributions of the Western scholars may be *meaningful* in so far as their approach to Islam may spring from vital interests—that is to say, if it be a part of their religious experience in general.

VIII. In a systematic study of Islamic Thought, it will be necessary to arrange the facts of Islamic history so that the subject (Islamic Thought) may be seen to have had natural and consistent development. These facts are fairly well known. But the preconceptions of the Specialist or the Dogmatist have often caused them to be suppressed or distorted. The notorious example of such misrepresentations is to be found in the fact that the natural connexion between *Qrn.* and the life of the Muslim mind tends to be ignored or neutralized. To the Specialist, the origins of the Islamic 'sciences' are too complicated and far-flung to be identified with the revelation that came to Muhammad. To the Dogmatist, those 'sciences' are too complicated and earth-bound to be considered as the sequel to Revelation.

To correct all such misrepresentations, it is necessary to postulate that *Qrn.* is the principle of Islamic Thought both in the

historical and the logical sense of the term. This will involve the assumption that there is appreciable continuity between the Holy Book and the life of the Muslim mind. Such an assumption has nothing to do with the question whether in the moral life of Muslim individuals the Quranic mandate has been carried out in full, or not. All that is contained in it, on the contrary, is related to the categories of thought and judgment with which the Muslim mind operates and which it has derived from *Qrn.* The connexion does not detract from the latter's purity and transcendence. In fact, nothing can be greater tribute to *Qrn.* than that the minds of countless generations of Muslims should have returned and echo to it through the ages—not only in moments of enraptured appreciation or proudly acknowledged indebtedness, but also when a particular (Muslim) person might have chosen to take a squeamish or unfavourable view of the Holy Book or even when it might appear not even to have swum into his ken.

IX. Such, then, is the importance of the Holy Book as the starting-point of a systematic study of Islamic Thought. Possibly, the tradition of exegesis may receive a fresh impetus from the recognition of this fact. Henceforth the Commentators will have to lay stress not so much upon the verbal ingredients of the Quranic text, as upon the thought-processes which occur in it. Historically, this kind of analysis has not been entirely neglected in the Muslim world. A number of great thinkers in the past have made reasonably successful attempts to define the specific character of the Quranic arguments. For instance, Ibn Rushd identifies them as 'the Argument from Solicitude' and 'the Argument from Creativity.'[13] Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī places them under a number of heads two[14] of which do in fact come from *Qrn.* itself. These are the arguments from the Āfāq (horizons) and the Anfus (selves)[15] which locate the divine 'signs' in the two realms of objective being and subjective experience.[16] In contrast to these two interpre-

13. Dalīl al-'Ināyat and Dalīl al-Ikhtirā'. See his *Kitāb al-Kashf 'an Manāhij al-Adillah:* (p. 65 in *Falsafat Ibn Rushd* q.v. in Bib.).

14. See his commentary on the Qur'ān: *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb* (Cairo 1308 A.H.), vol. i, p. 223.

15. *Qrn.* 41 : 53.

16. *Mafātīḥ*, vol. i, pp. 220 *et al* and vol. vii, pp. 369f.

tations, Ibn Taymiyah lays stress on the actual reasoning in the *Qrn.* To him Analogy and the *a fortiori* argument represent its methods.[17] Finally, Walīy Allāh observes the essence of the Scriptural style to consist in such propositions as may be commensurate with the universal problems of the first Irtifāq.[18] To a student in modern times these interpretations have many a thing to teach. In fact, they illustrate the consistent development of the tools of analysis with which their authors operated. This may be borne out by a comparison of the terms used by Ibn Rushd and Rāzī. To the former the Quranic arguments are divisible into the cosmological and the humanistic. The idea of humanity presupposed by this division is not yet enlivened by the consciousness of the transcendental or theocentric dimensions of the human character. Apparently under the influence of Taṣawwuf, Rāzī has introduced such dimensions. To him the Quranic methods are represented by the correlation of objective being and subjective experience. With Ibn Taymiyah we notice a reversion to the problems of an argument *as such.* He tells us that *Qrn.* uses analogical reasoning in such a way that Analogy is based on the similarity of the mundane and the divine. But the idea of such similiarity contains within itself not only the indication of its own deficiency or limitation, but also the principle of extrapolation (*Tafāḍul*) in accordance with which we assert that, if a certain quality be considered as Virtue on the part of man, it must be raised to a higher degree of realization before it can be called an attribute of God.[19] Finally, Walīy Allāh reduces the Quranic methods to a generic concept that is relevant to the problems of *all* men—at a time when their life may not have developed such complexity or differentiation as would make universal propositions or sweeping generalizations inapplicable to many of its emergent forms.

17. See Chapter II *passim.*

18. See Chapter III *ad loc.* To the four names cited in the text one may add Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Ṣan'ānī (d. 840 A.H.): *Tarjīḥ Asālīb Qur'ān 'ala Asālīb* (Cairo 1349 A.H.). Reference taken from 'Alī Sāmī Nashshār: *Les Methodes Chez les Penseurs Musulmans*: Cairo 1947, p. 202 fn.

19. Conversely, it must not be lower in character or value. Cf. *Qrn.* 43 : 16 ام اتخذ مما يخلق بنات واصفاكم بالبنين،

(Or hath He taken for Himself from what He createth daughters, and honoured you with sons?).

X. In a study of the Quranic arguments as a part of the constitution of the Muslim mind, the Holy Book should be viewed in relation to three factors:

(a) contemporary humanities represented by the traditions of the Jewish and Christian communities;

(b) naturalistic elements in the criticism of the pagan Arabs on *Qrn.*[20]

(c) difference between the opponents of *Qrn.* and the opponents of some other 'message.'[21]

The many-sidedness of the Quranic arguments[22] (which have passed into the Muslim way of thinking) can be explained only by reference to these factors. For these arguments have taken shape in accordance with the demands of the rival forces of the *humanities* and *naturalism.* Sometimes the conflict of these forces does lead to a higher synthesis; sometimes it is resolved in a manner comparable to the rebuttal of a dilemma. In general, the manner in which it entered into Islam has been distinctive. Actually, the point at which it came to do so falls somewhere in the middle of the line traversed by the development of its logical principle. The opponents of the Prophet of Islam were either humanists or naturalists. With the former, the humanities had been inveigled into rigid and parochial or even pseudo-scientific notions about their own character. With the latter, naturalism tended to degenerate

20. "They say, *It is only our life in this world, we die and we live, and naught destroys us but time (Dahr)*": *Qrn.* 45 : 23. Cf. Watt (*Islam and the Integration of Society: op. cit.*) on this verse (by index).

21. E.g., the Christian gospel. According to St. Paul (*Corinth.* i, 33), this was a 'folly' to the Greeks *and* a 'stumbling-block' to the Jews. On the contrary, *Qrn.* was too plain or unadorned to the humanists ("What is there to this messenger who eats food and goes about the market-places? Why has not an angel been sent down to him to be with him as a warner"? *Qrn.* 25 : 8), *but* not plain or probable enough to the naturalists.

22. Which have been identified (50 : 8) as a pointer and a reminder: تبصرة و ذكرى لكل عبد منيب . While in this particular instance the types of persons to whom the Quranic arguments have been addressed are not differentiated in explicit terms, Muslim writers (in Arabic) have generally thought of the recipients of a pointer as the Beginners, and of those of a reminder as the Accomplished. Cf. 'Abd al-Raḥim 'Irāqī, *Tabṣirat al-Mubtadī wa Tadhkirat al-Muntahī* (see GAL, G.i. 359).

into bald common sense and undisguised malignity. The peculiar disposition of these two classes of men seems to have conspired with some other (external) factors to tilt the balance in favour of a new (Islamic) type of humanities that would represent the Islamic method of resolving their conflict. By the time this new factor did in fact emerge, Quranism had been overtaken and outdistanced by the 'science' of Ḥadīth as the vehicle or the embodiment of the essence of the Islamic culture.

It is, therefore, possible to analyse the conceptual ingredients of *Qrn.* from two different points of view. In the first place, the Holy Book may be the starting-point for a review on Islamic history with special reference to the vicissitudes of the 'science' of Qur'ān-exegesis. Secondly, a reviewer may relate the Book itself to the general course or the concrete totality of the subordinate (intellectual) history of the Muslim community.

XI. In the final analysis, it is but a question of emphasis whether one or the other of the two modes (in which the Quranic arguments can be represented) should be the source of the positive contents of Islamic Thought. In any case, the subject ought to be sufficiently broad-based to transcend the limitations of the particular Islamic 'sciences.' To that end, the following facts of Islamic history can be included in its scope:

(a) the emergence of the Islamic humanities;
(b) the new conflict between *naturalism* and the (Islamic) humanities;
(c) I'tizāl;
(d) Ash'arianism;
(e) Taṣawwuf;
(f) Avicennianism;
(g) Ghazālī;
(h) Historicism;
    1. Ibn Rushd
    2. Ibn Taymiyah
    3. Ibn Khaldūn
    4. Shāh Walīy Allāh Dihlawī
(i) Westernization;
(j) New Meanings.[23]

23. See Appendix I.

XII. The foregoing sketch of the problems of Islamic Thought will be amply rewarded in any criticism the reader may consider it worth his while to make on it. Its deficiencies may appear to be many. Without having any inclination to minimize them, I would submit that some of them are relative. For instance, the various divisions of my subject confuse logical analysis and historical periodization. The reduced image of the subject thus presented in miniature is not the proper thing to have in an outline. This could be avoided if I were to capitalize my points. But that method would involve the total loss of clarity (if not indeed of meanings). Again, it has been my endeavour to proceed from familiar things to those which are not so well known. The facts or personalities I have taken into consideration stand in the broad day-light of (Islamic) history. This does not mean that no other things or persons could be admitted. But if they were to be brought in, unnecessary complications would arise. In keeping them out of view, however, I have been guided by a feeling that, if and when the omission is to be supplied, the additional material can be collected round the nucleus of the names or instances I have actually given.

It may be relevant to ask an interpreter of Islamic Thought: How should one conceive of the nature and function of this tradition? This question calls for a definition that can be given only in terms of a synthesis of *ideality* and actual *facts*. (Used disjunctively, these two things can be extremely unreliable. Ibn Sīnā and the Ṣūfīs, who thought idealistically, arrived at some overarching concepts or subjective interpretations which tended to defeat their own purpose. On the other hand, the innumerable repertories of facts which pass for a definition of the subject can at their best serve only some pedagogical purposes. If they succeed in avoiding value-judgments, they are likely to remain invertebrate; if the latter somehow find their way into them, their objectivity is liable to disintegration or perversion). Once the two elements have been brought together, they may receive varying emphasis in accordance with a person's specific interests and aptitudes. Hence Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyah, both of whom combine *ideality* and *facts*, can be distinguished from each other by reference to such variations. One of them is a greater philosopher; whereas the other has a more highly developed historical sense. To the former, Islamic Thought is more aptly definable in terms

of an Ideal (which in so far as it is hard to realize or even to think out constitutes a Problem)—viz. Tauḥīd. To the latter, on the contrary, the principle of definition is represented by a certain disposition which is to be inherited from the 'virtuous predecessors', and which expresses itself in some characteristic ways. In other words, Ghazālī defines Islamic Thought by reference to a specified *problem;* whereas Ibn Taymiyah thinks of it as a *characteristic* mode of activity which may be brought to bear upon *any* problem that may arise.

This duality arises out of the nature of the case. The directions taken by our two thinkers have, therefore, been followed by all other persons who addressed themselves to the same question in later times. In the Muslim world, the later exponents of Islamic Thought did not only follow these directions, but they also subscribed (*mutatis mutandis*) to the substance of the Ghazalian or the Taymiyan interpretation. However, the Western scholars to whom Islamic Thought presented a problem had greater success in analysing the implications of the two typical ways of looking at the subject. The immediate circumstances of their life, and the genius of the cultural traditions which moulded their minds, gave them valuable insights into the nature of Islamic Thought, and made it possible for them to express those insights in a form that surpassed all other forms ever used by the nations of the world in their communication with each other across enormous chasms on the physical plane or in the life of the mind and the heart. As a rule, these insights of the Western mind have been accompanied (if not determined) by its awareness of vast differences between Islamic Thought and its own activity through the ages.

XIII. A few illustrations will not be out of place even within the limited scope of the present discussion. In his *Philosophy of History*,[24] Hegel devotes a short section to Islam in which he explains the spiritual basis of Islamic life as a part of the 'Revolution of the East' which pitted itself against the Western trend towards 'particularity'—so that the processes of universal history should not be confined to narrow and one-sided channels. But

24. Translated by J. Sibree and with an introduction by C. J. Friedrich. Dover Publications, New York 1956, pp. 355-60.

the Islamic phenomenon is distinguishable from the pure Negation and the consequent 'enslavement of Spirit to the world of realities' which characterize the religions of the non-Semitic Orient or the Monastic way of life. For the energy of the soul that is released by the Islamic faith does go forth into the historical *process*, shaping its course decisively and cataclysmically.

As a Semitic religion Islam is found comparable to Judaism which apprehended the principle of divine Unity through an act of veridical or positive Knowledge. But Judaism had assigned a limited role to the divine Being, which was redefined by Islam in universal terms. In so doing, the Islamic faith relapsed into Negation.

The relationship thus recognized to subsist between the two great religions explains the analogical inference from the tremendous influence of Monotheism upon the Jewish character to a similar correlation of the Islamic faith and the Muslim character. According to Hegel, therefore, the Muslim believes in the Unconditioned (*Verhältnisslose*) as the condition (*Verhältniss*) of existence. He is devoted to this One so single-mindedly that everything that can be predicated of the object of his veneration ceases to be meaningful or even real to him. Historically, it was the Muslims' mission to establish the worship of this One. The mission met with phenomenal success; and it has left an indelible impress upon the Muslim character.

> "In its spread Mahometanism founded many kingdoms and dynasties. On this boundless sea there is a continual onward march; nothing abides firm. Whatever curls up into a form remains all the while transparent, and in that very instant glides away. Those dynasties were destitute of the bond of an organic firmness: the kingdoms, therefore, did nothing but degenerate; the individuals that composed them simply vanished. Where, however, a noble soul makes itself prominent—like a billow in the surging of the sea—it manifests itself in a majesty of freedom, such that nothing more noble, more generous, more valiant, more devoted was ever witnessed. The particular determinate object which the individual embraces is grasped by him entirely—with the whole soul. While Europeans are involved in a multitude of relations... in Mahometanism the individual is *one* passion and that *alone*; he is superlatively cruel, cunning, bold, or generous... The ruler who loves the slave, glorifies the object of

his love by laying at his feet all his magnificence, power and honour—forgetting sceptre and throne for him; but on the other hand he will sacrifice him just as recklessly." (*Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*)

For a variety of reasons it was necessary to dwell upon this great interpretation of Islam at considerable length. Hegel's analysis penetrates to some of the inner-most recesses of Islamic Thought. It is amazing to see that Muslim authors and thinkers have taken very little (if any) notice of it.[25] As far as the Westerners are concerned, they evidently have been profoundly influenced by this (as also by any other) part of Hegel's philosophy of History. But references or acknowledgements are few and far between. Even so, some of the post-Hegelians have been successful in restating the points made by Hegel, the performance having been made possible for them by their incomparably richer knowledge of Islamic life and history. For instance, the author of the exquisite work on Spanish history (*The Structure of Spanish History*) which has been noticed elsewhere in this introduction, seems to have tested and verified the Hegelian viewpoint in the light of his own very acute analysis of the Islamic influences upon Spain. Castro has expressed himself in an artistic form that makes any plain representation of his ideas well-nigh impossible. With this reservation, the points made by him can be summarized as follows:

God, man and the universe are the three problems of Islamic Thought as they are also problems for any other intellectual or spiritual tradition. Unlike many others, however, Islam has not kept them apart from each other, but has brought them together in a harmony that is spiritual in so far as God is believed to uphold or sustain it—i.e., the *spiritus spirituans* acting on the *spiritus spirituatus*.[26] By so doing, Islam explains away all reality or value that may be attributed to the world or humanity in its own right.

25. This does not mean that they have been unaware of Hegel's philosophy in general. Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, for one, refers to Hegelianism very often in a sarcastic but not inappreciative vein. He compares the flow of objectively unverifiable ideas in Hegel's mind to eggs laid parthenogenetically.

26. Castro's paraphrase on the formula '*natura naturans, natura naturata*' which had been used by Spinoza.

> "Islamic man and everything that exists for him are a continual endeavour in which the fingers of his creator are never still. His being and his truth cannot be fulfilled save at the moment of becoming one again in his point of origin, when man returns from the temporal to the eternal. Only the Greek, among the ancients, and his heir, the European rationalist, have believed it possible to make of man an absolute reality." (p. 594).

Consequently, eschatology in Islam serves the purpose of a 'bridge' between two worlds which are divine *in like manner.* In this respect, Islam is opposed to the Christian notion of 'original sin' which looks forward to an "ascension to God from the finiteness or wretchedness of the world of sensation" (p. 333). Whereas the Christian thinks of ultimate Happiness in terms of 'repose' or freedom from all contradictions and imperfections, the Muslim visualizes the same thing as the reconstruction of his mundane existence under the aspect of eternity. From the negation of a break or *hiatus* between the two worlds arises the Islamic conception of Reality as "the continuous heart-beat of divine creation" (p. 246) which makes itself audible in all that exists, and which requires that its observer should have proportionately large and keen mental powers. The Muslim mind, therefore, gathers impressions from all kinds of things—sacred or profane, personal or objective, spiritual or temporal. The variegated mass is then transmuted into intense and vivid consciousness which finds expression in highly specialized forms of communication and discourse.[27]

Technically, neither Hegel nor Castro can be said to belong to the circle of Orientalism. To each the Islamic phenomenon is subordinate to his major interests which lie in some other field.

27. Which may be employed in order to create "realities with 'open' or unfinished or extensible lines, figures that may resemble a flower or an animal but which do not imitate them after the Western notion of verisimilitude; or one may draw in the open and undefined manner of the arabesque, or one may fashion the indefinitely reiterated columns of the Mosque of Cordova, or one may tell the 'story that never ends' of the *Thousand and One Nights,* or one may write the book that always goes back to its beginning like the Archpriest of Hita's *Libro de Buen Amor*" (p. 335). Also see pp. 256, 293, 331, 333-37, 350, 434-35, 572, 601 (*op. cit.*).

It is for this reason that each can speak (and has spoken) of Islam in definitive fashion. Once due notice has been taken of this important but comparatively remote subject, the speaker feels himself at liberty to turn his back upon it. Such an attitude cannot be maintained by the professional Orientalists who choose to make a career or even personal history out of the varying aspects under which the Islamic phenomenon presents itself to them from time to time. Disciplined study of the subject in its ramifications, and wisely cultivated relations with Muslim individuals in various parts of the world, have led them to avoid over-emphasis and definitive characterization. This seems more especially to be true of the (contemporary) Orientalists in the English-speaking world. In that particular *habitat,* Orientalism has had a number of advantages. The international status of the English language helps it in its contacts with the Muslim world. The historical continuity of the British empire with some vestiges of its Islamic counterpart has made demands, and offered facilities, for the Orientalists' doubly interpretative or mediatory role. The prevalent political philosophy of the English-speaking world provides a suitable forum for the appraisal of the achievements of a society to which Law and other practical problems were of the utmost importance.[28] Against this background one can understand why the English-speaking Orientalists should have found in Islamics a vehicle for the expression of their intellectual outlook or their moral personality as a whole. It will, therefore, be unfair to think that the picture of Islamic Thought such a group may have formed in its mind should be represented by isolated or preliminary sketches produced by it in partial fulfilment of what it has in mind.

With this reservation, we can turn to a few writings in which some of the most eminent Orientalists (in the English-speaking world) have spoken of Islamic Thought. In his *Studies on the Civilization of Islam,*[29] Professor H. A. R. Gibb investigates the subject in a number of articles "drawn from a wide variety of publications over a span of nearly four decades" (p. v). Some

28. Those who believe in the symbolic authority of the British monarch (in relation to most of the Commonwealth countries) can be expected to bring some special insights to bear upon the problem of Caliphate in Islam.

29. Ed. by Stanford J. Shaw *et al.* Routledge, London 1962.

of the points made in these articles[30] provide a definition of Islamic Thought in explicit terms or direct fashion; in some other cases, the author's analysis of some historical factors mediates the components of a possible definition. To begin with, it is not his intention *a priori* to establish an irreconcilable opposition between Islam and any other civilization. But he is convinced that "the rhythms of Islamic history are curiously inverse to those of European history" (p. 3). This involves the recognition of functional differences—as set over against the essential. One of these turns on the interplay of religious intuition and theological reason which is a part of the universal experience of mankind, but which makes its appearance in the Muslim world with characteristic pertinacity and far-reaching effects on the Muslim mind. Throughout its history, the counterpoise to Islamic theology has been represented by the "irrationality of simple animism"[31] which can be distinguished from the "skepticism and refined infidelities of a self-confident reason that confronted Christianity" (p. 185). In this sense, the *Qrn.* prefigures the entire career of Islamic Thought, for its problems and attitudes have been reenacted in the latter. Now, the Holy Book solves the religious problem in a process that consists of two steps. The first raises the mind far above the 'irrationality of simple animism' into the universality and transcendentalism of Tauḥīd. On the second step, the elevated mind turns back to scan the heights to which it has attained or the distance it has traversed. In order to maintain its elevation, it builds a "scaffolding of congruent ideas and attitudes" (p. 190) so that its ascent may not leave it completely uprooted and unable to support its own weight. This stabilizing operation involves the reinstatement of some elements of animism which had to be rejected *in toto* in the first instance, but which can now be sublimated in part.[32]

30. Which deserve to be studied with infinitely greater attention and respect than it has been possible for me so far to devote to them.

31. Which (on Professor Gibb's interpretation) creates the symbols eventually used (in disjunction with their primitive significance) in higher forms of religious intuition:

32. In a beautiful illustration, Professor Gibb traces the sublimation of animistic Fear, through Awe, into Reverence which he identifies with Taqwa, and which he thinks must include a sense of the goodness of God, and a sense of personal relation to Him (p. 190).

What is the *nexus* for a comparison between the Quranic methods and those of Islamic Thought in general? In Logic such an element could be provided by a common concept or the 'middle term.' In Islam, on the contrary, it is the personality of the Prophet. Making use of the antithesis of these (logical and 'vital') mediatory factors, Professor Gibb finds it characteristic of Islamic Thought that "the personal relationships of admiration and love which he (Muhammad) inspired in his associates have echoed down the centuries, thanks to the instruments which the community created in order to evoke them afresh in each generation" (p. 194).

Many other points made by Professor Gibb are corollaries of his interpretation of this 'vital' element. He has laid stress on the power of linguistic artistry over the Muslim mind. He has noted the concrete framework of reference ('This particular action in these particular circumstances is good') in which a moral judgment is expressed Islamically. While he has been impressed by the Aristotelian tradition which exercised a powerful influence on Islamic theology (and wherein he recognizes the solid core of the Islamic as well as the Western ways of looking at the nature of things), he thinks that the metaphysical basis of Aristotelianism had to be modified and readapted to the main currents of Islamic Thought which moved in some other channels. Evidently, all these things lend themselves to interpretation in terms of the persistent influence of the Muslim vision of Muhammad's personality. In fact, Professor Gibb hints at the possibility of tracing the workings of that influence right into the ebb and flow of the historical process (in Islam).[33]

33. For instance, he suggests that the first of the two 'waves' of Islamic expansion is marked either by the mutual adaptability of indigenous and foreign elements of animism, or by the former's prevalence over the latter. Obviously, this proves the adequacy and success of the Prophetic principle of indoctrination. Again, Professor Gibb hints at some deeper meaning behind the fact that "orthodoxy from the first stressed the 'collectivity' as against the individual"; whereas "it is a tempting conclusion that it was the other currents of intellectual activity, outside the orthodox institution, which were mainly responsible for the appearance and activity of those individuals whose personal contributions swelled the total of achievements of medieval Islamic culture, even when they were themselves orthodox" (p. 18). Of these determinations, the first gives evidence of the influence of the Prophetic principle in direct fashion; whereas the other can yield a working hypothesis with regard to it.

Lastly, the author finds a clue to the nature of Islamic Thought in the development of the notion of Sainthood. The ascetical qualities which as a rule are attributed to a Saint do *not* presuppose that Knowledge leads to perfection, or that human beings possess worth in themselves. It is by virtue of the negative implications that the problem of Sainthood is relevant not only to Taṣawwuf[34] but also to Theology and Jurisprudence (in Islam).[35]

Our illustrations have been taken from some great thinkers and authors whose interpretation of Islam stems from the conception they hold of their own (Western) life and mind. To attempt an exposition of that background would be a formidable task. In general, however, it can be noted that the Western interpreters of Islam do not mean one and the same thing when they speak or think of the West. As a pioneer in the field, Hegel identifies the West in terms of the consummation of the process through which absolute reason unfolds itself in history. Geographically, the West would seem to coincide with Europe in his view. The Spanish author whom we have cited interposes himself between Islam and the West. By the former term he understands something that has its geographical basis in almost all those countries which use (or have used) Arabic as the language of culture—except Iran which he considers as *sui generis*. On the other hand, the West signifies to him those European (and American) countries where the Greek heritage of rationalism has been the dominant cultural force. Between these two poles he places his own country (or the Spain that has existed since 711 A.D.) as an example of how Christianity changes the tension wrought by Attraction and Repulsion into the principle of a people's character. In the main, the Spaniard's division (of the European and American countries) seems to be acceptable to the eminent leader of Orientalism in the English-speaking countries—save in so far as Christianity becomes an active force and a principle of harmony in the West as conceived by the latter.

We can now refer to two other Orientalists (in the English-speaking world) with whom the idea of the West receives further

34. For which Professor Gibb finds the nearest parallel in the history of Western painting (p. 211).

35. In addition to the pages cited above, see pp. 16f., 179, 182, 186, 193-97, 200, 203f., 207f. (*op. cit.*)

elaboration.[36] (a) In Dr. Watt's book (*Islam and the Integration of Society*) which has been noticed in an earlier part of this introduction, the geographical significance of the term (West) has been relegated to the background. On the other hand, the author lays stress on *materialism* as a conspicuous feature of Western life that is likely to be imitated by all other sections of humanity. In this sense, he considers Westernization as a threat to the none too fresh and vigorous spirituality of the Muslim society. It is his conviction that Christianity constitutes a bulwark against Western *materialism*. In so far as the Muslim society has been effectively insulated from Christian influences in the past, it makes him despondent to feel that the former lies in the path of an *avalanche*—without adequate means of protection at its disposal, and without a will to take them from some other source when they are offered to it.

The Watt thesis is notable for a number of reasons. Apart from telling the Muslim world (after the manner of many of its own Occidentalists) that there is *materialism* in the West but that there also are some Westerners who are alive to the danger,[37] it enters a *caveat* against the picture of the West that emerges from Castro's or Gibb's interpretation. As against the former; Watt rejects the implicit depreciation of the role of Christianity in the West; in contrast to the latter, he introduces it (Christianity) as a disruptive force.

(b) In Professor W. C. Smith's Islam in *Modern History*[38] (as indeed in his literary activity and academic role in general), the concept of the Western civilization is free of the opprobrium that would attach to it in the eyes of an author like Dr. Watt. To him the West[39] is vast and dynamic enough to harbour within itself

36. Our remarks will have to be brief and generalized—from considerations of the economy of space in the case of one of them; and from the restraint that is imposed by sentiments arising out of personal relations, in that of the other.

37. The coincidence parenthesized above does not extend to this part of the statement.

38. Paperbound edition. The New American Library, New York, 1959.

39. Whereof he thinks with reference to the genuine and active forms of 'modernity' the world over.

such diverse or even contradictory things as Hellenistic rationalism and Spanish mysticism, or Democracy and Communism.

This concept forms a part of an extended effort whereby Professor Smith seeks to reopen the bulk of the conceptual framework of Orientalism to criticism and revaluation. For such an effort the motivation has been provided by a number of intellectual interests.[40] Of some other revaluations thus attempted, one is related to the terms of a comparison between Islam and Christianity;[41] another, to the significance of the plurality of words for God in different languages; and a third, to the role that may be assigned to the followers of a religion as interpreters of what it stands for.

As far as Islamic Thought is concerned, Professor Smith argues that it has found concentrated expression in the idea of History that may be attributed to the Muslim mind. On his showing, such an idea is very different from the way in which the Marxist, the Christian or the Hindu looks (or hesitates or fails to look) for the meaning of History. Theocentric in character, it conceives of the Hereafter as the sequel to mundane existence in which the record of that existence will be matched with suitable Punishment or Reward. In this sense, History is 'decisive' but not 'final' to a Muslim. However, as long as the world goes, he believes in the possibility of the realization of Righteousness—through the fulfilment of his individuality by means of his participation in the

40. Some of these are:
   (a) application of the principles of Comparative Religion to particular religions (Islam and Christianity);
   (b) interpretation of History with special reference to the ideologies and cultural forces confronted with each other in the world today;
   (c) Mysticism (eastern and western);
   (d) and the problem of intercultural communication.

41. See pp. 25-26 fn. (*op. cit.*):—
   We suggest that much more insight is gained if one realizes that the role of St. Paul in Christianity and that of Muhammad in Islam are much more closely comparable. ... If one is drawing parallels in terms of the structure of the two religions, what corresponds in the Christian scheme to the Qur'ān is not the Bible but the person of Christ...And what corresponds in the Islamic scheme to the Bible...is the Tradition (ḥadīth)...To look for historical criticism of the Qur'ān is rather like looking for a psychoanalysis of Jesus.

life of the (Muslim) community which is governed by institutions inherited from the tradition of Prophecy.[42]

XV. I have been inclined to hold that the Western interpretations fall into the two categories (*questions* and *methods*) which had been foreshadowed in the writings of Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyah. Maybe, this relationship will appear to be insignificant or unconvincing. One may clinch the issue by saying that Islamic Thought cannot be established as an independent subject unless in principle such a relationship be taken for granted.

The newly established subject (Islamic Thought) will call for the revision of traditional historiography. As far as Muslims are concerned, it is possible to imagine that their response to this call will extend over a whole series of steps which may be differentiated as follows:

(a) the co-ordination of Islamic and Western interpretations in order to determine the problems of Islamic Thought in terms of elements common to them.

(b) the elimination of the genetical factor or the personal equation so that the 'problems' may be seen to fall into a complete logical *conspectus*.

(c) the *initial* cultivation of the subject as a substitute for scientific and philosophical activity—i.e., activity directed towards 'pure' Knowledge.

(d) in the event of the organization of scientific and philosophical activity in the Muslim world, the redesignation of Islamic Thought as a parallel force above or behind or against the former activity—viz., as a humanizing influence upon it.

(e) the reorientation of this 'parallel force' towards 'typical books' like the ones described in this work, so that their problems and attitudes should become its own.

(f) and the hope or the fear that the success or the failure of the Muslim mind (to regain such a deep and uninhibited insight into the true significance of Islamic Thought) will cause it to *stand* or *fall* in the years or decades or centuries that lie ahead.

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42. See Chapter I (pp. 11-47), *op. cit.*

Chapter I

GHAZĀLĪ

Tahāfut al-Falāsifah

Ghazālī's critique of Philosophy inaugurated a new era in the history of Islamic Thought. The main features of the change he had brought about are reflected in his own experience over the succeeding years. Like all great books, TF seems to have left its author eager and prepared to re-examine it—so that the questions or propositions to which the demands of consistency or the sheer force of his argument might have led him could be assimilated as a part of the settled habit of his mind. When it came, the re-examination proved to be drastic. What Ghazālī had denied reappeared as his own way of looking at things. What he had taken for granted now presented itself as a problem to him. In general, his revaluation of the book can be identified with what he chose to call 'the revival of the sciences of Religion.' His conception of such a thing stands out as one of the greatest attempts ever made to define the nature and scope of Islamic Thought. In the light of this achievement, TF takes on new significance and interest—as a prelude to IUD. Before we come to this aspect of the book, let us see what it is about.

TF is a critical book, a refutation. As such, its contents cannot be summarized to represent the author's own teachings. In fact, Ghazālī reminds us ever so often that he is not going to *affirm* (what he considers to be) the Truth. But this does not mean that he fails to recognize an important condition of *criticism*—namely, that when an objection is taken, the objector defines his own attitude in stating it (Etf. 53). From this point of view one might collect a large number of such assertions as would represent Ghazālī's own position and might even serve as a convenient summary of TF. From such a summary it will be seen that Ghazālī's own assertions[1] fall into coherent pattern that can be treated as the solid core of his philosophy in general. What he

1. See Appendix II.

seeks to prove in TF is that the 'Muslim philosophers', who had confronted Islam with their own formulation of Peripatetic thought and neo-Platonism, had gone astray. TF elaborates this point in the form of an ethico-religious classification of all men:—

The People of Truth (Etf. 89) form the first of the four groups into which Ghazālī divides all men. These have reconciled the demands of Reason and Revelation neither of which could or should have been abandoned. They believe that Reason has a twofold function. (a) It extends the data of the Imagination to transcendental things. For instance, it lends credence to the imaginative apprehension of the possibility of infinite extension in space and time. (b) In its more proper function, however, Reason rises above its dependence upon Imagination—to deduce from the nature of things (as it were) the impossibility of infinite extension in space or in time (pp. 41f.). From this fact the People of Truth derive support for their faith in Revelation. The teachings of the Prophets, whose truth is primarily a postulate of the moral consciousness, therefore, form an intelligible rational doctrine in the domain of metaphysics (as well). This is how the temporal origin of the world is 'proved.' Once accepted, the idea of creation leads to the conclusion that Knowledge (of the created things in their infinite particularity) and Power (to vary the modalities of creation or to determine its limits) must be attributed to the Creator. In fine, therefore, this position satisfies the demands of Reason as it also bids fair to promote the best interests of mankind.

To the People of Truth are opposed the Materialists whom Ghazālī recognizes to have as consistent and intelligible views as do their opponents—except that an inquiry into the fundamental principles of Materialism would ultimately refute it (pp. 140, 89).

In the third place, there are the over-zealous Supporters of the Faith (p. 7). They call into question some indisputable facts in order to vindicate their own Faith (which, however, they are unable to express in cogent terms).

Finally, the fourth group consists of the philosophizing Muslims whose inconsistencies (sing. *tahāfut*) Ghazālī seeks to expose in TF. He charges them with inconsistency, for they believe in an 'agent' who acts by necessity and in an effect that co-exists with its cause from eternity to eternity. Further, he points out the

contradiction involved in their idea of a knowledge that forms the simple essence of the Knower but which reaches down to the minutest particulars. In fine, he finds fault even with their belief in God for whom (according to them) the necessity of the causal phenomena has left not very much to do. In view of all these contradictions Ghazālī believes that the philosophizing Muslims are hypocrites and impostors who seek to find favour with Muslims by means of their lip-service to ideas the latter hold in esteem (p. 73).

Ghazālī's critics hold diverse views on the merits of TF. In his TT (p. 587 *et passim*) Ibn Rushd says that Ghazālī has over-acted his part, both by attacking those things with which Philosophy does not stand or fall, and by rejecting those to which Religion is indifferent. He does admit that much of Ghazālī's criticism applies to Ibn Sīnā and his followers—in so far as these thinkers might have failed to represent philosophical thought faithfully. But he believes that, given an insight of a superior order and an opportunity to pursue philosophical knowledge at a judicious distance from the sphere of popular interests, the distortion of the philosophical truth (by some thinkers who erred on the side of the excess of originality) can be rectified. On the fundamental question whether it is desirable to explain religious truth in philosophical terms, Ibn Rushd is of the opinion that it is absolutely imperative to do so, but that care should be taken to make the conclusions thus reached not too easily accessible to the masses of men.[2] In his revaluation of the theory of the intermediary Intelligences, Ibn Rushd rises to the height of impassioned eloquence in his defence of even the Avicennians whom Ghazālī had attacked, but who (according to Ibn Rushd) were actuated by a deeper veneration for the divine things than the theologians (Mutakallimīn) could experience (TT 207-234).

2. Cf. the following passage in his *Kitāb al-Kashf 'an Manāhij al-Adillah* (p. 85 in *Falsafat Ibn Rushd*, Cairo 1354/1935):—

That which it is desirable for the masses to know...is only what the Shar' has explicitly stated. For instance, on the question of the divine Attributes, all the masses can do is to recognize their existence — without analysing the problem... For it is not possible that analysis should lead them to any certainty on such questions. And here by the 'masses' I mean all those who have not concerned themselves with the art of Demonstration (Burhān)—regardless of whether the art of Kalām may nevertheless have been acquired by them, or not.

Quite different from Ibn Rushd is Ibn Taymiyah who would class Ghazālī himself with the philosophers attacked in TF. He believes that, although Ghazālī made a remarkable effort to get rid of the influence of Philosophy, that influence proved in fact to be far too deep and powerful for him to shake off. Later on in this work, we shall have an occasion for a more detailed consideration of Ibn Taymiyah's views.

The fact that TF has elicited equally unfavourable criticism from different sources is a challenge for the modern Muslims to concentrate on the importance of this work as a contribution to philosophical thought. In fact, it is not unusual for Muslim writers in our day to draw a comparison between Ghazālī and some Western philosophers.[3] For instance, his exposition of the subjective elements involved in the idea of the cause and effect is compared with Hume's conception of Causality. Or his scepticism in the beginning of his quest after the truth is compared with the Cartesian *methods* or with the problems that were experienced by St. Augustine. Or the distinction he has to make between the beginninglessness and the everlasting existence of the world is compared with Kant's distinction between the two instances of *regressus* to 'conditions' from that which is noumenally conditioned and that which is phenomenally so. These comparisons may be helpful if the terms of the comparison are kept in view, and if the whole thing is not intended to serve the purpose of a mere tribute to the philosopher(s) concerned.

Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn

At the end of the first Problem in TF, Ghazālī says that he would supplement his criticism of the Philosophers by a positive statement of 'the principles of Belief'. His critics have found it difficult to identify this supplementary work. Actually, one of the books of IUD itself (Quarter I: book 2) has the words 'the principles of Belief' for its title. Apparently, therefore, this is what Ghazālī referred to in TF. But the difficulty is that this book is not as ambitious a work as the TF reference would make us assume it to be. That is why the choice of some writers[4] fell

3. For instance, see pp. 229 *et passim* in Sulayman Dunya's edition of TF.
4. E.g. Dr. Simon Van den Bergh in his translation of TT (*op. cit.*): i, 68 & ii, 53.

on Ghazālī's *Kitāb al-Iqtiṣād fī al-I'tiqād* which answers in some sense to the description given in TF, but which bears a different name.

Just as the question of the exact significance of the TF reference remains problematical, so does the general issue of the affirmative and negative aspects of Ghazālī's thought as a whole call for a careful study. In IUD this problem has come to a head.[5] Although on a superficial view one might consider TF and IUD to be related to each other as Antithesis (philosophical scepticism) is related to Synthesis (theological or Mystical conviction or involvement), it would appear on closer examination that the two books can be contrasted neither as Denial to Affirmation nor as Philosophy to Mysticism.

In what follows, therefore, we propose to compare the two books rather than contrast them. Possibly, the considerations we may have to urge will lead to the conclusion that, after all, these

5. The following passage gives forceful expression to Ibn Rushd's views on Ghazālī's work :—

> Ghazālī was unjust to Shar' and to Philosophy, although his intentions might have been good. That they were good is shown by the fact that he sought through his writings to increase the number of the People of Knowledge. What in fact he has done, however, is to increase Disorder — without there being any increase of the number of the People of Knowledge. As a result of his activity, some people have denounced Philosophy, some have denounced the Sharī'ah, and some have tried to reconcile the two. Conceivably, the last thing may have been one of the purposes he had in mind at the time of writing his books. That (with this purpose in mind) he aimed at arousing the minds is proved by the fact that in his books he has not bound himself to any one of the traditions or schools. With the Ashā'irah he is an Ash'arī; with the Ṣūfiyah, a Ṣūfī; and with the Philosophers, a philosopher....
>
> It is necessary for the leaders of Muslims not to let any one but the People of Knowledge acquaint themselves with those books of Ghazālī which tend towards Ta'wīl or Interpretation through rhetorical or dialectical methods, and which do so in some other context than that of Burhān or rational demonstration. The necessity for such a step to be taken by them is as great as the necessity for books of rational demonstration to be withheld from those who are not qualified for them —although the harm that may result from the books of rational demonstration is less severe. (*Faṣl al-Maqāl*, pp. 26f. in *Falsafat Ibn Rushd*, *op. cit.*).

The point we are going to make is that Ibn Rushd's description of Ghazālī's work in general provides an excellent description of the IUD in particular.

two books can be contrasted to each other not as Antithesis (TF) to Synthesis (IUD) but *vice versa*. Before we come to the comparison, however, we must permit ourselves to consider some general characteristics of Ghazālī's work and his personality. To begin with, Ghazālī is one of those Muslims to whom the greatest test and (eventually) the supreme proof of their (loyalty to) Islam consists in their bold repudiation of false gods. What is thus rejected can be distinguished in terms of those objects or principles or institutions or ideals which claim to have become self-explanatory and self-justifying or even sacred by virtue of their time-honoured career. The spirit that reveals itself in the iconoclasm of these Muslims represents the legacy of Abraham to the Muslim community. According to *Qrn.* (6: 75 ff.), God granted Abraham an insight into the 'Kingdom of the Heavens and the Earth' when he had learnt not to love those things (Āfilīn) which decline even as one's fond gaze or worshipful thoughts turn towards them. In Abraham's case, the Āfilīn were not only the sun and the moon and the stars but also such immaterial things as the laws of parental affection (*Qrn.* 38: 101 ff.). In the case of the Prophet of Islam, on the other hand, the Āfilīn were the beliefs and the institutions of such respectable religions as Judaism and Christianity, and the joys and the blessings of quiet meditation and peaceful evangelism. Both these prophets (whose activity and aspirations provide the definitory formula of Islam as a critique of things which tend to claim our loyalty in their own name) made a strenuous and deliberate effort to outgrow their interest in the Āfilīn so that their minds and hearts could be more free and pure to know and accept truer manifestations of God's will.

This critical or negative aspect of Islamic Thought possesses significance and value in direct proportion to the importance of those things against which it may be directed. Its character and its persuasive force must be determined by reference to the inner discipline or the sense of responsibility that informs it. For without inner discipline and responsibility, all criticism remains blind.

Few indeed are those in the Muslim world who thought of Islam as a *criticism* and of themselves as critics or Witnesses,[6] and

6. Shuhadā' 'ala al-Nās (*Qrn.* 2 : 143): "Thus We have appointed you a middle nation, that ye may be witnesses against mankind, and that the messenger (Muḥammad) may be a witness against you".

whose criticism might consequently have proved to be informed with inner discipline and responsibility. One might refer here to two historical instances in which some sections of the Muslim community did make a real (although partially successful) attempt to treat Islam as a critique. One of them is drawn from the history of the Khawārij; the other, from some recurring attitudes which in their most cogent form are associated with the People of Sunnah.

The Khawārij had reaffirmed the greatest Islamic principle when they said that 'authority belongs to God alone.' That in form their assertion did represent the Islamic teachings is borne out by what their opponent, 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, had to say of it ("A just thing, used to promote the ends of injustice!").[7] But these people imagined that by their affirmation of God's sole authority they had done Him a favour.[8] Their attitude can be described in the form of the following argument:—

1. The methods used by 'Alī did not represent divine authority.
2. God's authority is the only true authority.
3. Therefore, the Khārijī opposition to 'Alī was supported by the true divine authority.

This argument is based on the *arbitrary assumption that if I* should have deprived myself of the support of divine authority, the mere recognition of this fact would enable you to gain what I have lost. This is strange reasoning, explicable only in terms of a desire to lay God under an obligation, to make Him pay for theological espionage.

In the second place, the People of the Sunnah, who advocate a 'return' or reversion to the Word of God and the Sunnah of the Prophet, take a critical view of those things in the lives of Muslims whence they would like the latter to 'return' or whereof they

7. Shahrastānī, *Kitāb al-Milal* (Cairo, Azhar Press 1910), p. 204.
8. *Qrn.* 49 : 17 :—
They make it a favour unto thee (Muḥammad) that they have surrendered (unto Him). Say: Deem not your surrender (Islam) a favour unto me; nay, but Allah doth confer a favour on you, in as much as He hath led you to the Faith, if ye are earnest.

would like them to repent themselves. In their criticism, they draw a sharp line between *actuality* and the *ideality* of the proposed reconstruction. In so doing, they hold an uneasy balance between historical realism and theological idealism. From the former point of view, they should take actual facts as they are. From the latter, it would be necessary for them to recognize that the realization of an Ideal transforms its character. The idealizing mind has a true conception of divine perfection only when it is prepared to assert that every thing that comes into being is other than God. My faith in an ideal state of affairs is bound to degenerate into idolatry if its realization finds me unwilling or unable to attribute *still* greater perfection to God—as the One from whose idea in my mind newer forms of *ideality* are conceivable.

Now to come back to the comparison between TF and IUD. We submit that these two books illustrate the progress of a mind that sought to evolve a critical method so as to define Islam as a critique. Whatever may be one's estimate of the progress thus illustrated, it is absolutely clear that the writing of these books was considered by the author as a means whereby he could fulfil his Islamic obligations.

These two books exhibit similarities as well as differences. Their similarities arise from Ghazālī's *philosophical* approach to his subject—in TF as a whole, and in the originality of the main argument of IUD. Their differences, which provide the measure of Ghazālī's success in his search after the media and the contents of the Islamic critique, are determined by the fact that TF is a critical book in an external and polemical sense, whereas IUD represents a criticism of Criticism—i.e., in other words, the Islamic critique or Denial turning upon itself.

It needs to be asserted that TF and IUD are philosophical works of comparable status. Of course, their common philosophical quality does not depend upon their contents. In that respect, they are different. TF as a book on the technical problems of traditional philosophy does have little in common with IUD which ranges over a vast field of Knowledge, but which concerns itself with problems of traditional philosophy in only indirect fashion—i.e., by way of explicating its author's working hypotheses or reminiscences or *obiter dicta*.

The real ground for a comparison between these books is to be found in their methods. In both of them, Ghazālī first selects a problem (viz., the 'incoherence' of the Philosophers, and the 'sciences of Religion'). In his presentation of the data related to that problem, he gives an exhaustive or almost encyclopaedic formulation to the whole thing (cf. the twenty questions in one book or the forty 'books' of the other). This scheme enables him in either case to penetrate to the first principles of the subject, as on the other hand it induces him to discuss their ramifications and concrete manifestations in areas which are contiguous to the subject but separate and distinct from it. It is true that, in some cases, the union of the principles and their illustrations or corollaries (not only in IUD but also in TF) is extremely loose and unstable. This defect is further aggravated by the fact that Ghazālī's presentation of data (as set over against his analysis of topics) is in many cases marked by a relapse into rhetorical or dialectical devices. In quite a real sense, however, these defects are counter-balanced by the fact that the periodic reinstatement of philosophical methods presents Ghazālī as a thinker whose 'relapses' do not weaken or impair his mental powers, but spur him on to a more vigorous exercise of intellectuality. More especially is this true of IUD where extremely unoriginal things alternate with subtle and penetrating analyses of religious experience.

It is, therefore, with reference to the periodic reinstatement of its rational approach that IUD can be called not only a philosophical work but perhaps the most philosophical thing Ghazālī ever wrote. This quality of the book needs (as we said) to be asserted—not only to show in what respect it can be compared to TF, but also to contradict the popular assumption that it represents Ghazālī's contribution to Taṣawwuf. From what he had to say in his *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl,* many people have received the impression that (in so far as IUD can be considered as Ghazālī's *opus magnum*) the 'revival of the sciences of Religion' should have been tantamount to the successful or satisfactory end or resolution of the spiritual crisis through which Ghazālī had lived in the past, and out of which (according to the *Munqidh*) only Taṣawwuf could show him the way. This is fine as far as it goes; but one should not try to make too much of the assumption that in his *opus magnum* an author goes past the stage when he might experience a spiritual crisis. Actually, in Ghazālī's case, IUD gives

evidence of a deepening of the spiritual crisis—in so far as the insights he had come by brought an increasingly profound awareness of the mystery that surrounds the truth of Religion.

Nor does it sound very convincing to speak of Ghazālī's relation to Taṣawwuf in terms of complete identification or total acceptance on his part. We have referred to Ibn Rushd's view that Ghazālī associates himself with all the traditional schools, but that he belongs to no one of them. In essence, that is an accurate estimate. The contents of IUD would offer ample evidence to confirm and substantiate it. It would take us far beyond the scope of the present work to examine that evidence in detail. Suffice it here to indicate the specific reasons why we would draw a line between Ghazālī's thought (as expounded in IUD in particular) on the one hand and Taṣawwuf on the other.

The most remarkable difference between these two consists in the fact that their common interest in the Islamic 'sciences' finds its fulfilment in contrary directions. The Ṣūfī thought advances from the concrete reality of those 'sciences' to the idea of their hidden 'meaning(s)'. Very soon, however, the Meanings cease to be the meanings *of* the Islamic 'sciences', and take on the significance of a permanent factor—i.e., a timeless or unhistorical element in the universal system. On the contrary, the sciences of Religion with which Ghazālī is concerned in IUD continue to be related to the Islamic 'sciences' as their superordinate principle.

In the second place, Ṣūfī thought is characterized by its *epistemology*. As a rule, it interprets the limitations of Knowledge in terms of its incommensurability with the infinite Truth. To such an interpretation a philosopher (who may have been initiated into Mysticism) opposes either a more optimistic or even dogmatic theory of Knowledge (cf. Spinoza) or a reaffirmation of the limitations of Knowledge from a different point of view. In either case, the reconstruction of its epistemological basis weakens a philosopher's interest in Mysticism and reduces it to a minor role. Of the two ways of reconstruction, the second has been followed by Ghazālī who thinks of Knowledge in terms of man's incessant longing for such Power as truly belongs to God alone. Knowledge on this view is the second best thing with which finite beings' passion for Power contents itself. As a substitute for Power, Knowledge comes to exhibit the same characteristics as mark the latter—name-

ly, that two separate and distinct instances of the pursuit of Knowledge tend to be mutually exclusive. Hence arises the harsh and inevitable conflict of moral judgments which cancel out each other, and which thus reveal the irreparable limitations of all Knowledge (IUD, book 28, pp. 6 ff.). Like the Ṣūfīs, then, Ghazālī recognizes the limitations of Knowledge. In contrast to their idea of infinite Truth, however, he posits interminable Conflict as the source of *limitations.* And the contrast is more significant and crucial than likeness in the present instance.

Thirdly, the failure of Knowledge is (on the optimistic principles of Taṣawwuf) an occasion for the overflow of God's love and mercy. On the contrary, IUD considers the failure (or more correctly, the disintegration or *tahāfut*) of Knowledge as the occasion when one experiences a further deepening and an inevitable darkening of the Mystery (of God's ways to men).

Lastly, in the fourth place, Taṣawwuf can be described (among other things) in terms of an intense love for the Prophet of Islam whence a Ṣūfi seeks to derive moral principles of a universal character. On the contrary, the source of all moral principles recognized in IUD is the doctrine of Tauḥīd.

This, then, explains the philosophical character of IUD by virtue of which it can be compared to TF, and can also be contrasted with the characteristic trends of Ṣūfī thought. But we have also noted the fact that there is a very great difference between TF and IUD by reference to which one could determine the magnitude and the direction of Ghazālī's progress in his quest after the media and the contents of the Islamic critique. This finds the most poignant expression in the fact that, in contrast to TF (which contains Ghazālī's denunciation or takfīr of the Philosophers), IUD itself comes very close to being subjected to takfīr.[9] By putting himself

9. In the sequel to IUD (*Kitāb al-Imlā' fī Ishkālāt al-Iḥyā'*, p. 2), Ghazālī says (to a sympathetic correspondent who has drawn his attention to the general reception of IUD in the literary circles of the time):—

> You have expressed sorrow (over some malicious comments on IUD made by)...people who are little better than brutes... and who have charged its author with being misguided and misguiding. These people have also accused the readers and the followers of the book—of a tendency to corrupt the Sharī'ah or to destroy it. Let them have their way until they return to God, and on the occasion of the momentous Encounter render account unto Him.

in such a vulnerable (although not indefensible) position, Ghazālī has shown that the methods he had used in TF had now outlived their utility for him. Ever and anon in the course of writing IUD, he comes back to an attitude of relentless criticism (on his own position in TF) that can be set forth as follows:

(a) Islam does not stand in need of any one's help or support—by way of a bellicose refutation of anti-Islamic things. For the Prophet actually contemplated[10] the possibility of strength and support coming to Islam from even anti-Islamic things or persons.

(b) He who undertakes ostentatiously to support or defend Islam most often is a self-seeking man.

(c) If a self-styled supporter of Islam thinks that he has done what others could not do because of their lack of Devotion or Insight, then such a person himself is the most devoid of Devotion and Insight. Of Devotion, because he takes a contemptuous view of the masses of men to whom indeed Faith is of the utmost significance or the most vital concern. Of Insight, because he fails to see that the cause of Faith is not promoted by the extra-ordinary qualities of highly gifted men whose example cannot be followed by the common or plain man (IUD, quarter 3, ch. 2, pp. 9 ff).

These words acquire tremendous significance in view of the fact that they have been uttered by the author of TF. Not even Ibn Rushd could have criticised the latter book in such unsparing terms.

We must now let IUD speak for itself. In what follows, therefore, we will present the Argument of the book as a whole. Our summary may serve the purpose of an introduction to, or a prompter for a detailed study of this book that needs yet to be written from the Islamic point of view. We shall not offer any documentation on the specific points included in it.[11] For our

10. "God will strengthen this faith by (the contributions of) the wicked man" SB: 56 (Jihād), ch. 182. Also see IUD, quarter iv, *Kitāb al-Tafakkur*, p. 75.

11. In general, however, our sources can be indicated (by reference to the 'books' of IUD and the pages in the *variorum* scheme of numbering them) as follows:—

Bk. 1, pp. 65ff., 76ff., 98ff., 149ff. Bk. 2, pp. 161ff.; 213-15. Bk. 4; pp. 287-90. Bk. 7, pp. 483ff. Bk. 8, pp. 524ff. Bk. 10, p. 596. Bk. 12, pp. 694ff., 709ff. Bk. 14. Bk. 15, pp. 946ff., 1027ff. Bks. 16, 19, 21-26; 28-33; 35-37; 39.

presentation of Ghazālī's views is bound to involve a considerable amount of selection, interpretation and even reconstruction.

To begin with, IUD represents the only philosophical attempt in the Muslim world to review the concrete totality of Islamic thought, belief and conduct from the standpoint of the greatest and the most original Islamic principle—viz. Tauḥīd. According to Ghazālī, a man's reawakening to the importance of this principle (as the *criterion* of good and bad or right and wrong in actual life) constitutes the 'revival of the sciences of Religion'. Although the demands of Tauḥīd are severe and soul-searching or even world-shaking, it is nonetheless true that through his reawakening to them a man can realize his individuality and attain freedom. For it is only in the presence of God that humanity can possess and enjoy individuality and freedom. On the contrary, one who turns away from that 'presence' remains a mere slave to the ineluctable and brutalizing necessities of the world. Hence the first and by far the most difficult religious problem consists in the bare recognition of the fact that in all places other than, and remote from the 'presence' of God, man can have only an ignoble and degenerate existence.

There may be some men who just cannot recognize this fact. They would flatter themselves with the assumption that it is they who think and feel and choose and decide; and therefore no one can convince them that the necessities of temporal existence might lie at the root of their thought and will and choice and decision. So they congratulate themselves upon their success, imagining that they already are in possession of freedom and individuality. But these ideals are not so easy of attainment. In fact, our struggle for them never can cease.

Some men who are not self-deluded would recognize that a life remote from the 'presence' of God is unworthy. These people may experience another difficulty that may be created by extraneous circumstances. They may be told that some of those things which are remote from the 'presence' of God are not so in an absolute or final sense and that, therefore, in the long run they might prove not only to be reconcilable to Tauḥīd, but even a contributory factor or a means to it. This extenuating circumstance is cited in favour of such grand things as the objects

or institutions or principles of Society and History, Religion and Law, and Morality and Philosophy.

Here the religious man has a difficult problem to face. *A priori* he knows that Tauḥīd cannot be identified with any one of these things; for a man can live by any one of them and yet miss the 'presence' of God. But if they are claimed to be a possible means to Tauḥīd, the claim deserves to be considered very carefully. It is only rash and presumptuous men who would reject it outright. By so doing, they can only bring their spiritual struggle to an ignominious end. On the other hand, those persons who would not reject this claim do indeed ensure the uninterrupted development of their spiritual life. For now they can look for the evidence of Tauḥīd where they had thought it could not be found. But their problems are by no means over. For they are confronted with a paradoxical aspect of religious life—namely, the possibility of the expression of their love for God through attention to things other than God; and it is not clear how long the duality can justifiably maintain itself.

Once persuaded to attend to those things which are called a possible means to Tauḥīd, the religious man may learn to see in them some reflections of divine power and glory. But he will soon discover that such reflections are inevitably turned to a degrading and deceptive use. For they are used to justify the existence of the medium in which they shine, not to proclaim the perfection and blessedness of the Source whence they radiate.

An illustration will make the point clear. Law is one of those things which are other than Tauḥīd but which can be considered as means to the latter. As such, therefore, Law can engage the attention of the religious man who will consequently begin to see in it reflections of some transcendental elements—viz. divine power and glory. Now, rational necessity demands that the grateful response of the protagonists of Law should take the form of an argument like the following one:—

1. Without the transcendental elements of divine power and glory, Law is a trivial thing.
2. With those elements added to it, it becomes sacred.
3. Therefore praise be to God whose Name elevates Law from a trivial character to sanctity.

In point of fact, however, those who are devoted to Law express their response in the form of an argument like the following one:—

1. Without ... transcendental elements ..., Law is a trivial thing.
2. With those elements ..., it becomes sacred.
3. Therefore, praise be to Law thus elevated to sanctity.

This form of the argument is irrational and blasphemous—except that it points to the irresistible pressure of the necessities of temporal existence.

This sort of thing happens in the case of Law when legal provisions, which can be justified only by reference to the purposes they are designed to serve, become ends-in-themselves. It also happens in the case of Religion, Morality, Philosophy, History, &c.

Thus, the elements of power and glory which enter into the constitution of Religion are eventually subordinated to that constitution when particular religions develop an interest in formal patterns of overt conduct. Such a development is of great utility. For without formalism, the teachings of a religion cannot be communicated to the masses of men. In essence, however, formalism has nothing to do with Tauḥīd, and might indeed be opposed to it.

In the case of Morality, the transcendental elements are subordinated to extraneous things in so far as Morality connives at the elation, even arrogance, that accompanies the consciousness of Virtue in the mind of the virtuous man. Moreover, Morality inculcates an exaggerated notion of the efficiency of the moral agent.

In the case of Philosophy, the transcendental elements are subordinated to its interest in all Knowledge as an end—without setting one kind of Knowledge over against another.

As far as History is concerned, one might feel that its panorama of the concrete instances of divine power and glory might make of it the most convincing proof of the truth of Tauḥīd. But this proves to be a fond hope. For in this case, too, the transcendental elements are subordinated to extraneous things. Historians lose sight of the fact that History never can be an adequate ground for anticipating or predicting the mysterious workings of God's will. Man's inability to arrive at anticipations or predic-

tions of this kind illustrates not only the imperfection and the finitude of his knowledge, but also the incorrigible imperfection of his moral judgment. History does not necessarily prove that those who ought (from the historian's point of view) to be rewarded or punished get what they seem to deserve. But the practical interests involved in the presentation of History demand that the idea of Reward and Punishment — even as shaped forth by the reason or the imagination of the historians—should serve as an indispensable postulate.

The failure of all those things which could be a means to Tauḥīd raises the question as to how one might justify one's faith in God. The decline of the Āfilīn itself is an effect of God's will and power. How, then, can one reconcile oneself to the fact that it is God who brings about the corruption of the transcendental elements in Morality, Law, etc.—in such wise as to defeat the purposes of Tauḥīd?

This dark and desperate problem of the philosophy of Religion must be disentangled from ontological assumptions before any attempt could be made to solve it. Thus, in the first place, when it is said that the decline of the Āfilīn is itself an effect of God's power and will, the meaning is not that God is a natural cause of such a thing. On the contrary, all it means is that the natural causes being whatever they are, the religious mind would interpret not only their effects, but even their own inner *constitution*, in terms of God's will and power. Religion teaches us to believe in the power and the greatness of forces outside ourselves. In our attempt to explain what may be an endlessly increasing series of natural causes by reference to God's will and power, this religious belief manifests and fulfils itself.

In the second place, we must get rid of those ontological assumptions through which Personality may be attributed to God. If God were a person in the sense in which we know *personality* and have it, it would be treacherous on His part to give us for an Ideal something (i.e. Tauḥīd) against which the effects of His own power and will should militate. It is the idea of *personality* as an attribute common to us and Him that makes us expect a fair deal at His hands — imagining that He is also pleased with our success and displeased with our failure. But in attributing

to Him pleasure with our success, we posit some kind of a deficiency in His character.

Therefore, just as the process of de-personalization will avert the imputation of Treachery, so on the other hand must it also lead us to hold that our success and failure, our salvation and error, make absolutely no difference—as far as God is concerned.

Once these ontological assumptions have been set aside, it will be possible to see that the question concerning the justification of one's faith in God (who frustrates one in the pursuit of Tauḥīd) is not directed against one's faith in the existence of God, but only against a certain notion of His attributes. Hence the whole problem comes to this — namely, why should one (and indeed how can one) believe in certain incomprehensible and mysterious attributes of God as set over against some more familiar qualities?

The answer to this question is that there are three different types of the apprehension of the divine attributes. The first may be called *virile*, the second *effeminate*, and the third *hermaphrodite*. (a) Those who can believe in a divine being that is not subservient to their own purposes and to the laws of their own existence represent the first type—viz. Tanzīh (i.e. Transcendentalism). (b) Those who believe in a divine being in whom their own existence and experience and character are thought over again, represent the second type — viz. Tashbīh (i.e. Anthropomorphism). (c) The third type is represented by all those theologians who are incapable of the virility of Tanzīh and of the homely beauty of Tashbīh. Evidently, therefore, a divine being who creates difficulties in the spiritual life of men fulfils the demands of Tanzīh in the highest degree. Any attempt to soften the rigour of the idea (of such a being) can produce only a theological hermaphrodite.

The foregoing classification is based on the assumption that there is an essential difference between the idea of the existence of God and the idea of His attributes. On ultimate analysis, however, this turns out to be false. No true apprehension of God is possible unless the religious consciousness should simultaneously grasp the truth of His being and His attributes. Doubtless, there are some persons who would *first* obtain a proof of the existence of God whence the next step is supposed to take them to a theory

of His attributes. But if Existence is thus to be divorced from attributes, the result would be a relapse into ontological assumptions; and the 'proof' by means of which such assumptions may be verified would be ill-suited to support Faith. For if Faith is based on Proofs, it can also be shaken by them; for they are like a double-edged sword that cuts both ways. As a matter of fact, the vicissitudes of Faith that is based on Proof represent not only a possibility, but an inevitable outcome. If you are such that only a miraculous Serpent can show you the way to God, there will also be a pseudo-miraculous Calf to entice you away from Him (cf. *Qrn.* on Sāmirī).

From the relative or double-edged character of Proofs two consequences would seem to follow. First, it follows that Tanzīh can no longer be considered as a doctrine of the divine attributes only. Secondly, the question concerning the justification of one's Faith (in a divine being that causes one's spiritual struggle to fail totally or partially) involves questionings with regard to the existence of God.

Therefore, the final answer to the question raised by the decline of the Āfilīn is that the spirit of the doctrine of Tanzīh must influence our conception of the existence of God (as well). This means that the religious man cannot but believe in God — recognizing Him as the Author of the impediments and the contradictions, &c. by which he is inevitably confronted in his spiritual life; but not holding Him responsible for those impediments; nor flattering himself with the idea that if he could surmount them, he would arouse a pleasurable response on His part.

This is an extremely negative position to take. Those who are in it are so critical in their attitude towards life and the world that they represent a destructive force in the universal system. If this force were to have greater strength and wider influence than it does, the universal system would collapse. Mercifully, however, its strength suffers set-backs and its influence is localized. As such, therefore, it represents an illustrious element in the universal system through which the world and humanity emancipate themselves from their phenomenal degradation. For like its super-abundance, the total extinction of this force would also annihilate the universal system.

Having attained to this negative position, the religious man will see that his endless problems have brought him a deeper understanding of the ways of God. In the beginning, he might have thought that his assent to the doctrine of Tauḥid will fulfil his obligations towards God. Later on, he must have realized that divine power and glory could, and did, shine through some objects in the world or some facts of life, and that therefore the latter also had some obligations to impose upon him. This must have led him to the discovery that, apart from the transcendental elements that were reflected in them, the very worldliness of such media was an effect of divine power and will. As such, however, these things in their debasement should not cause him to lose patience with God. On the contrary, the imperfections and the impediments and the contradictions which have been created by Him in the life of humanity should induce the religious man to love God. For that is the way to invest his spiritual struggle with meaning and purpose — and thus to attain Freedom.

Man's love for God, or his attainment of Freedom by means of justifying his faith in Him, is the greatest 'proof' of God's existence. In the language of Mystical experience, this state is identified as the one in which God makes the decision that should have been made by a man. For only as long as God is a mere necessity of thought, Thought can take more than one course in rendering Faith articulate and explicit. But when this necessity of thought is apprehended as *given*, the possibilities open to Thought foreshorten or reduce themselves to only one formulation of Faith. That is the one determined by the Datum to which it is related. Thus is man's love for God reciprocated by Him.

Rational necessity demands that a man should seek to justify (if not to prove) his faith in God. In other words, he should be able to show why his having faith is better than not having it. Once this question has been set at rest, there will be a demand from the other side — namely, that he who claims to have faith should be able to ascertain whether the claim is true, or not.

It is none too easy for a man to verify such a claim. Both the quality of his faith, and the manner in which he may seek to satisfy himself as to whether it be true, will depend on the (Anthropomorphic or Transcendentalist) type to which he belongs.

In the early stages of his spiritual struggle, a man most often is an Anthropomorphist. In so far as this theology possesses the greatest attraction for the human mind, an Anthropomorphist's claim (concerning faith in God) may only amount to the rationalization of something to which he is inclined by nature. An attempt to verify such faith may cause its dissolution.

With a Transcendentalist's faith, the difficulties involved in verification may be still more disconcerting. They are due to the complications arising out of the Transcendentalist's varying response to the substance of his creed—namely, his recognition of the principle that it is God who *creates difficulties in the spiritual life of men*. There are two possibilities to distinguish here. First, the recognition in question, and a Transcendentalist's consequent love for God, may lead him to make light of the distinction between Good and Evil. But he who fails to distinguish these two can have no Faith. (For on Ghazālī's principles, Faith is faith-in-God, which means the acceptance of Tauḥīd, which signifies the discovery of the supreme criterion of Good and Evil). In his case, therefore, the question of verification will not arise at all.

Secondly, a Transcendentalist's love for God, and his consequent presumption that God loves him in turn, may cause him to imagine that (in his case) the great ideal of Freedom has been realized — in definitive fashion, and as the result of his own performance. Here the claim (concerning faith in God) advanced by such a person will be much too personal and self-congratulatory to verify.

Hard is the struggle through which one seeks to verify one's avowed faith in God. But that is by no means the whole truth of the matter. The most disconcerting fact of religious life is not that this struggle is hard, but that it is doomed to be a self-defeating process. One who makes a deliberate effort to have sincere and verifiable faith in God can succeed only by virtue of a certain amount of superiority to others whose faith must therefore be demonstrated to be insincere. For no one can have sincere faith in God unless the sincerity of his faith be determined as a quality distinguishable from the insincerity of the faith of many (if not all) others. (This is the sense in which a man with sincere faith represents not only a rare thing, but also a destructive force in

the universe). But is it necessary that sincere Faith should shine against the background of insincerity and faithlessness? Indeed, is it desirable that the constitutive principle of Faith should be its opposition to things external or contrary to it?

The answer to both these questions would be in the negative if Faith could be viewed and valued in the light of its own character and substance. But he who has it cannot see it in that light; for exaggerated notions of personal importance and efficiency obscure his vision. The only 'person' who can view and value a man's faith in the light of its substance and character is—God.

But the divine view of a man's faith cannot be made known to him in this world. As long as he lives, his faith is in the making — i.e., being made or unmade; whereas the divine view of things encompasses their totality in a final and definitive sense. It follows that if in his life-time a man ventures to anticipate the divine view of his faith, he is a transgressor, seeking to go beyond the limits God has set.

Therefore, in those cases in which sincere faith may be possessed, there is no means whereby this fact could be ascertained. As the world goes, God's verdict on man's faith is not announced; and man himself cannot make an announcement — without a drastic diminution of the integrity and sincerity of Faith.

Despite the unverifiable and incommunicable character of Faith, however, people like to attribute it to each other or to themselves. This is so not because they may have taken steps to verify the attributes they affirm, but because the term 'faithful' is used to describe *greatness.* Ghazālī correlates the two as follows : —

1. Faith is the highest Knowledge—viz. the one related to the highest Knowable.
2. Knowledge satisfies finite beings' longing for the infinity of Power that truly belongs to God alone.
3. Power is both a means to *greatness* and the actual enjoyment of it.
4. Therefore, Faith is attributed to the person who appears to possess *greatness.*

This extension of the significance of Faith also accounts for the transference (to Faith) of two important characteristics of *great-*

ness. First, the struggle for *greatness* (which in its ultimate significance is divine) admits of no collaboration or partnership (*Shirk*). Secondly, the absence or the loss of *greatness* is not a mere privation, but amounts to the acquisition of its opposite—i.e., *meanness.* In like manner, therefore, the struggle for Faith admits of no Partnership; and faithlessness is the term both for a person who fails to have faith, and for one who may choose not to have it. The combined effect of these two consequences is this:—By calling a person *faithful* people seek to emphasise his *greatness.* If now some one feels that this designation threatens or contradicts his own greatness, he will impute faithlessness to the person in question.

When the attributes 'faithful' and 'faithless' are thus being bandied around (by friend and foe) in relation to one and the same person, they cancel out each other.

But in those cases in which no one calls a person 'faithful' whereas every one calls him 'faithless', there are two contrary possibilities to reckon with:—

First, such a person may be so selfish and inhuman that he might have made of himself a curse to all mankind. The accusation against him will be just, if not literally true.

Secondly, the person in question may be such that his humility or selflessness would threaten or contradict the popular notion of *greatness* as such. This person is faithful in the truest sense of the word. In his case, Faith is proved:—

1. not because God may have announced His verdict to confirm his faith (for that verdict is not announced in this world);
2. nor because he himself may have claimed to have Faith (for that would be Transgression);
3. but because of the ferocity of the accusation (of faithlessness) against him which bears inverse proportion to the reality of Faith. For those who have Faith represent a destructive force in the universe. Therefore, the accusations of faithlessness against such persons are in fact an indirect protest (against their destructiveness),

Chapter II

IBN TAYMIYAH'S REFUTATION OF LOGIC

Ghazālī's two books which have been discussed in the first chapter describe a pattern of spiritual development unparalleled in the subsequent history of Islamic Thought. (In the earlier periods of Islamic history, the lives of some Companions of the Prophet of Islam, e.g. Abū Dharr Ghifārī, might conceivably offer some analogies). Never again since his time has a Muslim embarked upon a historic refutation of Rationalism — whence in the end he should have turned back to consider what merit his refutation could possess in the eyes of God.

However, there have been some cases in which post-Ghazālian thinkers were so deeply inspired or provoked by Ghazālī's work (in all or some of its concrete manifestations) that their consequent effort to follow his example, or to counteract the harmful effects they thought it had produced, resulted in a comparable reconstruction of Islamic Thought. Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), Ibn Taymiyah (1263-1328) and Shāh Walīy Allāh (1703-1762) represent this class of authors or thinkers.

Ibn Rushd devoted an entire book (TT) to the issues raised in Ghazālī's attack (TF) on Philosophy. In some other writings (e.g. *Faṣl al-Maqāl* and *Manāhij al-Adillah*), he made repeated attempts to rethink his attitude towards 'this man' who obviously had outdistanced his analysis. It is in such revaluations that he seems to think of Ghazālī as a fellow-interpreter of the relation between Reason and Authority. He came to the conclusion that the unphilosophical things wherein Ghazālī's writings abound give rise to questions which necessitate that the utmost care be taken in presenting his teachings. For Ghazālī's inability or unwillingness to identify himself with any one of the traditional schools was bound to be misunderstood by unwary readers as also it might have very disturbing effects on immature minds. However, Ibn Rushd's appreciation of the actual contents of IUD is poor in quality and substance. Most often he refers to it in passing, and

in his remarks he contents himself with the repetition of the popular conception of its teachings. It is for this reason that we would not bring him in at the present time.

On the contrary, both Ibn Taymiyah and Shāh Walīy Allāh have been influenced by IUD — each of course in his own way. Although their appraisal of the technical aspects and the historical precedents of Ghazālī's contribution to Philosophy does not approach Averroesian standards, they have been more successful in establishing Ghazalianism in the context of Islamic Thought. Ibn Taymiyah's work (KRM) which has been selected here for a comparative study is comparable both to Ghazālī's TF and to his IUD. To the former, because it is a refutation; to the latter, because it takes all (Islamic) knowledge for its province. In what follows, therefore, we propose to summarize Ibn Taymiyah's teachings in KRM with special reference to Ghazālī's influence on them.

To begin with, this book interprets Ghazālī's life and thought in different ways. The plan of the work itself bears testimony to the influence of TF, in that Ibn Taymiyah seems to have set out to ratify Ghazālī's takfīr (excommunication) of the Philosophers or to supply its omissions. Ibn Taymiyah believes that Ghazālī misrepresents Islam in recognizing its opposition to Philosophy on three points *only* — viz. the eternity of the world, the contentless universality of God's knowledge, and (scepticism with regard to) the resurrection of the dead. In his opinion, the criteria employed by a representative of Islamic Thought must also include such things as the belief in Prophecy, the divine speech, Intercession, &c.[1]

Ibn Taymiyah's amendment and extension of Ghazālī's indictment (of the Philosophers) is not to be dismissed as a minor issue or formal criticism. On the contrary, it must be recognized as the expression of a deep-rooted conviction on his part—namely, that Ghazālī's attempt to get rid of the influence of Philosophy might have been genuine, but that its success was only partial and limited. What Ibn Taymiyah considers as serious omissions in the maledictory parts of TF were assumed to have occurred by

1. See p. 523 (KRM, published with an introduction by Saiyid Sulaymān Nadvī, Bombay, 'Abd al Ṣamad Sharaf al-Dīn 1949).

reason of the author's lingering interest in Philosophy and his irreversible commitment to its teachings.[2]

It is not only Ghazālī's omissions, but also some positive aspects of his teachings, that appear (to Ibn Taymiyah) to be coloured by his persistent philosophical interests. To be specific, Ibn Taymiyah charges him with initiating the practice of presenting Fiqh in terms or concepts borrowed from Greek philosophy (pp. 14f). One of his books (*al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm*) is named as a dangerous concoction in which logical principles were rephrased in Islamic terminology whence they were claimed to have been derived from the teachings of the Prophets (pp. 194-98). As regards the Mystical teachings, Ghazālī is said to have made a distinction between *'Ālam al-Khalq* and *'Ālam al-Amr*[3] which Ibn Taymiyah considers to be un-Islamic.

From the standpoint that the influence of Philosophy on Ghazālī's mind proved to be unshakable, Ibn Taymiyah is naturally inclined to class him with the followers of Ibn Sīnā. (Not unlike Ghazālī himself, Ibn Taymiyah had the teachings of this great thinker in mind whenever he referred to Philosophy). In this sense, the most severe stricture on Ghazālī is to be found in a passage (p. 103) where Ibn Taymiyah declares that in some cases Ibn Sīnā and his followers have placed themselves in sharper opposition to the teachings of Islam than even the idolatrous 'Arabs in pre-Islamic times ever had done.

However, the interests Ghazālī had developed towards the end of his life sum up the best part of his contribution to Islam. Ibn Taymiyah recognizes that 'at the time of his death, Ghazālī was preoccupied with Bukhārī and Muslim' (*loc. cit.*). This must have neutralized the erstwhile pertinacity of his philosophical interests; for (as we shall see later on) Ibn Taymiyah considers the two kinds of interests as mutually exclusive.

2. Hence he quotes, with unconcealed approbation and delight, the words of Ghazālī's own followers and admirers who thought him to have been irretrievably committed to Philosophy. For instance, see p. 482 where Qāḍī Abū Bakr b. al-'Arabī is reported to have made adverse admissions concerning Ghazālī's interest in Philosophy and his meagre knowledge of Ḥadīth.

3. i.e., according to Ibn Taymiyah, the realms of corporeal and incorporeal beings respectively.

It would be a rewarding study to analyse the specific qualities of Ibn Taymiyah's style. As a great master of the Arabic language, his excellence is unquestionable. As a writer on philosophical and theological subjects, he can be obstinate and self-righteous or quite subtle and analytical in turns. In general, he is concerned to show that he knows the rational sciences quite intimately, but that his commitments lie elsewhere. More especially, this attitude finds poignant expression in his judgments upon persons and in his use of the philosophical vocabulary and methodology. While he can be extremely ungenerous in his criticism on some of the greatest figures in Islamic history, he tries to be objective in his views—taking care to document them from his extensive readings, and to forestall such counter-criticism as might be provoked by some sweeping denunciations (takfīr) in categorical terms. To this element of restraint in his judgment corresponds a negative quality or a certain weakness that is to be found in his views on philosophical subjects. In order to assimilate a profound or recondite idea, he often resorts to verbosity that stands in marked contrast to the effortless elegance and lucidity of his style in general. In many cases, this quality of his style appears to be infelicitous in comparison with the achievements of authors like Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā.

At its best, however, this very quality enables Ibn Taymiyah to rethink philosophical ideas in terms which may be unconventional, but which are congenial or even indigenous to the conceptual substratum of the Islamic 'sciences'. In order to show that he knows Philosophy, he rephrases its teachings in such a way that in what he may have to say, the Islamic 'sciences' (which have moulded or informed his mind) attain to the consciousness of what Philosophy can mean to them.

Now to pass on to the book (KRM). In his introduction (pp. 3 ff.), Ibn Taymiyah tells us that this work had been preceded by a period in which he had criticised Greek logic but had also recognized many of its teachings as true. Later on, he began to realize how error could creep into that part of the subject as well. When he was in prison at Alexandria in 709/1309, he had conversations with some persons to whom Logic represented the unadulterated essence of Truth. He advised them to be bold enough to see that their idol could have feet of clay. On his own

part, this necessitated an elaborate exposition of the subject which has passed into KRM.

When the book had thus taken shape, Ibn Taymiyah was still quite reluctant to let its provocative teachings represent his attitude in definitive fashion. He thought that some of his earlier writings[4] on Metaphysics and Theology (Ilāhiyāt) had already provided the most suitable occasion for the refutation of rationalism in the Muslim world. But some one urged him not to withold the new Refutation. Ibn Taymiyah complied because in spite of its fragmentary character, the book 'opens the door to (the understanding of) the Truth'.

The introduction is followed by a summary (pp. 4-7) in which Ibn Taymiyah offers a preliminary exposition of Logic.[5] The Logicians divide Knowledge into Taṣawwur and Taṣdīq[6] each of which may be self-evident or debatable. In general, however, it is necessary that even if most of the terms and propositions were debatable, at least some of them should be self-evident. If all of them were to lend themselves to theoretical investigations, Knowledge would be an indefinite and interminable process. For theory fulfils itself in the recognition of some self-evident things. On the other hand, if all terms and propositions were self-evident, Knowledge would be superfluous.

There are two methods by which we arrive at Taṣawwur and Taṣdīq. One of them is Definition (Ḥadd). This is explained in various ways. According to some people, it includes linguistic explanations or marks as well as the essential descriptions of things. On another view, it is set over against the first one of these processes and identified with the second and/or the third. In any case, it consists of the essential as well as accidental attributes of the defined thing. Each of these two kinds of attributes may be common or peculiar to the defined thing (as viewed in relation to some others). An essential attribute that is common

4. Particularly, BMS (published together with his *Minhāj al-Sunnah* in 4 volumes, Bulaq 1321-22 A.H.).

5. According to the editor(s), KRM (p. 4 fn.) uses Ghazālī's MIm as the *locus classicus* on Logic.

6. 'Term' and 'proposition' would convey the technical sense of the Arabic words more fully, although they do not give an exact translation of the latter. Cf. Walzer, *Greek into Arabic* (Bib. *sub nom*) by index.

is called *genus*; but if it is peculiar to the defined thing, it is called *differentia*. The combination of *genus* and *differentia* is called *species*. An accidental attribute that is common is called the *general accident*; but if it is not common, it is called *property*. These, then, are the five Predicables (Kulliyāt). (A kullī or Universal is opposed to the Particular which is explained as something whose 'notion precludes all participation in it').

Deduction (Qiyās) is the other method by which one arrives at terms and propositions. If its subject-matter be things which are *certain*, it is called Demonstration (Burhān). Things which are 'granted' for the sake of argument, or which are based on popular conviction (Mashhūr), or which are imaginary or fallacious, yield a dialectical or rhetorical or poetical or sophistical Qiyās (respectively). A deduction consists of at least two premises or judgments. Again, it may be *mediate* or *immediate*. In the latter case, a judgment yields inference as to the truth or falsehood of some other judgments by means of *contradiction* or *simple conversion* or *conversion by negation*. In the former case, it is called Syllogism. In a syllogism, a premiss is either categorical or hypothetical (which is subdivided into the conjunctive and the disjunctive). In form, therefore, this leads to the threefold division of Syllogism into:

1. arguments whose premises may be *contained* within one another;
2. arguments whose premises *necessitate* each other;
3. and arguments whose premises are mutually *exclusive*.

Syllogistic reasoning that proceeds from the universal to the particular is called Qiyās al-Shumūl. Istiqrā' (induction) is the word for an argument in which this order is reversed. Tamthīl (analogy) means reasoning that proceeds from one particular to another.

Analogy and Qiyās al-Shumūl are mutually convertible. This has given rise to a controversy—namely, whether the word Qiyās is used *in stricto sensu* in Qiyās al-Shumūl and only metaphorically for Analogy (or *vice versa*), or whether it is applicable in both these cases in the same way. The first position has been accepted by Ibn Ḥazm (among others); the second, by Ghazālī and Abū Muḥammad Maqdisī (among others). But the third finds favour with the majority of men all over the world.

The Problem of Definition

The foregoing summary is so formulated as to indicate the points on which Ibn Taymiyah would attack the Muslim Aristotelians. The task he thus sets himself consists both in the refutation of the doctrines of Definition and Demonstration, and in the vindication of comparable methods which were used by Muslim authors and thinkers prior to the vogue of Logic. In specific terms, this latter aspect of his criticism is to be centred on his exposition of the fallacies involved in the Aristotelians' preference for Qiyās al-Shumūl as the scientific counterpart to Tamthīl.

Ibn Taymiyah's criticism of the doctrine of Definition has not been set forth in systematic form; but it springs from a distinct awareness of the theoretical implications of the whole problem. Ibn Taymiyah connects Definition with some deeper philosophical issues in the historical context. He is not unacquainted with the teachings of the most important schools of Philosophy in antiquity. Using Ibn Sīnā's KS as his source, he refers to the Pythagoreans who taught that *numbers* are the essence of things. According to our author, Plato and his followers could not subscribe to this idea. But their own investigations led them to identify the nature of things in terms of the Ideas which were supposed to have subsistence (Thubūt) and *being* in contradistinction to the objects of the sensible world. Once they had learnt to draw a line between the Ideas and the objects of the physical world, these philosophers affirmed Matter, Time, Space and the Void as the ideal principles of the physical objects whence (according to Ibn Taymiyah) they must have derived all such notions. Aristotle came—to assert that the Ideas are mental determinations. But the Stagirite and his followers placed some other mental determinations in opposition to the physical objects. For they taught that Body is composed of *form* and *matter,* and that the *species* exist independently of the individuals.

Ibn Taymiyah thinks that the teachings of the Greek philosophers are foreign to the Muslim mind. That is the reason why the Mutakallimīn and the scholars of Fiqh do not subscribe to the idea that bodies are composed of *form* and *matter.* Nor does their aversion to it lead them to accept the alternative conception of bodies as aggregates of simple substances—viz. the atoms.

Latterly, however, Greek philosophy came to influence some Muslim thinkers amongst whom Ibn Sīnā is the most prominent. This man taught that the distinction between the nature or the *quiddity* (Māhīyah) of a thing and its actual existence is absolute, and that, even when a thing may not *be*, its nature may have subsistence and being *in re*. For this reason, the nature of a thing is one of the Universals or 'simple notions' (al-Taṣawwurāt al-Mufradah) whence Definition derives its significance and validity—as the unfolding (Taṣwīr) of the essence of the defined thing. Not inconsistently, therefore, do the Avicennians hold that only those parts of a definition are essential which enter into the Māhīyah of the defined thing. Such parts are distinguished by them not only from purely accidental things, but also from those (viz. *properties* and 'inseparable accidents') which coincide with *existence* (if they do not enter into Māhīyah). For instance, they say that rationality is an essential attribute of man, because human nature is constituted by this attribute. On the contrary, the oddness of three or the evenness of four is claimed to be non-essential; for although there is no three that is not odd (and no four that is not even), oddness (or evenness) does not constitute *number*, but follows from its being (pp. 66 f.).

The Avicennian interpretation of Definition has, according to Ibn Taymiyah, filled people's minds with ridiculous delusions and malicious contempt for the traditions of the Muslim society. For now they think that their quest after the Māhīyah can bridge the gulf that inevitably exists between a thing and our idea of it. This exaggerated notion has led them to look down upon all those unassuming but fundamentally sound and sensible devices whereby Muslim authors and thinkers used to understand or explain a thing. While Ibn Sīnā had thought out the theory that lies behind this anti-traditionalism, Ghazālī upheld it much more effectively—in that he incorporated it into the body of the Islamic traditions. For it was he who cast the teachings of the Prophets in the Aristotelian mould. It is, therefore, under his influence that the Islamic sciences have fallen away from the lines on which they would have developed if only he had let them do so in accordance with the laws of their own nature (p. 14).[7]

7. Represented by Fiqh on which Ghazālī wrote in his *Mustaṣfa* in accordance with the principles of Logic.

To the lines of the natural development of the Islamic sciences a clue is provided by the pre-Rationalistic approach to the problem of Definition in the Muslim world. As a matter of fact, all thoughtful Muslims have made use of the method of Definition. Unlike the Aristotelians, however, they would not flatter themselves with the assumption that, in defining a thing, they could lay hands upon its essence. Consistently with the unassuming but useful role they thought Definition could have in their work, they did not attach too much significance to the distinction between *differentia* and *property*. The *genus* tended to drop out of their statements about a thing; for it shows (for instance) what is common to man and some other beings, whereas they were interested in what might be regarded as his own. In general, they were content to define a thing by reference to those qualities which appeared and disappeared upon its own appearance (Tard) and disappearance ('Aks).

This simpler and saner view of Definition is attributed by Ibn Taymiyah to all the Muslim sects—e.g. the Mu'tazilah, the Ashā'irah, the Shī'ah, the Karrāmiyah, &c. It is also claimed to be acceptable to the leaders of all the schools of Fiqh and to their followers. It is said to have found favour with such authorities as Imām Abū al-Ḥasan Ash'arī, Qāḍī Abū Bakr b. al-Ṭaiyib Bāqillānī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn Abū al-Ma'ālī 'Abd al-Malik Juwaynī, Abū Maymūn Nasafī, Abū Hāshim, 'Abd al-Jabbār, Ibn Naubakht, Ibn Hayṣam &c. (p. 15).

In a general review (pp. 26-32) on Logic, Ibn Taymiyah contrasts it with linguistic conventions—e.g. the use of singular terms or names. The latter, he thinks, have a definite purpose to serve; and they do not militate against reason or facts. On the contrary, the Logicians teach things which are neither useful nor rational nor objective.

For instance, they believe that their art is a standard for the sciences, and that its use enables the mind to avoid mis-thinking. In this respect, they compare it to such arts as Prosody or Grammar, &c. But the comparison is untenable. For Prosody or Grammar is related to a subject that cannot be thought out by a beginner for himself. His own judgment and devices having been ruled out, he must be content to receive certain conventional or current rules on the authority of the great masters of the art. These rules

can be discovered only by means of induction; and the method by which they are recorded and communicated is traditional.

Different is the case with Logic, however, which has Thought itself for its subject. A beginner in Logic must *think*—either on his own or in subservience to authority. The latter alternative may be helpful; but there is no reason why authoritative thoughts should be truer or nearer to the essence of Thought. God has made a just and equitable distribution of the capacity for thinking among men. One man cannot dictate to another how he should think. And all men who are interested in the right use of this capacity, try to make it correspond to reality. All this points to the conclusion that the glorified system of Aristotelian logic is a *tour de force* or an 'unnatural art'. To this conclusion incontrovertible testimony is borne by the fact that the translation of Aristotle's logical terminology into a foreign language makes a barbarous addition to the latter's original character and resources. Similarly, the rules he sought to give the mind place it under unnecessary strain and obstruct its view of things.

The Logicians claim that their art leads to the definition of the reality of things which cannot be defined in any other way. This has led them to introduce distinctions among Qualities which do not have those distinctions in themselves, but which could not have been used in the form or the order in which they occur.[8]

8. Aristotle makes a distinction between those things which are prior in nature (*phusei proteron*) and those which are prior in the order of our acquaintance with them (*eemin proteron*). See H. Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*. Oxford University Press 1916, pp. 88 *et al.*

Avicennianism had made use of this distinction in its conception of the essential attributes as prior in the order of Knowledge. According to Ibn Taymiyah, however, the development of the notion of Māhīyah in that system tended to hypostatize the order of Knowledge—so as to obliterate all distinction between *phusei proteron* and *eemin proteron*.

In his analysis of this development, Ibn Taymiyah refers to the following four possibilities:

(a) the nature of a things *in re;*
(b) its existence *in re;*
(c) its nature in mind;
(d) and its existence in mind.

Of these, he believes that the first and the second go together to constitute the actuality of a thing, whereas the third and the fourth coalesce so as

So the Logicians divided them into the essential and the non-essential. For the theory of Definition they had formulated, the essential qualities came to serve the purpose of *matter*, whereas its *form* was identified with the order in which the Logicians apprehended the Qualities.

Thus the reality of a thing is supposed to be represented by those qualities which are called essential; and the order in which the essential and non-essential qualities have been arranged by the Logicians is identified with the order of Knowledge itself. But all that is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to prove; and even if it can be proved at all, it will make no addition to Knowledge (p. 29).

In general, the idea of an essential attribute is based on the principle of the inclusion (Taḍammun) or implication of one term in another. For instance, a passage in Ghazālī's MIm explains the relation of Taḍammun in terms of the unity that binds a whole to its parts or a genus to its subordinates. Thus, the word *house* signifies *wall,* and the word *man* signifies *animal,* by implication.[9] In these cases, the two terms imply each other; for the sense of one of them is contained in the other. This relationship can, therefore, be distinguished from those cases in which one of the two terms necessitates the other. For instance, *ceiling* and *wall* are necessarily related in the sense that there is no ceiling without a wall, but not *vice versa.* Similarly, *man* and *tailor* are necessarily related in the sense that he who is a tailor must be a man, but not *vice versa.* From the inconvertibility of these terms it

to render it intelligible. On this principle, the fallacy of Avicennianism consists in the fact that (in speaking of the absolute distinction between the nature of a thing and its being) it divorces the first alternative from the second, and the third from the fourth. Having thus isolated these alternatives, it picks up the first and the fourth — so as to substantiate its contention that the nature of a thing has being *in re* even when it may not be, or when its existence is in mind only. It will be possible to refute this fallacy when it is recognized that when a thing exists actually, both its nature and its being are *in re*, and that when it is conceived in mind, both its nature and its being represent a mental construction (p. 67).

9. These illustrations are Ghazālī's own (see KRM, pp. 75f.). They include the *extension* as well as the *intension* of terms—viz. the senses in which Aristotle found *animal* in *man* and *man* in *animal* (respectively). See Joseph, *op. cit.*, pp. 136 ff.

can be seen that the significance of each one of them is not contained in that of the other, but that only one of them (necessarily) follows from the other. This necessarily following thing cannot freely be used in Definition. For it has its own followers (Lawāzim) whence follow some other things, and thus the series may go on *ad infinitum.* In any case, it must take a lower (non-essential) place in Definition than the one that belongs to those (essential) attributes which are related by way of Taḍammun.

On this point Ibn Taymiyah's criticism is twofold. In the first place, he questions the Logicians' assertion that the relationship of Taḍammun makes the implicatory attributes of a thing precede it as its constituents. In the second place, he holds that the Logicians have not consistently applied the principle of Taḍammun to their doctrine of Definition. In the following section we shall see how these two points have been elaborated.

Per Genus et Differentiam

We have seen that the five Predicables recognized in the logical theory with which Ibn Taymiyah is concerned include *genus, differentia, species, property* and *accident.* This conforms to the list given in Porphyry's *Isagogue* which had modified Aristotle's list of the Predicables,[10] but which had been accepted as authoritative by Logicians in the Muslim world. Historians of Logic[11] have taken account of an important consequence of this modification. Both Ibn Taymiyah and the Logicians whom he has criticised seem to allow the Porphyrian innovation and its consequences to characterize their own positions as well.

Another point on which Porphyry diverged from the Aristotelian position is the division of *accidents* into separable and inseparable.[12] Ibn Taymiyah and his opponents are again in agree-

10. In that it substitutes *species* for *definition. Ibid* pp. 106 ff.

11. Namely, that it implies that the meaning of the five Predicables is to be found in the relations which its predicates bear to an individual subject barely as that individual. On the contrary, Aristotle's doctrine as a whole implies that the subject term is general—viz. an individual subject *of a certain sort. Ibid.*

12. Porphyry, *Isagogue* (cited by Joseph, *op. cit.,* pp. 108-109 fn.)—Accident is what comes and goes without the destruction of the subject. It is of two kinds, separable and inseparable ... To be black (i.e. an inseparable accident) is predicated both of the species of crows and of crows severally.

ment with Porphyry—so much so that in their own thought this inconvenient bifurcation has overshadowed the notion of *property* (as one of the Predicables).

In general, however, the doctrine recognized by Ibn Taymiyah and the Avicennians conforms to the original teachings of Aristotle in respect of two important principles—viz. essentiality and the relationship of Taḍammun. We have seen how Ibn Taymiyah connects the teachings of the Greek philosophers and of the Avicennians with the problem of the essential attributes of a thing as set over against the non-essential. The famous Avicennian dichotomy of Essence and Existence lies at the root of the new emphasis (in the Muslim world) on the reduction of all the Predicables to these two categories. As regards Taḍammun, the passage Ibn Taymiyah has cited from Ghazālī's MIm makes it clear that the five Predicables are based upon a division of all predicables into:

1. those which are analytically related to the subject—in the sense that they express what constitutes the latter;[13]
2. those which are synthetically related to the subject—in the sense that the latter's being may be their cause;
3. and those which may come and go without any effect upon the subject whatsoever.

These, then, are the fundamental presuppositions of the doctrine of Definition criticised by Ibn Taymiyah. Let us now turn to his criticism itself. In the main, his contention is that Definition is one of the many functions of *language* through which we represent a thing to ourselves. In this sense, Definition, *names*, descriptions, translation are all very useful things. For (with certain differences which arise out of their particular circumstances) they all help us to distinguish a thing or to understand it in such a way that it should not be confused with any other thing. In this activity of distinguishing does Knowledge consist. To know a thing is to see where it stands in comparison or contrast to other things. Such comparison or contrast can be likened to the mathematical statements which delimit an object in space. For instance, you know a plot of land when you measure its area and

13. Cf. the sense given to the terms 'analytical' and 'synthetical' in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

refer to other plots that surround it on all sides. In so doing, it will be your endeavour to speak of your plot in such a way that every inch of space that goes into it should have been taken into account which, on the other hand, must not extend itself to the units of space included in other plots (p. 40). In like manner, language (through its various functions) enables you to know a thing by means of comparison and contrast. However, the difference between the two cases lies in the fact that the mathematical statements are quantitative, whereas the linguistic ones are qualitative. The former can deal with Quantity as it is found in one object (or in classes of objects); but the latter are always concerned with species as set over against individuals, for Quality is not to be found in individuality (pp. 9, 40).

The functions of language can be divided into those which designate an object and those which signify it. [Ibn Taymiyah uses the words Asmā' (names) and Ḥudūd (definitions) almost interchangeably and invariably in the latter sense—viz. the one in which they conceptualize the attributes of a thing. In fact, he claims that the use of these words in *Qrn.*[14] supports his interpretation. This shows that the problem of proper nouns and designations has not received Ibn Taymiyah's attention in his critique. In general, however, the twofold division posited here is too obvious not to have been recognized by him.] Now, in the case of the latter, signification is based on the fact that an object has been apprehended by us either through the inner or the outer forms of consciousness (Mashā'ir).[15] If an object does not directly correspond to those forms, its conception will depend upon its being analogous to some other objects which do correspond to them.[16]

14. E.g. "He taught Adam all the names" (2:31) and "The wandering Arabs are ... more likely to be ignorant of the Ḥudūd of what Allāh hath revealed to His messenger" (9:97). *Pace* Ibn Taymiyah, it must be noted that the Commentators (e.g. Zamakhsharī) explain the word Ḥudūd (in the last verse) not as 'definitions' but as 'limits' (set by the Sacred Law).

15. The former represent Feelings (e.g. hunger, thirst, &c.); the latter, Sensation (p. 11).

16. In principle, this is meant to refute the distinction made by the Logicians between a definition and the explanation of a name (Sharḥ al-Ism). In a passage cited (pp 19-22) from Ghazālī's MIm, it has been pointed out that Definition is possible only when there is an object corresponding to the

In order to fulfil the requirements of signification, it is necessary that words which express our direct or analogical apprehension of objects should be positively related *inter se*.[17] For in their

definitory formula. If, on the contrary, there is no such thing, all you can do is to give the dictionary meaning of a term. Since Ghazālī does not believe in the existence of 'empty space' or the Void, he thinks that the elucidation of this term offers a good example of Sharḥ al-Ism in contradistinction to Definition.

This distinction is unacceptable to Ibn Taymiyah in so far as it is based on the assumption that Definition carries within itself the guarantee of its correspondence to real things, or (conversely) that Sharḥ al-Ism betrays its own being destitute of such guarantees. By itself, the definition of man (for example) does not establish the veridical character of its contents in contradistinction to what may be said in explanation of the term Centaur. The ground of the affirmation of one and the denial of the other lies somewhere else than in the words 'rational animal' (or the dictionary meaning of Centaur). (Cf. pp. 38 ff. *et passim*). On this showing, it will not be difficult to see how Ibn Taymiyah can regard both man and Centaur as equally significant terms—the one, of things directly apprehended by us; the other, of such 'things' as recombine the elements of experience in fantastic fashion.

17. i.e. they should constitute an affirmation or a denial. Ibn Taymiyah deals with this question in the context of what are called syncategorematic terms. According to him, most Logicians had laid down the rule that only a complete sentence could form a definition, and that simple and unrelated words (however numerous and compact or syncategorematic in respect of their significance) could not serve the purpose. Rāzī (Fakhr al-Dīn), who disagreed with other Logicians on this point, was prepared to treat (for instance) 'rational animal' as a complete definition in this very form. (Hence he thought of the fuller statement 'Man is a rational animal' as superfluous). Ibn Taymiyah refers (pp. 32 ff.) to Rāzī's *Muḥaṣṣal* to show that the latter did not consider 'rational animal' as a mere jumble of *simple* terms. On the contrary, he claimed that there is complexity in it—which, however, he described as restrictive in character (al-Tarkīb al-Taq'īdī).

What makes Ibn Taymiyah's rejoinder to Rāzī extremely interesting is not that it rejects the latter's interpretation, but that it proceeds to work out its consequences from the Islamic point of view. Ibn Taymiyah refers to some people (e.g. the Ṣūfīs) who content themselves with the repetition of words like Allāh in prayer or devout meditation. That, according to him, is not the right thing to do. For all the formulas of Prayer (e.g. "God is the greatest One" or "Praise be to God") which occur in *Qrn*. or Ḥadīth are definitive statements in the form of complete sentences through which a person gives expression to Faith and Knowledge. The over-simplification to which the Ṣūfīs have resorted is at its best a meaningless thing; for the mere word Allāh cannot give expression to clear and positive attitudes describable in terms of Faith and Knowledge. The worst instance of the

isolation, they cannot serve any useful purpose. It is only when they stand in relation to each other (in meaningful and complete units of speech) that they can inform us (about reality). Their informative character presupposes *conversation*—i.e. between a person who uses them and another to whom they may be addressed. The latter person must in some sense be prepared to receive them. For if he is not so prepared, an attempt to inform him will be like the utterance of the words of a foreign language to one who does not understand it. Just as in the case of a foreign language information must be preceded by elementary instruction, so will conversation fail to be of any use to an unprepared participant. The way to deal with him, therefore, is to enable him to identify the objects which may be signified by the informative words that may have been addressed to him.[18] On the

Ṣūfī over-simplification is to be found in the teachings of Ibn 'Arabī (*fī madhhab ahl al-zandaqah wa al-ilḥād, ahl waḥdat al-wujūd*). For his use of the mere word Allāh is not an omission in relation to questions of Faith and Knowledge, but a contradiction or denial of the two (p. 36). He did not believe in the creatures on whose subservience to God and difference from His Islam teaches us to base all Faith and Knowledge. According to him, Allāh is the only word that can be used meaningfully or in an existential sense. From the Islamic point of view, however, that is (characterized by Ibn Taymiyah as) a monstrous doctrine to teach. For Faith or Knowledge does not consist in the pronouncement of mere words.

18. Ibn Taymiyah says (p. 55) that the Mutakallimīn used the word Ta'īn to describe this process. It is possible only when you can get hold of an object so as to present it for inspection by the senses (of the person concerned). For instance, you speak of snow to a person who does not know the thing you mean or the word you use for it. What you can do, therefore, is to help him to see some snow—i.e. to grasp it in its 'Ayn (identity). If, however, an object be unavailable for inspection by the senses, you must revert to the description of its qualities or of its likeness to some other objects which may be (or may have been) present to the senses.

As regards the person who may have identified an object, it is interesting to note that Ibn Taymiyah grades his resultant experience in terms of Darajāt al-Yaqīn (degrees of certainty). Thus:—

(a) 'Ilm al-Yaqīn is the term for his condition if it can be supposed that (before the *identification*) he knew of snow in theoretical fashion or through Tradition.

(b) 'Ayn al-Yaqīn is the term for *identification* itself in so far as it may have been preceded by (a).

(c) Ḥaqq al-Yaqīn is the term for his condition if it can be supposed that (before he identified snow on this particular occasion) he had not only seen or heard of it or known it, but had also developed familiarity with it. (P. 56 fn.).

contrary, one's being prepared to receive information will make a contribution towards the realization of the purpose it is designed to serve. In essence, such preparation takes the form of a person's previous acquaintance with an object signified by the informative words. Thus, you *translate* whenever you have information to be weighed by a person who knows the thing you mean, but who has not conceived of it in the same words as form a part of your information.[19]

Translation is,[20] then, a general term for all the functions of language that inform; and in all cases, it presupposes previous

19. For (according to Ibn Taymiyah) that is precisely what you do in putting the words of one language in the place of the words of another—so that a person who knows the former may extend his concept of them to the latter.

20. It is in consonance with this principle that Ibn Taymiyah applies the term not only to those cases in which the words of one language are put in the place of the words of another, but also to those cases in which words of one and the same language are shown to belong to a particular universe of discourse.

Ibn Taymiyah thinks that most of the literary activity of Muslim scholars is translative in the latter sense. For (although both they and their readers use the Arabic language) they are concerned with the problem of the determination of the significance of (some) words—in the Islamic universe of discourse. For instance, this is true of Qur'ān-exegesis, the commentaries on Ḥadīth, and the expositions of Fiqh). It is wrong to assume that their problem can be solved merely by means of philological research into the Arabic language. Such research can be a part of their activity in an incidental or minor sense. It is only in a few cases that the dictionaries of the Arabic language might provide them with a standard. Far more numerous, on the other hand, are those cases in which Custom provides them with a standard. (For instance, their explanation of such things as Marriage or Sale is determined by reference to Custom). Above all, however, the Islamic significance of words is determined by reference to *Qrn.*, the Tradition of the Prophet, or the practice of the Muslim community or its leaders in the good old days.

Naturally, the Islamic authorities attach the highest importance to the Asmā' Shar'īyah (religious terms) which determine the significance of words in the Islamic universe of discourse. (In some cases, they require each and every Muslim to learn them; in others, the obligation imposed by them envisages its specific performance in a single instance or by only one person. In any case, the imposition of the obligation is necessitated by the complete ignorance or the imperfect and unsatisfactory knowledge that is possessed by most people).

acquaintance with the objects signified by the informative words. Unrelated to each other, these words are merely names (for the various qualities of objects). But when they take the form of a complete and coherent report which is susceptible of proof or denial, they are called a description or a definition. In either case, their value lies in the concepts they communicate to other persons. These concepts cannot be identified with the essence of the conceived objects. For in forming or receiving them, their authors or recipients break up the concrete totality of a thing into several factors—without knowing whether this or that one of them is a *sine qua non*. For the determination of such an indispensable character would depend upon the elimination of other factors; but the totality of a thing admits of no such experimentation. We have to take a thing as it is in the fullness of its components. In fact, even the comprehension of such fullness cannot be said to be an easy matter; for in most cases, some of its components inevitably elude our grasp (p. 71).

The communication of concepts offers a good example of what (in the case of the Islamic sciences) is called a unipersonal report (Khabar al-Wāḥid). The man who speaks to you of a thing gives you no certainty unless his words should give expression to a valid concept (on his part) which is verifiable in the light

This translative function of Muslim scholarship fulfils itself in Tā'wīl (interpretation). Once you may have determined the significance of a word in the Islamic universe of discourse, your next problem should be to consider whether the object signified by it is self-evident, or not. Ijtihād means the activity through which you arrive at the 'interpretation' of those objects which correspond to the Asmā' Shar'īyah, but whose correspondence is not self-evident. An alternative term for this activity is Taḥqīq al-Manāṭ—i.e. the ascertainment of the *nexus* or the crucial factor (by virtue of which the said Asmā' become applicable to certain objects.

On Ibn Taymiyah's showing, the latter term is only a part of Ijtihād. For Taḥqīq al-Manāṭ consists (for instance) in the deduction of the principle of a rule in Fiqh—e.g. the deduction of the *just* character as the principles of the eligibility of Witnesses; whereas Ijtihād uses this deduction in order to extend a rule to some other instances—e.g. in the case of the extension of the significance of incest which was explained in *Qrn.* (4:23) by reference (*inter alia*) to the mother and the daughter, but which has been 'interpreted' to include the mother's mother and the daughter's daughter (Pp. 51-55).

Ibn Taymiyah's view of Ijtihād and Tā'wīl also provides an occasion for the consideration of the problem of the Muḥkam (definite) and Mutashābih

of some (previous) acquaintance (on your part).[21] If a particular definition formulated by him fails to communicate concepts to you, the deficiency must be supplied by arguments in support of it—without which (in the present case) there can be no Knowledge. At this point, Ibn Taymiyah ventures to turn the tables on the Logicians. For they reject Khabar al-Wāḥid[22] as a part of the methodology of the Islamic sciences,[23] but allow it to go unchallenged in their doctrine of Definition.[24]

(problematical) verses of *Qrn.* (3:7). In this (Quranic) passage, it is possible either to stop at the word Allāh or to read it in conjunction with the following word (Rāsikhūn). On the former reading, the knowledge of the interpretation of the problematical things in *Qrn.* is attributed to God alone; on the latter, it is attributed to Him and to some specially qualified persons. From the grammatical point of view, the former reading is perfect; from the theological point of view, on the other hand, it may be considered as disappointing. In the case of the latter reading, the terms of this evaluation will be reversed. (For a fuller treatment of the whole question, see Ibn Taymiyah's own Tafsīr *ad loc.*). Even at the risk of some violence to Grammar, Ibn Taymiyah is prepared to attribute the knowledge of Tā'wīl to God and to some specially qualified persons. However, he hastens to point out that in the present context Tā'wīl is comparable to the problem of Definition in general. Thus, if the definition or the 'interpretation' of things be explained in terms of distinguishing them, both of them can be kown to God and man alike. But if they were to be explained in terms of unfolding the essence of things, human knowledge will extend to them in neither case (p. 60).

21. Thus, the 'preparations' of the listener must correspond to similar 'preparations' on the part of the author of a definition. Between themselves, the two refute the Logicians' claim that Knowledge is (newly) acquired by means of Definition. Ibn Taymiyah is willing to concede, however, that in either case, these preparations consist in the understanding of *names* which becomes more explicit when it is expressed in Definition (p. 10).

22. Ibn Taymiyah uses this term in its generic sense—viz. the one in which it would represent the methodology of historical knowledge. Hence it must be distinguished from the technical sense it has (e.g.) in Imām Shāfi'ī's *Kitāb al-Umm.*

23. Which on Ibn Taymiyah's showing are historical.

24. (Pp. 11-13, 37 f.). Actually, the interpretation Ibn Taymiyah attributes to the Logicians would seem to dismiss Khabar al-Wāḥid as irrelevant rather than accept it as a valid method in the case of Logic. (Even so, his objection would stand. For he might charge them with inconsistency in that they think that such Khabar vitiates the methodology of the Islamic sciences, but not that of Logic). He represents them to maintain that a definition can be supported or refuted neither by an argument nor by reference to the character of its author as a reporter.

Now to pass on to Ibn Taymiyah's critical examination of some actually attempted definitions. In general, his attitude is that most of them could be accepted as useful means of distinguishing things, but that no one of them could satisfy the fantastic conditions the Logicians had laid down in their doctrine of Definition. For instance, the way in which they had tried to define words like *man*, Sun, *name*, *reasoning* (Qiyās), &c. had created more problems for them than it could have solved.[25] As a matter of fact, it is inconceivable that the human mind should hit upon the perfect definition of any term—on this side of eternity. But this does not mean that 'scientific' activity should be held up until after the discovery of perfect definitions. The Logicians must recognize that the terms and concepts which are actually employed by the Muslim authors and thinkers[26] possess as much validity as can be attributed to anything used in lieu of unattainable perfection.

Some of the greatest Logicians have themselves pointed out the difficulties that beset Definition. For instance, one of the chapters in Ghazālī's MIm describes them at some length.[27] How-

According to Ibn Taymiyah, the Logicians say that the only criterion of the validity of Definition is its inner consistency. In defining an object, it must not leave out anything that belongs to it, nor bring in anything that does not belong to it. In other words, the definition of a particular thing must be the only definition of that thing only. Hence they agree that the way to invalidate a definition is either to confront it with a rival definition or to show that it is much too wide or too narrow. Mu'āradah is the term for the former process; Naqḍ, for the latter. Naqḍ is sub-divided into the exposition of excess or defect. For instance, if you define man as animal, your definition includes other things than man—e.g. horse. But if you define him as Arab, you will have excluded many other human beings—e.g. the Greeks.

25. This results from the fact that the Logicians had produced too many definitions—e.g. more than 20 for Qiyās, more than 70 for 'Name', &c. (p. 8).

26. E.g. the Philosophers, Physicians, Grammarians, Jurists, Theologians, &c. (*ibid*).

27. فى استعصاء الحد على القوى البشرية الا عند غاية التشمير و الجهد (pp. 19-22). Ghazālīsays that the utmost care must be taken:—

(a) in defining a thing by reference to its approximate genus which it is not easy always to keep in view. For instance, one may lose sight of

ever, the clearest and the most authoritative statement of such difficulties is to be found in Ibn Sīnā's KS (i, 5).[28] For he actually says that, in the case of the primary notions, a perfect defini-

animal (as the approximate genus) and define man as 'body that is rational and mortal'.

(b) in distinguishing inseparable accidents from the differentia. For in so far as the former coincide with the existence of a thing, the imagination is prone to identifying them with the latter.

(c) in the enumeration of the differentia which has to be exhaustive. This presents an almost insoluble problem in those cases where the differentia left out of a definition may have appeared to be redundant. For instance, the correct definition of animal is: "Body, possessing 'soul', having sensation, and moved by Will". But there is equivalence (Musāwāt) between animal and the words "Body, possessing 'soul', having sensation". If, therefore, voluntary movement is *not* enumerated, the omission may be described as reasonable (if not correct).

(d) in selecting the *fundamentum divisionis* by reference to which the differentia may be introduced into a definition. For instance, body is divisible into organic and inorganic. But (in so far as animals are bodies) it can be divided into rational and irrational as well. However, the former division is primary and, therefore, more correct. In many cases, it is extremely difficult to distinguish such primary principles of division from the secondary or subordinate.

28. Ibn Sīnā admits that the meaning of such terms as *being, thing,* and *necessary* is impressed upon the soul in a manner characterized by its primacy. For these meanings could not have been derived from things more familiar than they are. In spite of the primacy of their meanings, however, these words may be and are defined for certain purposes and in a certain manner. For instance, *being* is defined as that which performs or receives *action*. Similarly, *thing* is defined as that about which you can make an assertion. Again, *one* is defined as that which cannot be divided or multiplied. Or *many* is defined as the aggregate of *ones*. The first three of these definitions make use of concepts (i.e. action, passion, assertion, division, and multiplication) which are less familiar than what they are designed to make known, and whose own definitions consequently should involve a reference to the latter. As regards the definition of *many*, it is but proper that it should depend upon the notion of *one*. Some people have sought to reverse this relationship, defining *one* as a thing wherein there is no plurality. By so doing, they have tried to make the concept of *number* independent and self-explanatory; for that which is true of *plurality* applies to *number* as well. In principle, however, this definition too amounts to defining a familiar thing by reference to another that is less familiar. (According to Ibn Sīnā, this would be apparent if one realized that *number* cannot be identified with plurality *as such*, but only with things whereof the latter is predicated. In order to avoid this difficulty, some other people have tried

tion is (from the nature of the case) impossible. With his words on this point his followers (e.g. Ghazālī, Rāzī and Suhrawardī) also agree. In spite of this appreciative reference, however, a major criticism Ibn Taymiyah would make here is that the principle of indefinability which has been recognized by Ibn Sīnā must be extended to many other things than those he would describe as 'familiar'. For the familiarity of a concept depends not only on its being universally acceptable to mankind, but also on the consistency and regularity with which it may be used—e.g. by some experts in their special fields (pp. 47 f.).

But although the Logicians recognize some contra-indications, two most important things they fail to perceive are (a) the personal factors involved in Definition and (b) the evidences of Experience which are gathered up by Analogy into the texture of even purely abstract and non-empirical things—viz. the concepts which enter into Definition. As regards the first, the Logicians not only ignore them, but they also try to get rid of them—so that Definition may be established as a sure and certain means to Knowledge in the case of all persons. But that is a mere dream. In so far as Definition is a function of language, they ought to have realized that the personal circumstances of the speaker and the hearer in a particular case may call for the modification of a regular definition. We have seen how in certain cases Definition takes on the character of translation. Now, there are some other cases in which both the speaker and the hearer may know the meaning of words (used in a definition) as well as the objects signified by them. To them, therefore, Definition may still be of considerable significance and use—in so far as they may like to know some special features (Khaṣā'iṣ) of the defined thing, or some combinations into which it may enter, or its efficient or final cause, or some wider implications of its definition itself.[29] In general, these differences[30] are explained by the fact that one

to define number as 'discrete *quantity* which has *order*. But the idea of *order* is less familiar than that of *number*).

29. By way of illustration, Ibn Taymiyah here (p: 60) refers to the problem of the Soul. Perhaps his meaning is that both the questioner and the definer of Soul may know it in like manner at the outset — i.e. in an enquiry that may lead from preliminary definitions to a more penetrating analysis.

30. *Between* the speaker and the hearer or *among* various speakers or hearers at different times.

and the same definable thing may appear to be self-evident and problematical to different persons or to one and the same person at different times. The circumstances of a man's life form the subject-matter of the activity of his senses (Ḥissiyyāt) or his experience (Mushāhadāt). When they are communicated to some other persons (through uninterrupted and reliable channels), they can be described as Mutawātirāt in relation to them. To persons who may have heard of them through less reliable and complete sources, they are the subject-matter of Opinion or Conjecture (Ẓanniyāt). To persons who receive them but who do not know whence they might have come, they are ill-known things (Majhūlāt). In view of this diversity, it is unreasonable to hope that any definition that may be devised will produce the same kind of Knowledge in the minds of different persons (pp. 13 f.).

As regards the empirical elements which find their way into Definition, it must be borne in mind that the Logicians' interpretation of the *differentia* and the generic qualities is open to criticism on many points. As Ghazālī has pointed out, logical theory sets itself a difficult task in requiring that the *differentia* be different from the inseparable accidents. Ibn Sīnā has taught his followers to exalt the *differentia* of man (rationality) above the oddness or the evenness of *number*. In general, his argument for this distinction is that rationality constitutes man, whereas oddness or evenness follows from the being of number.[31] But that argument is based on assumptions which are untenable. However, he makes use of another argument to prove the point—at least, in the case of some numbers. Thus, he maintains that the knowledge of man's essential attributes[32] is immediate, whereas the knowledge of the attributes of numbers is immediate in some cases[33] but mediate in other.[34] He thinks that this proves the *differentia* of man to be more essential than the mediately known

31. Ibn Taymiyah rejects this argument because he thinks that the concrete totality of the defined things warrants no such division into constitutive and coincident attributes. Even so, he is prepared to assert that, if a distinction could be made between rationality and oddness (or evenness), the latter should have been considered as more essential to *number* than the former is to man (p. 70).

32. I.e. his generic qualities as well as the differentia.

33. E.g. in the case of the proposition: $2 = 4/2$.

34. E.g. in the case of the proposition: 1372 can be divided by 2 (p. 68).

attributes of some numbers. This brings us back to the problem of Taḍammun or the analytical relationship that exists between two terms. For Ibn Sīnā's use of the words mediate and immediate is based on the assumption that in one case our knowledge is analytical, whereas in the other it is not. Now, it is reasonable to describe the evenness of 1,372 as unanalytical.[35] But the question is whether the concept of rationality (in the case of man) is analytical, or not. An important thing the Avicennians seem to have ignored is that, if two terms be analytically related to each other, one of them must be the larger of the two. In other words, they must differ in quantity (if not in quality). For if they are equal (in quantity), one of them will not contain the other. In fact, the absence of all (quantitative as well as qualitative) differences between them will cause them to cancel out each other, wherefore they will cease to be two. It follows that, if rationality can be known analytically or by way of Taḍammun (in the concept of man), its quantity must be unequal to that of the latter concept. If, therefore, the concept of man is universal, the knowledge of rationality that is contained in it must be particular— i.e. rooted in the experience of rational beings in the sensible world.[36] On this principle, the Avicennian anti-thesis (between the rationality of man and the evenness of a composite number) is untenable; for the reduction of the quantity of rationality would place it on the same footing as the attributes of composite numbers are.

35. In the sense that it is derived from (or 'mediated' by) the primary concept of the evenness of 2 (which is analytical).

36. Ibn Taymiyah gives expression to this fundamental principle of Empiricism in the context of the problem of Knowledge (pp. 80-87). He represents the Logicians to maintain that the (meaning of the) term 'knowledge' is self-evident. For all men know such things as their own feelings, and this knowledge is also known to them. But these kinds of *knowledge* are secondary and composite. Hence the Logicians conclude that the primary and simple notion of Knowledge *as such* is presupposed by those cognitions. Reducing this argument to the idea of Taḍammun, Ibn Taymiyah contends that the concept of Knowledge (which is universal) is too large to be contained in a particular knowledge (e.g. that we know our feelings):—

ليس في الخارج ما هو مطلق عام مع كونه مطلقاً عاماً وإذا وجد المعين
الجزئي فالانسان والحيوان وجدت فيه انسانية معينة مختصة به غير
عامة ولا مطلقة

Moreover, the principle of Taḍammun may have disastrous consequences for the doctrine of Definition. The Logicians require that things be defined *per genus et differentiam*. And they exalt the differentia above the inseparable accidents because the former is related to the genus by way of Taḍammun. But if this is so, why should a definition consist of both the genus and the differentia? For instance, man is defined as a rational animal. If rational is related to animal by way of Taḍammun, the word animal will be superfluous. For no other beings than animals can be rational. In answer to this objection, the Logicians have tried to justify the use of this word on the ground that it makes for greater clarity (Tafṣīl). But if that is what they are interested in, let them recall their own definition of this word (animal)—i.e. "Body, possessing 'soul', having sensation, and moved by will".[37] It is obvious that the mere word animal is not equivalent[38] to all the attributes included in its definition. Therefore, the requirements of Tafṣīl would be fulfilled if the Logicians were to substitute all these attributes in place of the word animal in the definition of man (p. 76).

Finally, the fundamental assumption on which the notion of differentia is based brings it into conflict with the so-called purpose of Definition—namely, its contribution towards the acquisition of Knowledge. The Logicians think that Definition unfolds the essence of the thing that is defined—in such a way that a person who might not have known it at all would henceforth become familiar with it. But if this is so, the inclusion of the differentia (in Definition) begs the question. If a person does not know man, it is no use speaking to him of rationality. For the term man is unknown to him and must not be represented to him by reference to itself—i.e. by reference to any attributes exclusively characteristic of it. In this sense, therefore, the notion of differentia as a part of Definition involves self-contradiction. However, there is a deeper sense in which its use can be justified. This will be apparent if it is recognized that the surest way to inform a person about a thing is to mention those (generic) attributes of it which it shares in common with some other things.

37. See note 27 above.

38. *Ibid.* Cf. Ghazālī's assertion that it is equivalent to only three out of the four attributes included in its definition.

He may already know the latter; wherefore, his realization of the attributes common to them and to the definable thing in question will facilitate the transition of the understanding from more familiar things to a less familiar one. (In this sense, Analogy provides the explanatory principle of our conception of the genus and of the generic attributes which are common to its species). Now, the attributes common to the various species of a genus must be such that they should not be confused with the common attributes of the species of another genus. They must form a class by themselves. Hence they can be described as the differentia of the genus in question. This shows that, if differentia has to be considered as a necessary part of Definition, it must be identified with the characteristics of the genus superordinate to the definable thing, not with the characteristics of that thing itself. For those latter characteristics represent the identity of a thing which cannot be defined by reference to itself (p. 56).[39]

The Problem of Demonstration

The other part of Ibn Taymiyah's criticism (pp. 88-545) is related to the problem of reasoning and demonstration. While it reaffirms many of the fundamental ideas to which he gave expression in the first part, it is quite distinctive in many respects. Of these, by far the most significant is the consistency and the systematic character of Ibn Taymiyah's criticism in this part. These qualities bear direct proportion to his interest in some other methods of reasoning than the one taught by the Logicians. His criticism of the latter forms a defence of the former. Hence his treatment of the problem of Demonstration as a whole falls into

39. Suppose that you want to define A, and that B and C &c. are some other things which (together with A) form a species. Further, suppose that *b* and c &c. are attributes A shares in common with other members of the species, whereas x_1 and x_2 etc. represent qualities peculiar to A.

In so far as you may be defining A because it is *not* known, you can have no idea of x_1 and x_2 &c. These must be excluded from Definition.

Again, in so far as you can define A only by reference to *b* and *c* &c. it follows that Definition depends upon Analogy. (This means that Analogy consists in thinking of x_1 and x_2 &c. as definable—not in themselves, but in the light of *b* and *c* &c.).

Lastly, in so far as *b* and *c* &c. are common to the various species of a genus (and, therefore, form a class by themselves), it follows that you can define A only by reference to the differentia of its superordinate genus.

a coherent pattern. It is for this reason that the second part of the book must be distinguished from (or above) the first where divergent points of view lend substance to the author's criticism of Definition.[40]

Ibn Taymiyah's digressions into metaphysics (Ilāhiyāt) are also characteristic of his criticism in this (second) part which is punctuated with them *in extenso.* In general, there is a perceptible connection between these and his main problem—viz. the refutation of syllogistic reasoning; for the latter depends upon universal judgments whose transcendence above experience involves metaphysical investigations. More especially, however, Ibn Taymiyah's interest in Ilāhiyāt arises out of his utter dissatisfaction with Ibn Sīnā's conception of the Necessary Being (Wājib al-Wujūd). Furthermore, he would have us imagine that Ghazālī's criticism of the Avicennian conception had not only failed to anticipate his own refutation (in KRM), but that its own philosophical prepossessions had made it increasingly imperative (e.g. for Ibn Taymiyah himself) to concentrate upon the theological significance of the whole problem. At any rate, Ibn Taymiyah's treatment of metaphysical questions is large enough in its sweep to recapitulate some of the greatest moments in the history of Islamic Thought.

Now to begin with. Ibn Taymiyah represents the Logicians to maintain that, in order to produce *certain* Knowledge, theoretical investigations must take the form of Demonstration (Burhān) —i.e. an argument in the form of a syllogism in the first figure (Qiyās al-Shumūl). Such an argument is explained by them to consist of two premises whence a third follows as a necessary conclusion. In this kind of reasoning all depends upon a universal proposition through which an affirmation is made. Hence it is necessary that one of the two premises should be *universal affirmative.* Conversely, it is impossible that a conclusion should follow from the two premises of an argument both of which are particular or negative.

40. For instance, he told us there that the pre-Rationalistic authors and thinkers in Islam were more interested in differentia than in similarities (see text following No. 60). Should this also represent his own attitude, it would seem to contradict the assertion he makes (note 92) in his vigorous attack on differentia (whose inclusion in Definition is claimed by him to beg the question).

The movement of thought that constitutes Demonstration is explained by the Logicians in terms of 'the progression of the mind from a given thing to a universal concept which in its generality includes or comprehends that thing and many others'.[41] In specific terms, this includes the following steps:

1. a movement from a particular thing to a general concept;
2. a movement to a particular thing in the light of the general concept;
3. the comprehension or the subsumption (shumūl) of the particular thing under the general concept.

As a matter of fact, the Logicians consider the first step to have been taken by the human mind *sub specie aeternitatis*—in its assent to the pure intellectualizations[42] or the first principles of all Knowledge which are presupposed by all universal judgments that govern actual arguments. As regards the latter judgments, they become available[43] when objects of sense-perception become *known*. The mere activity of sense-perception does not constitute Knowledge. For its objects are given here and now so that their identity remains inaccessible to any one whose senses are not in touch with them. If, therefore, our senses were to provide us with the only outlook on things, any information that could be gathered through them would remain in the exclusive possession of their subject in a particular case. But Knowledge is the term only for such information as lends itself to participation (by all sentient beings). However, the formation of Knowledge is not delayed far beyond the activity of the senses. Indeed, the latter

41. انتقال الذهن من المعين الى المعنى العام المشترك الكلى المتناول له ولغيره (p. 119).

42. These include such assertions as "One is half of two" or "The whole is greater than its parts" or "Things equal to the same thing are equal to one another" or "Two contraries never meet nor can both of them be ruled out" or "Two contradictories never meet" (p. 108).

43. In a manner that gives expression to the inner necessity of reason, or from a source describable as the Giver of Intelligence (Wāhib al-'Aql) (p. 152).

activity finds the Soul prepared[44] for the enunciation of a universal judgment.

The following argument may illustrate the significance of a universal judgment:

1. All that intoxicates is forbidden (ḥarām).
2. Nabīdh[45] is an intoxicant.
3. Therefore, Nabīdh is forbidden.

In this argument, the first (major) premiss is universal affirmative. The third part of it is the conclusion that necessarily follows from the subsumption of the second (minor) premiss under the first. Each of the three parts of the argument includes two terms—viz. a subject and a predicate. But the words used as the subject or the predicate are not all new and distinct. Some of them have been repeated so as to halve the mathematical possibilities (the number 6) of terms in the argument. Thus there are only three terms—intoxicant, Nabīdh and forbidden. The term (forbidden) which is the predicate of the conclusion is called the major term; and the one (Nabīdh) which is its subject, the minor. The term (intoxicant) which occurs in the two premises but not in the conclusion is called the middle term (p. 349). Of these terms, the major may be larger in connotation than the minor, or may be equal to it; but it cannot be the lesser of the two. The same holds of the relation between the middle and the minor terms. As regards the middle and the major terms, the former can be lesser than the latter, or may be equal to it; but it cannot be the larger of the two.[46]

The Logicians say that the middle term mediates the subsumption of a particular thing (or a less general one) under a universal judgment. The precise significance of its mediatory function makes itself apparent when the conclusion to which it

44. (Pp. 300 f.):

واما الحكم العقلي فيقولون ان النفس عند رؤيتها هذه المعينات تستعد
لان تفيض عليها قضية كلية بالعموم

45. i.e. 'must' or 'mead' or 'wort'. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon, sub voce.*

46. (P. 363). All this presupposes that the first figure is the 'natural' one, and that, therefore, it is the best suited to Demonstration. (For the explanation of the other three figures, see p. 161).

leads reveals it to have been an objective or an epistemological factor.[47]

From what they have to say of the middle term it can be seen that the Logicians consider the universal premises in an argument as immediate—at least, within the framework of that argument. The relation between its subject and predicate is self-evident. As regards its inner contents, it makes an affirmation concerning a whole class which is true of each and every one of its members. But it is not based upon an actual observation of all the members of a class. No one knows a class such as man in the completeness of its extension in the past, the present and the future. But the essential attributes of man (e.g. his rationality or his being animal), which enter into his Māhiyah, can be and are known—independently of one's knowledge (or ignorance) of a certain number of men. Indeed, the actual observation of a particular man becomes Knowledge under the influence of a universal conception of man. In other words, the latter conception is not only prior to the former activity, but it also invests that activity with meaning or reason. The influence of the universal conception is not confined to a particular individual or a single instance. When we see another individual or thing of the same kind, it comes to be recognized (as comparable to the first) and reinvested with meaning or reason. The process that leads to the reinvestment is Qiyās; and our recognition constitutes the minor premiss of the argument. It is necessary to have this minor premiss because a universal affirmation does not by itself constitute an argument.[48] Accordingly, the smallest number of

47. The conclusion is either a proof or a drawing out of certain consequences. In the former case, the middle term turns on a *ratio essendi*; in the latter, on a *ratio cognoscendi*. Ibn Taymiyah tells us (p. 90) that the Avicennians distinguished the two kinds of arguments based on this twofold character of the middle term as Burhān al-'Illah or Burhān Lima and Burhān al-Dalālah or Burhān Inna respectively. (For Rāzī's disagreement with the majority of Avicennians on this point, see pp. 90, 345, 415, 418 &c.). See Joseph, *Introduction to Logic, op. cit.*, pp. 251 ff. Also see L. Gardet, "al-Burhān", *Ency. of Islam* (New Edition).

48. Cf. the following passage from Ḥasan b. Mūsa Naubakhtī's (d. after 300/912) *Kitāb al-Ārā wa al-Diyānāt*:—

> The Master of Logic is wrong in saying that a single premiss does not make an argument ... It is possible to say: 'The reason why man is *substance* is that he is susceptible of contrary qualities descending upon him at different times'. Here it will not be necessary to bring in another premiss—viz. 'All that is susceptible of contrary qualities at

premises that can be included in an argument is two. There is general agreement among the Logicians that this also represents the maximum in the present case—so that the premises can be neither more nor less than two. If, therefore, more than two premises appear in an argument, they can and should be reduced to two. However, (in Arabian logic) this question has been related to the problem of Tafaṭṭun (Apperception) or Istiḥḍār (Recollection). Ibn Sīnā maintains that in some cases one's knowledge of the two premises of an argument may not help him to arrive at the conclusion.[49] In such cases, therefore, the mind makes an additional effort (to draw the conclusion) which is a tertiary factor. But this interpretation was challenged by Rāzī who said that the necessity of the conclusion which follows from the premises cannot be 'other' than the conclusion or the premises. For if it were an external factor, it would give rise to an additional (third) premiss whose own alienated necessity would give rise to a fourth premiss, and so on *ad infinitum* (p. 191).

The Logicians believe that the formal rules applicable to reasoning presuppose a critical conception of the varieties of its sub-

different times is *substance*'. For the fact that all the recipients of such qualities are *substances* is the very *problem* in the present case ... In so far as the Particular is included in the General, a reference to one of the two renders the other superfluous ... As a rule, we do not find two universal premises both of which may be requisite to establishing the conclusion in an argument.

In his comments on this passage, Ibn Taymiyah interprets Naubakhtī's meaning as follows:—

(a) No syllogism does in fact contain two axiomatic or self-evident premises. If, therefore, it is made to contain them, it can be rectified by eliminating one of them.

(b) If one of the two premises is axiomatic whereas the other is questionable, the latter will form the crux of the argument.

(c) If both the premises are questionable, both of them will be crucial so that a 2-premiss argument may change into a 3-premiss argument (pp. 337 f.).

In general, Ibn Taymiyah feels that the criticism of Aristotelian logic by Naubakhtī offers a good example of how the Muslim sects make a common cause against Rationalism.

49. (P. 191):—

A man who knows that the she-mule is sterile may sometimes be unmindful of the fact. Therefore, on seeing a she-mule that appears to be big, he may ask: 'Is it bearing (its issue), or not?' Some one may say to him: 'Do you not know that it is a she-mule?' If he says 'Yes' he may again be asked: 'Do you not know that the she-mule is sterile?' On answering the latter question in the affirmative, it will occur to him that the she-mule in question will not bring forth any issue.

ject-matter. Not all those things whereof people think or speak can be argued;[50] indeed, some of those things cannot be discussed

50. Following is a scheme of judgments classified on the basis of the varying degrees of the certainty of their subject matter:—



(KIT cited in KRM, pp. 396 f.).

or argued at all. Some other things which can be argued fall into arguments which are imperfect and incorrigible from the nature of the case. It is only the *certain* things that lend themselves to Demonstration. Few in number and hard to come by, these are apprehended by the intellect which acts and moves in transcendental realms unclouded by the confusion and contradictions of the senses. Represented by the teachings of such sciences as Mathematics and Metaphysics,[51] they serve as the criteria of the validity of arguments grounded in any other subject-matter.

From a close examination of the varieties of the subject-matter of reasoning it will appear that the Logicians considered moral judgments and the causal explanations as the only two approximations to a pure intellectualization. This is borne out by the fact that in the foregoing classification (of judgments), Ibn Sīnā subdivided the true facts of common knowledge (Mashhūrāt) into the axiomatic truths (Awwaliyāt) and moral judgments (al-Ārā' al-Maḥmūdah). Rāzī interprets this subdivision to mean that the Mashhūrāt are Awwaliyāt—unless the contingency of their subject-matter should cause them to be redefined (as the Ārā' Maḥmūdah).[52] As regards the causal explanations, it will be possible to realize their affinity to pure intellectualizations if it is recognized that the Avicennian notion of Causality includes two different types of relationship. In the first place, it treated the divine Being as the cause of the universe. In the second place, it considered the causal relationship to be exemplified by the con-

51. Ibn Taymiyah tells us (p. 123) that the Logicians divide all the sciences into the physical, the mathematical and the metaphysical. Of these, the first (which has Body for its subject-matter) depends upon Matter both in mind and *in re*; whereas the second (which treats of Number and Quantity) is independent of Matter in mind but not *in re*. In contrast to these two, the third is absolutely independent of Matter. Hence Metaphysics is the worthiest, and Physics the least worthy, science; whereas Mathematics stands mid-way between these two (p. 133). In spite of this gradation, however, Mathematics as well as Metaphysics is sufficiently abstract to yield the pure intellectualizations (note 42) or the first principles of Knowledge which are presupposed by all universal judgments in actual arguments (pp. 107 f.).

52. (Pp. 397-99). Rāzī here has introduced a vertical principle of division instead of a horizontal one. *Any* (true) 'fact of common knowledge' is (comparable to) an axiomatic truth—save in so far as the externality of its subject-matter should call for a redefinition of its name (and status).

tingent beings which 'follow' one after another. The principle of distinction between these two instances was assumed to consist in the length of time that intervenes between the cause and the effect in each case. Thus God and the universe were said never to have been separated from each other in time, for both of them are eternal. This coevality (Iqtirān) of the cause and the effect (p. 377) did not strike the Avicennians as a contradiction in terms. On the contrary, they thought that it might well serve as a norm for all causal phenomena; for it is conducive to the most direct and complete realization of the efficiency of the cause. In contrast to it, they conceived of the contingent events and things of the world as effected through a long series (of causal factors) which has its upper limit in celestial movements. On this interpretation, various but irreducible units of time must intervene between all observable effects and their 'causes' in the world.[53]

This, then, explains how the Avicennian notion of Causality embraced two different types of relationship which can be described as Simultaneity (Iqtirān) and Concomitance (Talāzum). Of these terms, the first is comparable to (if not identical with) Taḍammun or Tadākhul which signifies the logical relation of terms[54] (when one of them is analytically contained in the other) —in that both of them can be expressed mathematically or in the form of a pure intellectualization. If, therefore, a causal explanation were to be based on the idea of Simultaneity, the Avicennians would in perfect consistency recognize it as comprehensive enough to appear as the major premiss of an apdeictic argument. This would correspond to their recognition (*cum grano salis*) of the (true) Mashhūrāt as axiomatic truths.

As regards Concomitance (Talāzum), causal explanations based on this concept were not acceptable to the Avicennians as pure intellectualizations.[55] However, Ibn Sīnā himself classed them as 'empirical judgments' which 'compel assent' (note 103). And Ibn Taymiyah seems to imply (pp. 92 f.) that, in general

53. i.e. properly speaking, factors or links in the causal series, or the media of causal efficiency rather than its principles.

54. Used by the Logicians as one of the principles of the classification of Qiyās.

55. Just as they would not accept moral judgments as axiomatic truths in the strict sense of the term.

the Avicennians considered these judgments as composite—i.e., composed of sense-perception and intellectual generalization. For instance, 'A hard stroke gives pain' is an empirical judgment that generalizes the painful effect of a particular stroke or strokes. The particular thing thus generalized could have been perceived by the senses alone; whereas the generalization itself is an intellectual action. Hence the judgment as a whole is composed of sensuous and intellectual elements.

Indeed, causal explanations are implicit in a particular type of Syllogism—viz., the interpellative (Istithnā'ī). Arguments of this kind are distinguishable from the conjugate (Iqtirānī) in that their premises actually indicate what the conclusion may (or may not) be, whereas the premises of the latter argument contain their conclusion within themselves in a potential manner. The two subdivisions of the interpellative argument are the hypothetical conjunctive syllogism and the hypothetical disjunctive syllogism. In both these arguments, the conclusion depends upon certain positive or negative conditions. (Hence the comparison between them and causal explanations). Thus, in the conjunctive argument, the affirmation of the antecedent (in the minor premiss) leads to the affirmation of the consequent (in the conclusion), and the denial of the consequent (in the minor premiss) leads to the denial of the antecedent (in the conclusion). In the hypothetical disjunctive argument, on the other hand, the *modus tollens* may be premised in one of three ways. First, the alternative conditions may be based on an exhaustive division—e.g., 'Number is either odd or even'. (Therefore, if a certain number is not odd, it must be even). Secondly, the alternative conditions may be such that they might be eliminated, but could not be brought together, at once—e.g., 'This is either black or white'. (It cannot be both, but it can be neither). Thirdly, these conditions may represent the converse of the preceding arrangement.[56]

56. That is to say, both of them may be present, but both may not be absent, at the same time. According to Ibn Taymiyah (p. 160), the Logicians find it hard to illustrate this kind of disjunction. However, an illustration they actually use is: 'Either he is a sea-farer, or he is not going to be drowned'. Ibn Taymiyah himself feels that many other illustrations would be readily available—e.g. 'He must be living, or he would not be capable of knowing, &c.

Of the foregoing disjunctions, the Logicians consider the first as the best example of conditions; for the alternatives assumed in it are mutually exclusive and exhaust the possibilities (p. 160). But this also shows that, although the dependence of its conclusion upon certain conditions makes a hypothetical argument comparable to a causal explanation, the perfection of its conditions can be realized only in a pure intellectualization. For empirical judgments which constitute causal explanations do not provide an exhaustive enumeration of conditions.

With their slight infiltration into Demonstration[57] having thus been explained away, the causal explanations must revert to the empirical judgment which presents a conglomerate of sensuous and intellectual elements. Arguments based on *certain* and indubitable evidence are not the proper place for such explanations. It is only some other arguments, less *certain* in character and of humbler origins, to which these can be given over. Arguments of this kind are based on Induction and Analogy. Of these, the first proceeds from the Particulars to the Universal; the other, from one Particular to another. Neither is sufficiently independent of sense-data to guarantee the purity or the truth of the general statements to which it may lead or which may be presupposed by it (p. 159).

Seeing versus Looking

Ibn Taymiyah's criticism on the doctrine of Demonstration which has been summarized above can be presaged by his general appraisal of Naẓar (theoretical inquiry). He tells us (p. 352) that Muslim authors and thinkers have held conflicting views on whether such inquiry does or does not lead to Knowledge. In fact, one and the same person alternates between favourable and unfavourable views on the subject. According to Ibn Taymiyah, this conflict can be resolved if Naẓar is compared with the activity of the sense of sight. Our eyes act not only when we see things but also when our interest is confined to their activity or exercise itself. In the latter case, we may strain them as hard as we would or could; but that kind of exertion does not constitute Vision. In

57. As represented by a hypothetical (disjunctive) argument in which the conditions are mutually exclusive and exhaust the possibilities.

like manner, Naẓar may be pursued for its own sake—in which case the mind's eye can *look* but is unable to *see*. This kind of inquiry does *not* lead to Knowledge. On the contrary, Naẓar that is directed towards an ascertainable object or objects from a well defined point of view may (even if in some cases it does not) lead to Knowledge.

Ibn Taymiyah considers the Aristotelian doctrine of Demonstration as Naẓar in the first of the two senses. For it does help the mind to exert itself with remarkable vigour—but without success or without proper orientation towards success. Its inability to produce knowledge arises from the exaggerated conception of the Universals that is held by it. It seeks to establish a distinction between these (Universals) and the general statements which are discovered by means of Induction or which are implied in Analogy. In so far as one and the same proposition may appear in these three different roles,[58] the Logicians would attribute different degrees of certainty to it by reference to them. For instance, 'Man is mortal' would appear to them to be certain if it were the universal premise in a Burhān,[59] but uncertain if it were based on the actual observation of particular men. As regards Analogy, they would insinuate that a comparison between two persons may presuppose this proposition in the same way as it might assume them to be in possession of the most accidental things. But these distinctions are artificial and untenable. There is no difference between Qiyās al-Shumūl and Qiyās al-Tamthīl in respect of the certainty of the reasoning that is involved in each case. And in so far as each may be conducive to certainty, it must be based on Induction.

It is necessary to examine what exactly may be involved in these three methods. For the Logicians have misconceived and misrepresented them. Their errors culminate in what they have to say of the methods used in *Qrn.* or in the teachings of the Prophets. For instance, they assert that, in describing the three methods Muḥammad ought to use in his preachings,[60] *Qrn.* takes

58. viz. the demonstrative, the inductive and the analogical.

59. Actually, dialectical (p. 209).

60. *Qrn.* (Sale's tr.) 16:126: Invite men unto the way of thy Lord, by wisdom, and mild exhortation; and dispute with them in the most condescending manner.

approving cognizance of the Hellenistic classification of arguments—as demonstrative, persuasive and dialectical (respectively), &c. Again, they have made use of a particular Ḥadīth[61] to show how Muḥammad's thinking conforms[62] to the formal requirements of syllogistic reasoning.[63] As regards the moral principles taught by the Prophets, the Logicians say: 'In speaking to mankind, the Prophets intended to teach it something contrary to the true state of affairs. In essence, therefore, their teachings consist in Falsehood that is uttered from solicitude for the practical interests of mankind' (p. 442). Finally, the Logicians have failed to appreciate those methods which in fact do occur in the Scripture or in the Prophet's tradition.

On Ibn Taymiyah's own interpretation, the problem of Demonstration can be seen in the proper perspective if it is recognised that the terms Taṣawwur and Taṣdīq and the theory of Qiyās represent a false and unnatural analysis of the elements of Thought. The Logicians define Taṣawwur as 'a simple concept that is devoid of all qualifications—positive or negative.'[64] That makes little sense. At any rate, the thing thus described is an *ignis fatuus* that 'occurs' (Khāṭir) to the mind (and disappears), without bringing any Knowledge. In order to bring Knowledge to it, even the simplest elements of the mind must represent to it something that allows itself to be designated or qualified by reference to its being or non-being (p. 358). And the being of a thing is not

61. Kull muskir khamr wa kull muskir ḥarām: *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, Ashribah 73 (KRM, pp. 111, 251).

62. In so doing, however, the Prophet's mind was recognized to seize upon the middle term with greater rapidity and originality that would exalt it above the thought-processes of other men. For Ibn Taymiyah's reference to Ibn Sīnā's view of the Prophetic intuition, see p. 473. Cf. *Avicenna: De Anima* (Arabic text) ed. by F. Rahman. Oxford University Press 1959, pp. 248 f.

63. Ibn Taymiyah retorts:—

The Prophet did not say: Kull muskir khamr wa kull khamr ḥarām—i.e. a form (reported in some other versions, but not conclusively established) that would be comparable to the Hellenistic formulations. For his knowledge and expression are too great to make use of the Logicians' jargon (p. 251).

64. (P. 357). Apparently, a quotation from Rāzī's *Muḥaṣṣal* (see Bib.) which replaces Ghazālī's MIm (note 58) as Ibn Taymiyah's source in his treatment of Qiyās.

a 'pure' concept, but its reality that is determined by reference to its attributes or predicates. A possible objection to this view is that the Logicians have posited simple concepts in order to explain or justify the progress of the mind from them to propositions. But if they are not considered as simple, they will not be fit to serve as a point of departure. The way to answer this objection is not far to seek. Concepts which give rise to propositions need not be considered as 'free from all positive or negative qualifications'. All that can be demanded of them is that they should not already have such limitations (Taq'yīd) as arise out of their absorption into a proposition.

From this fundamental notion of a concept, Ibn Taymiyah draws several conclusions. First, he repeats his criticism of Definition—viz. that it can differ from a *name* only in degree, not in kind. Secondly, he asserts that Definition cannot be considered as amenable to Argument and Proof.[65] On the contrary, the mere fact that it offers a fuller explanation of what is summarily indicated by a *name*[66] places it under a necessity to point out and justify the 'fuller' character of its contents. Such a demonstration can only take the form of a sound grasp of the middle term—i.e. the reason why that which is defined is definable by reference to the attributes or the predicates included in the formula of its definition. In the third place, therefore, it is possible to generalize that variations of the degree of clarity ('perfection') with which the middle term is apprehended make Taṣawwur, Taṣdīq and Qiyās interchangeable, and that this term should replace the *form* of the three (latter) things as the problem of Science.[67]

65. (P. 358): ان الحد لا يقام عليه دليل و لا يحتاج الى قيام دليل

Cf. note 77.

66. (P. 359):

ان الحدود بمنزلة الاسماء وهو تفصيل ما دل عليه الاسم بالاجمال

67. (P. 357):—
And this is so because that which is said in Definition and Argument is a complete judgment—i.e. a sentence as the Grammarians call it. And the answer to a question concerning Concepts and Propositions is a complete judgment—namely, a sentence in the indicative mood. In

The line of thought that leads to the foregoing affirmation of interchangeability is paralleled by Ibn Taymiyah's criticism of the various kinds of Qiyās. He seeks to correct and restate the Logicians' definition. They define Qiyās al-Shumūl as an argument from a Universal to a Particular, Istiqrā' as the reverse (of Qiyās al-Shumūl), and Tamthīl as reasoning from one Particular to another. To him their (third) definition of Analogy is utterly unacceptable. On dismissing it, therefore, he finds them left with only two kinds of argument—viz. Universal-to-Particular (Qiyās al-Shumūl) and *vice versa* (Induction). This proves their classification to have been based on an incomplete division. Just as they have lost sight of the Particular-to-Particular arguments,[68] so have they failed to take account of Universal-to-Universal arguments. In both these cases, the quantity of the starting point as well as the goal of reasoning is the same—i.e. particular in one case, and universal in the other. This makes for perfect correspondence or exact concomitance (Talāzum) between the terms of reasoning in each case. Both can be illustrated by an inference from sunrise to day-time. If we refer to these two as viewed on a particular day, our inference represents a Particular-to-Particular argument. Such an argument is an argument from a Sign (Āyah). On the contrary, if sunrise and day-time be used in a generic sense, the inference would extend over two Universals (p. 162).

Ibn Taymiyah considers such an argument to be represented both by Demonstration and Analogy. As far as Demonstration is concerned, it is false to think that our knowledge of a Particular (conclusion) can be derived from a Universal (major premiss). A Particular is known in its own right, and our knowledge of it does not follow from our knowledge of some universal things. In knowing particular (human) individuals to be rational, one does not have to know that all men are rational. Nor is it necessary that the knowledge of a particular object as not having both being and non-being at the same time should follow from a

either case, both the question and answer are composite speech; and in either case, an attribute is affirmed (through the speech) of a 'bearer of attributes'—the former being the Predicate, and the latter the Subject.

68. *By misinterpreting Analogy in terms of it.*

pure intellectualization—namely, that two contraries can neither be affirmed nor denied at the same time.[69] Therefore, the Logicians would be on safer ground if they defined Qiyās al-Shumūl in terms of an inference from a general rule to another that is less general. (This may be a euphemistic representation of the common criticism that the use of alphabetical symbols in Logic is not only a convenient device, but a limitation necessitated by the inherent immateriality of the subject (p. 113).

The basic thing in Qiyās al-Shumūl, then, is neither the universality of its major premises, nor the particular quantity of the conclusion that follows from it, but the fact that a general rule which applies in one case is recognized to apply in another. The passage from the first case to the second is facilitated by the middle term. In essence, therefore, this pattern is not different from analogical reasoning. It was malicious of the Logicians to define Analogy as an argument from one particular thing to another. The illustration they have taken on this point[70] represents

69. (P. 316). The self-sufficiency of the knowledge of Particulars points to the conclusion that the converse is also true—viz. if in order to know a particular or a definite thing we arrive at a universal judgment, we shall have failed to *know*. According to Ibn Taymiyah, this contention finds its most graphic illustration in the rational theology developed by the Avicennians. Starting from such pure intellectualizations as 'Only one proceeds from the one' and 'The series of causes and effects cannot go on *ad infinitum*', that theology arrives at the Necessary Being. In so doing, it flatters itself with the assumption that it has come to know God. But the divine Being is definite—in the sense that our conception of it must 'preclude all participation in it'. On the contrary, the Necessary Being is a Universal or a generic term whose conception does *not* preclude participation in it. If, therefore, the Avicennians think that they know God in or through their knowledge of the Necessary Being, they labour under a delusion:—

من علم واجبا مطلقا وفاعلا مطلقا وغنيا مطلقا لم يكن عالما بنفس رب العالمين وما يختص به عن غيره

(p. 154).

70. "The heaven is composed (of parts). Therefore, it must (on the analogy of man) have had a beginning in time". Ibn Taymiyah allows that this argument is open to serious criticism (p. 121). But he contends that its weakness arises out of its subject-matter, not out of its (analogical) form. Hence it would continue to have that weakness even if it were changed into a Qiyās al-Shumūl ("The heaven is created; for it is composed of parts, and that which is composed of parts is created").

a deliberate attempt to make confusion worse confounded. In general, they think that the essence of Analogy is to be found in the art of Physiognomy. For that art is based on the assumption that a man's physical constitution is an index to his moral

Ibn Taymiyah traces the use of this argument (from Composition to Creation) to some historical precedents. Speaking of Ibn Sīnā's term Wājib al-Wujūd (Necessary Being), he tells us that the latter philosopher applied it to God whom he would not call substance (Jauhar) because in the philosophy of his time he found this word (Jauhar) in use for a space-filling entity—i.e. an atom. In so doing, however, Ibn Sīnā had broken away from the standard Aristotelian terminology in more than one sense. In Aristotle, the Necessary Being does enter into the category of *substance*. Moreover, Ibn Sīnā's division of all things into necessary and possible *per se* (although eternal) has no basis in Aristotle. The Stagirite used such terms as 'the first Cause' or 'Principle'; and in the philosophy of antiquity in general, the possible is that which is capable of being and non-being, and which is temporal in character. It is only later philosophers (*muta'akhkhirū hum min al-malāḥidah alladhīn intasabū ila al-Islām ka Ibn Sīnā wa amthālihi*) who talk of the Necessary Being and the (eternal) possible so that these two terms may replace the Mutakallimīn's division of all beings into the Eternal and the temporal. By mixing up the two schemes of division, they have thrown Greek philosophy and Kalām into a jumble.

On this showing, the argument in question would provide another illustration of the Avicennian syncretism. The Mutakallimīn of old illustrated the processes of reasoning (al-dalīl al-'aqlī) by reference to the following argument:

(a) All that changes is temporal.
(b) The world does change.
(c) Therefore, it must have begun in time.

But Rāzī (in his *Muḥaṣṣal*) came to restate this argument as follows:

(a) All that changes is possible.
(b) The world does change.
(c) Therefore, it is possible.

(What Ibn Taymiyah seems to imply here is that the use of the first argument even by way of illustration proves the earlier Mutakallimīn's faith in Creation, whereas Rāzī uses an equivocal term to excuse himself out of such faith).

As regards the analogical argument (from Composition to Creation) in question, Ibn Taymiyah's historical analysis would suggest that the idea of Composition (i.e. the differentia of the eternally existing Possible conceived originally by Ibn Sīnā and latterly by Rāzī) stands or falls with the 'spurious' element introduced by Rāzī into Kalām. Hence it could not have been employed by those people who believe in the value of Analogy—viz. (on Ibn Taymiyah's interpretation) the exponents of Islamic Thought (pp. 304, 463).

character, and that the physical constitution is in turn represented by the features of his face (p. 210). But it is false and unjust to define Analogy as an argument from one particular thing to another. Properly speaking, it ought to be defined as 'the progress of the mind from one particular or definite rule to another on the basis of the common relation of the two rules to a universal principle'.[71]

From the change or correction thus suggested by Ibn Taymiyah it can be seen that he and his opponents understand different things by Analogy. By comparing it to Physiognomy, they imply that analogical reasoning takes the form of the 3-term argument that if A = B and B = C, then A = C. Such an argument is valid in Mathematics where the relations under consideration are quantitative. But Logic is concerned with qualitative relations—viz. those between the Subject and Predicate in various cases. For instance, the mathematical sign of equality (=) cannot denote the relation between a man's physical constitution and his moral character. Hence the Logicians's criticism of it as something accidental or even doubtful. In the second place, they define Analogy in terms of an argument from Composition to Creation—in the two cases of man and the heaven. Apart from Ibn Taymiyah's criticism,[72] they criticised this argument because they thought it involved the naive assumption of the similarity of organic and celestial composition. On this interpretation, they appear to have identified Analogy with simple enumeration. In contrast to these two senses, Ibn Taymiyah brings Analogy very close to the higher of the two senses attached to it in Logic—viz. proportion or the identity of relation.[73] For he defines it as an argument that turns

71. واما قياس التمثيل فهو انتقال الذهن من حكم معين الى حكم معين لاشتراكهما فى ذلك المعنى المشترك الكلي

(p. 120). In this definition, '*this* universal premiss or principle' refers to the major premiss in Qiyās al-Shumūl which is considered by Ibn Taymiyah as convertible with Analogy. Cf. note 41.

72. Of composition as a throw-back to the Avicennian concept of Possibility. See note 70.

73. See Appendix III.

on *rules* (applicable to things)—as set over against *things* (governed by them).[74]

Ibn Taymiyah believes that this redefined significance of Analogy proves the fundamental similarity that exists between it and Qiyās al-Shumūl. In spite of the exaggerated and artificial distinctions the Logicians have introduced between them, both these methods of reasoning can and do give expression to one and the same truth (or falsehood). It is always possible, therefore, to convert Qiyās al-Shumūl into Qiyās al-Tamthīl, and *vice versa.*[75]

One of the greatest functions of the intellect is to know the likeness or unlikeness of things to one another. Such knowledge is based not only on the apprehension of two things as like or unlike each other, but also on the conceptualization of their relation in a general way. Qiyās al-Ṭard and Qiyās al-'Aks denote the intellectual processes in which our concept of likeness or unlikeness (in a particular case) enables us to determine whether some other things are comparable, or not.[76] The principles of Ṭard and 'Aks lie at the root of all reasoning or argumentation. Whatever form the resultant arguments may take, their truth is determined by reference to their subject-matter. No degree of formal perfection can save an argument that denies what *is* or affirms what is *not.*[77] As far as the form is concerned, the differences between various arguments are not absolute. The so-called Qiyās al-Shumūl (Demonstration), Qiyās al-Tamthīl (Analogy) and Istiqrā' (Induction) cannot but interpenetrate—in that Knowledge is a many-sided thing which always depends upon Experience, and through which the latter unfolds itself in an increasingly large measure of clarity and richness. In order to have an idea of the likeness (or unlikeness) of things of a certain kind, we generalize on what the senses present to us; wherefore Analogy and Qiyās al-Shumūl go hand in hand. In lending credence to a generalization, we remind ourselves of the particular

74. However, this does not imply any contempt for arguments from particular things to particular things—viz. the Āyāt (signs).

75. See Appendix IV.

76. (P. 371). On this interpretation, Ṭard ('sequel') and 'Aks ('reverse') represent the laws of Identity and Contradiction. Cf. note 24.

77. i.e. arguments which do not hold in Ṭard and 'Aks respectively (p. 206).

instances (in the past) which are represented by it or which (in the future) may be explained by it. This is how Induction enters into Analogy or Qiyās al-Shumūl.[78] In any case, reasoning is based on the statement of a general factor that is common to more than one particular. This stands or falls with the middle term which represents something we find in one particular instance and *would* find in another. In general, it is advisable that the background of the middle term should be explained in our reasoning. In so doing, we proceed analogically. For instance, 'Nabīdh intoxicates and is therefore forbidden on the analogy of Wine' is an argument from analogy which derives its validity from the fact that it posits intoxication as the general principle of Prohibition (Taḥrīm) which does apply to the 'root' and which therefore must apply to the 'branch' as well. He who challenges the generalized principle thus posited must be prepared to admit and answer the same challenge (Muṭālabah) in the case of the universal premises in Qiyās al-Shumūl. For the relation between a universal judgment and particular instances is much less evident than it is in the case of the *nexus* (Manāṭ) and the rule (Ḥukm) in Analogy; and whatever differences it may exhibit in the two cases, it never can be self-evident. It is only the Logicians who labour under the delusion that it can be self-evident. However, most of them are willing to admit that its self-evident character is an exceptional thing—being confined to the analytical (i.e. by Taḍammun) relation of terms in a judgment. For instance, Ibn Sīnā and his ancient masters (who did not reject arguments from Analogy even if they would not glorify them) thought of *reason* in a judgment both as a *ratio essendi* and as a *ratio cognoscendi*. Rāzī is the man (in the Muslim world) who dropped the disjunction, and interpreted this *reason* in terms of a *ratio essendi* as a rule. In so doing, he and his followers were motivated by deep-rooted malice and contempt for the methods of Muslim thinkers and scholars who prized Analogy most highly.[79] For they thought

78. See Appendix V.

79. (P. 234):
The criticism on arguments from analogy represents the views of the later Philosophers who had found it very much in use with the Fuqahā. Now, the latter do use it in those cases in which the subject-matter is problematical. In those cases, there *is* room for doubt—from

that the latter merely contended themselves with subjective and superficial explanations, whereas their own recognition of the objectivity of *reason* placed within their reach self-evident principles to which all men must accord uniform and unstinted assent.

Rāzī's interpretation raises fundamental issues. It offers philosophical justification for the technical rule that the terms in Definition or the premises in Syllogism should be limited to a certain number. Again, it requires all men to make abstraction of those personal circumstances which cause them to take different views of one and the same thing. Both these consequences are unacceptable. For the terms or premises (which are but a means to Knowledge) are numbered by reference to the varied capacities of men for the assimilation of Knowledge (pp. 342 *et al*). As regards the personal circumstances, one has to recognize them to be of sufficient importance to alter the whole complexion of the knowable subject-matter. What is evident to you may be problematical to me because the subject-matter in question might have presented itself to us in different lights. What is objective reason to you will, therefore, appear to me *qua* an explanatory principle or argument—i.e. reasoning. Indeed, one and the same person observes such a distinction between the various aspects of things known to him. What his own senses tell him convinces him, whereas the reasoning to which the intellect leads him is used by him to convince others (p. 91).

Above all, Rāzī's interpretation tends to place the problem of Causality in a false perspective. If the terms related to each other in judgments are to be self-evident, Knowledge would end up either with the unverifiable subtleties of metaphysical speculation, or with abstract mathematical propositions, or even with foolish tautologies. None of these possibilities represents Knowledge that is of immediate concern or real significance to mankind. At any rate, causal explanations would be impossible if we were to confine our attention to self-evident terms. For such explana-

the nature of the subject-matter, not because of the (analogical) form of reasoning. Thinking that weakness (in the analogies used by the Fuqahā) arose out of the *form*, however, the Logicians began to exalt the form of their own reasoning as apodeictic, and to belittle the form of the (analogical) arguments of the Fuqahā as problematical.

tions make an addition to Knowledge only in so far as the relations between causes and effects with which they are concerned are not already known. The element of novelty that here comes in arises out of the fact that sense-perception as well as intellectual functions are subservient to them. We perceive a particular instance in which an effect follows a cause, whence we proceed to generalize that the same effect must always follow the same cause *ceteris paribus*. The gulf that divides the general and the particular in this judgment provides a measure of the novelty that characterizes it. This Rāzī would have us throw overboard. Hence the futility of his interpretation.[80]

Actually, the problem of Causality has had a chequered history in the Muslim world. There have been not a few thinkers[81] who would deny it altogether. Out of misguided theological interests and dogmatic preconceptions, they asserted that God wills a consequent to follow upon the occurrence of an antecedent, without the latter having any influence upon the former. But the majority of intelligent people (within or outside Islam)[82] have always held that the knowledge of two things in sequence leads to the knowledge that there is a potentiality in the antecedent which calls for the occurrence of the consequent. To this potentiality they give various names in different cases.[83] An important consequence of their opposition to anti-Causality is that they think of the intellect both as potential and actual Knowledge,

80. (Pp. 408 f.):
If you (Rāzī) say: 'In demonstrating this principle, I have those Logicians in my mind who would grant me that some inseparable attributes (Lawāzim) are mediate while others are immediate' the answer would be: *This is wrong for several reasons... It only proves your argument to be dialectical, whereas you had sought to make it demonstrative....* As such, therefore, it is unscientific; for it represents what some people may have agreed to assert.. Your argument is false and false is the division on which it is based.

81. (P. 94):

كالجهم وموافقيه في ذلك مثل ابي الحسن (الاشعري) واتباعه

82. *Ibid:* جمهور العقلا • من المسلمين وغير المسلمين

83. e.g. Ṭabī'ah (nature), Gharīzah (instinct), Naḥīzah (disposition?), Khulq (character), 'Ādat (habit), &c., *Ibid.*

whereas 'the deniers of nature(s)' identify it with nothing but Knowledge *in actu*.[84]

Just as the extreme of *defect* is represented by anti-Causality, so is the extreme of *excess* to be found in the views of the Logicians. For they believe in such things as the simultaneity of the cause and effect, or the self-evident character of the connexion between the two, or the mechanical necessity of Creation. All these metaphysical notions are held by them to be of such decisive importance that they distinguish their protagonists or supporters as 'the people of Burhān (Proof)' from all other men (whom they call 'the people of Dispute or Dialectical reasoning').[85]

On a sane and balanced view of the matter, Ibn Taymiyah himself would consider anti-Causality as foolish, whereas the Logicians' interpretations strike him as being sophistical.[86] From his own point of view, a causal explanation is an empirical judgment which is composed of intellectual and sensuous elements, and which is necessitated by the 'habitual' sequence of two things whose connexion is *not* self-evident. When such connexion is asserted to exist between them, the antecedent and the consequent become the cause and the effect (respectively). For all

84. *Ibid.*

ولهذا كان السلف كاحمد بن حنبل و الحارث المحاسبي وغيرهما يقولون العقل غريزة و اما نفاة الطبائع فليس العقل عنده هم الا مجرد العلم كما هو قول (الاشعري) و (الباقلاني) وغيرهم

85. This criterion is said to have been employed by Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd among others. Ibn Taymiyah's implied grievance (that this amounts to a wholesale denunciation of outsiders regardless of whether the knowledge acquired by them be non-philosophical or unphilosophical) would seem to be justifiable in the light of Ibn Rushd's explanation of the term 'masses' (note 2).

86. It is interesting to note that Ibn Taymiyah is not prepared to apply the term 'Sophist' (in a pejorative sense) to a whole class of men. For he thinks it is impossible to stigmatize a whole class of men as impervious or blind to Truth throughout their lives. Of course, there are circumstances in which any man can place or find himself at variance with Truth in respect of a particular question or problem. But in that sense, it is not only a historical school in ancient Hellas, but also its opponents or critics (e.g. Aristotle and his followers), who can be charged with Sophistry (pp. 234, 329 ff., 395 &c,).

practical purposes, the assertion is inevitable; for without it Knowledge would not be possible. Once it has been made, however, it is necessary to ascertain its validity in the light of facts. Muslim scholars and thinkers have made use of several methods to ascertain the validity of the causal explanations. All these methods turn on the explication (Ibdā') of the common (Jāmi') factor or the elimination (Ilghā') of the heterogeneous (Fāriq) factor. In detail, they are represented by:

(a) Ṭard and 'Aks;[87]
(b) Daurān;[88]
(c) Munāsabat;[89]
(d) Sabr and Taqsīm.[90]

In spite of the criticism[91] the Logicians have made upon them, all these methods are adequate and effective—in the sense that they help us to find out whether in a particular case we can determine the ground of our judgment (in a causal explanation or an argument from analogy) with absolute certainty or reaso-

87. See notes 76, 77.

88. i.e. 'revolution' between positive and negative instances. Writers on Fiqh identify it with Ṭard and 'Aks. See *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* by Muhammad Khiḍrī, 3rd printing, Cairo 1938, p. 319.

89. As a method, this may consist in the discovery of the Munāsib or a congenial factor. The latter is the term for the Manāṭ or the *nexus* (in a causal explanation or an argument from analogy) itself—i.e. when the Manāṭ should have proved to be the original or derivative principle of the rule (Ḥukm). See Khiḍrī, *op.cit.*, pp. 319 ff.

90. *Ibid.* pp. 317 f. This may be defined in terms of three steps: (a) Enumeration: (b) Variation: (c) Elimination. Thus, in the first place, there must be reasonable certainty that a certain number of attributes exhaust the possibilities with regard to the cause one seeks to determine. Secondly, an attempt must be made to ascertain how the absence of those attributes (one after another) may affect the occurrence of the subject as a whole. Thirdly, those factors which can be varied without any adverse effect upon the subject must be rejected.

The methods of Variation and Elimination had suggested (to the Logicians) a distinction between controlled experience (Experiment) and uncontrolled experience (e.g. in the case of the natural phenomena). Hence they specifically used the terms Ḥadsiyāt and Mutawātirāt (note 50) for those empirical judgments which were related to uncontrolled experience. Ibn Taymiyah finds this distinction untenable—at least, from the standpoint of the Arabic usage (pp. 93, 95, 210, 235 ff.).

91. See Appendix VI.

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nable probability. In either case, our success or failure will be just as good (or bad) as it is in the case of an attempt to prove the universal premiss in Qiyās al-Shumūl.

Jawāmi' al-Kalim[92]

It is now time we turned to questions of relevance to Islamic Thought. Ibn Taymiyah's investigations into the problems of Logic have convinced him that the differences between the Islamic ways of thinking and those of the Logicians are irreconcilable. In fact, the latter are opposed to the principles and values held in esteem by all those people who have been influenced by the historical tradition of Prophecy. In essence, they are characterized by their orientation towards *disinterested* Knowledge. Hence they tend to isolate themselves from all those forces which determine the course of history (Akhbār al-Umam).[93] Even so, their

92. The Prophet of Islam is reported to have used this expression to describe the excellence of his discourse (p. 112). See *Bukhārī,* jihād 133, ta'bir 11, i'tiṣām 1: *Muslim,* masājid 5-8.

93. (Pp. 182 f.):

والمشهور المتواتر ان ارسطو وزير الاسكندر بن فيلبس كان قبل
المسيح بنحو ثلاثمائة سنة وكثير من الجهال يحسب ان هذا هو
ذو القرنين المذكور في القرآن ويعظم ارسطو بكونه كان وزيرا له
كما ذكر ذلك ابن سينا وامثاله من الجهال باخبار الامم

It is interesting to note that this very passage is preceded by another in which Ibn Taymiyah himself subscribes to a popular misconception—namely, that "Ptolemy, who wrote the *Almagest,* was the last (Christian) king." (For the sources on this identification of the Greco-Latin Ptolemaeus with one of the Hellenistic kings of Egypt, see M. Plessner, "Baṭlamiyūs", *Ency. of Islam,* New Edition).

But this does not disprove a possible generalization that Ibn Taymiyah is distinguished from his opponents (e.g. Ibn Sīnā) by a genuine and maturer historical sense. For his mistake consists in substituting one historical fact for another; whereas his opponents substituted dogmatic preconceptions for history.

The idea of the anti-historicism of the (Muslim) Rationalists is supplemented by a feeling that they represent a self-stultifying principle or a dying force. Cf. Ibn Taymiyah's approving reference to Abū Bakr b. 'Arabī's lines:

فماتوا على دين رسطاليس   وعشنا على ملة المصطفى

'They died in the state of adherence to the Aristotelian faith while we live on by our relation to the community founded by Muḥammad.' (p. 511).

interpretation of the moral Ideal confuses the issue with extraneous things. For instance, they think that metaphysical knowledge represents the highest thing of which man is capable. But Metaphysics is concerned with things which exist in mind, not *in re*. No perfection can be derived from the study of such pure abstractions. Moreover, the basic postulates of this science are false.[94] In addition to all these things, one has to reckon with the fact that, in respect of the principles of this science, there is no unanimity among the philosophers. Aristotle disagrees with most of his predecessors. The so-called 'philosophers of Islam'[95] who have introduced Aristotle to the Muslim world exhibit further divergence and contradictions in their presentation of his teachings. In point of fact, therefore, metaphysical knowledge is one of the least creditable things a Muslim can possess. In contrast to it, the Prophetic teachings which have been received by the Muslim community address themselves to intellectual as well as moral problems. Moreover, they form a part of a larger tradition which has moulded the course of history because its teachings had passed into the Weltanschauung[96] of peoples living in the central part of the civilized world.[97]

94. See Appendix VII.

95. (P. 199):

> Kindī was the philosopher of Islam in his time—that is to say, he was a philosopher who flourished in Islam. Otherwise, 'the Philosophers' and the Muslims are distinct (classes). Hence a prominent Qāḍī of our times (who heard Ibn Sīnā mentioned as 'the Philosopher of Islam') said: Islam has no philosophers.

96. This is what Ibn Taymiyah understands by Ḥikmat (wisdom). Cf. p. 447:

> Every community has a Ḥikmat that is definable by reference to its sciences and its religious interests and practices. (Ibn Taymiyah refers to the Indians, the pre-Islamic Arabs and the Greeks whose lower status in the Islamic scheme of evaluation does not preclude their having a Ḥikmat)... The upholders (ḥukamā) of the Ḥikmat of a people are its wisest and most virtuous men. But this does not mean that they should for this very reason be praiseworthy in the eyes of God and His messenger.

97. Ibn Taymiyah believes that the names of the Prophets Moses, Jesus and Muḥammad and of such famous cities as Mecca, &c. are known to all

In so far as the Prophetic teachings[98] are not only morally but also intellectually effective and well-founded, it will be a rewarding study to analyse how they *argue*. There is a passage in *Qrn.* (16:26)[99] which calls upon Muḥammad to base his preachings on Wisdom, mild exhortations, and disputation. All these methods are required to be followed 'in the most condescending manner'. This passage has been misinterpreted by the Logicians who thought that the Prophet had been advised to use what they call demonstrative as well as persuasive and dialectical arguments. What, on the contrary, *Qrn.* has emphasised is that one and the same Truth is to be presented in different ways to different men—according as (a) they already know and accept it; or (b) know it but do not accept it; or (c) neither know it nor accept it (p. 468). In this sense, then, the three methods recommended in *Qrn.* turn not on the subject-matter of the argument, but on an insight into the nature of its recipients, which (insight) is no mean preparation for success in an argument.

Apart from such insight, however, the arguments used in *Qrn.* and Ḥadīth form a class by themselves. One of the most effective forms of reasoning employed by *Qrn.* is the argument from Signs (Āyāt). This is an argument from one particular to another. Every thing that exists, and the whole system of such things, are Signs which necessarily point to the existence of their Lord. All these Signs are related to Him by way of Luzūm (as contrasted with Talāzum) so that they point to His being, but not *vice versa*.[100] However, in spite of the fact that the whole universe is a Sign, the Quranic arguments from it never degenerate into the diffused universality of a pure intellectualization.

men—at least, to most of those who live in the central part of the civilized world:

فان هؤلاء قد تواتر خبرهم الى عامة بنى آدم وان قدر من لم يبلغه اخبارهم، فهم فى اطراف المعمورة لا فى الوسط

(p. 92).

An important characteristic of such peoples is said (p. 266) to consist in the use of words which denote the (seven-day) 'week':

> For it is learnt through the teachings of the Prophets that God created this world in six days, and that (on the seventh) He established Himself upon the Throne (p. 265).

98. i.e. those received by the Muslims, and inclusive of Qrn. and Ḥadīth

99. See note 60.

100. (P. 350). See note 91.

Another type used in *Qrn.* is the *a fortiori* argument (Qiyās al-Aulā). What this means is that if an attribute of perfection be applicable to the created beings, it would be still more proper to apply it to the Creator. Conversely, if an attribute denotes imperfection on the part of created beings, it would be necessary to deny it of the Creator 'for stronger reasons'. For His is the most excellent Similitude (al-Mathal al-A'lā).[101]

The great teachers (Salaf) of the Muslim community in the past have reemployed this (*a fortiori*) argument in such a way as to bring out some of its fundamental presuppositions. In so doing, they had been actuated by the historical controversy on the question whether the (*a fortiori*) affirmation of an attribute of perfection (or the denial of an attribute of imperfection) in relation to God left it confined to its original significance, or whether in being applied to Him it had changed its meaning—so as to become either a superlative or a metaphor. Some thinkers (e.g. Abū al-'Abbās Nāshī) maintained that such an attribute is applicable *in stricto sensu* to God and metaphorically to man. Some other persons (among the Jahmiyah, the Bāṭiniyah and the Philosophers) transposed these terms. But the majority of thinkers (among the Mu'tazilah, the Ashā'irah, the Karrāmiyah, the scholars of Fiqh and Ḥadīth, the Ṣūfīs and the Philosophers) consider such an attribute to be used *in stricto sensu* in either case.

However, the two senses need not be identical even though they must be *strict* in like manner. For instance, if human knowledge proves God to be a still greater Knower, the term Knowledge must be considered to include the divine as well as human knowledge in the same way as Being may be said to include 'necessary' and 'possible' being. Just as the former is superior to the latter, so is the divine knowledge superior to the human—in direct proportion to the gulf that divides the Creator from what He has created. In so far as in either case the distance is irreducible and immeasurable, our use of one and the same ('univocal') term (Knowledge) in relation to God and man is problematical.[102]

101. *Qrn.* 16:56.

102. Ibn Taymiyah divides the univocal (Mutawāṭi'ah) terms into the general and the particular. The former are subdivided into (a) those having

The treatment of the question of Resurrection in *Qrn.* offers the best example of Qiyās al-Aulā. In order to establish the possibility of Resurrection, the Holy Book often refers to Him who did give Life or Death (in extra-ordinary fashion) to some historical personages (e.g. the people of the Cave).[103] In the second place, it refers to the actual ('first') birth of human beings[104] and to the biological processes that precede it. In the third place, it refers to the creation of the Heaven and the earth[105] and to the phenomena of rainfall and vegetation.[106] All this evidence goes to prove the possibility of Resurrection in so far as it will be controlled and directed by the Creator who *has* performed this kind of activity not only in the case of human beings, but also in that of the Heaven and the earth (which admittedly are more difficult to produce than the body of man). The important thing to note about this cumulative argument (*a fortiori*) is that the possibility it has established is objective in character.[107] Arguing from facts which *have* been, *Qrn.* teaches us to admit the possibility of the same thing or similar things coming again to be in the future.

In essence, the methods of reasoning employed in *Qrn.* also represent those employed in Ḥadīth. The Prophet used the term Jawāmi' al-Kalim[108] to explain the excellence of his discourse. As

the same verbal form; (b) those having the same significance and applicable to a homogeneous class; and (c) those having the same significance, but applicable to a heterogeneous class which admits of axiological differences among its individuals. In this scheme, the problematical (Mushakkikah) terms belong to (c). (Pp. 154ff.).

103. (Pp. 320 ff.). See *Qrn.* 2:55-56, 243, 259. 18:21, 25.

104. *Qrn.* 17:49-51. 22:5: 30:27. 36:78-79.

105. *Ibid.* 17:98-99. 36:81. 46:33.

106. *Ibid.* 7:57. 35:9.

107. As such it must be distinguished from the subjective possibilities with which the Logicians concern themselves. To them a thing is possible if it can be shown to be not-impossible (cf. Āmidī: "If we supposed such a thing, no contradiction would arise"). But this is unconvincing. For if you do *not* know (impossibility), you do not *know* it not to be. Some of them consider possibility to be proved in and through the mere conception of it (cf. Rāzī: "That which *is* is either identical or distinct or neither in relation to that which is other than itself"—i.e. a formula to prove the concrete totality of Being). (p. 322)

108. See note 92. In the present context, this term may be translated either as 'concentrated expression' or as 'compact words' or even as 'synthetical affirmations'.

regards the contents of his discourse, they fall into two main divisions—viz. the instructive and the imperative. In *instructing* people, he spoke to them of such definite and verifiable things as the divine Names and Attributes. (That these things are so definite explains why they should have been incomprehensible to the Logicians who run after generalities; whereas the latter-day Jews and Christians, who have fallen out of touch with the original sources of their faith, can nevertheless appreciate such instruction). In addition to theological subjects, the Prophet's instruction also covered some definite and concrete events which have been or which are going to be (p. 445).

As regards the imperative things to which the Prophet gave utterance, they are all based upon the recognition of Justice as the fundamental principle of the actual constitution of all things and of their fulfilment or progress towards perfection. For *justice* consists in the comparison of things which are similar, and the differentiation of those which are dissimilar; and these two functions represent the essence of Knowledge which, therefore, collaborates with Morality so as to enable us to see the True and the Good in one.[109]

The formal aspect of the Prophet's *ipsissima verba* is *Jāmi'* in the sense that it discloses the connexion between the 'roots' and the 'branches' in the absolute minimum of words in a particular case.[110] On the other hand, the substance of his speech or the meaning of his words is *Jāmi'* in the sense that he enables his followers to arrive at an instinctive interpretation of the moral value of the rules he prescribed to them. Neither he nor, therefore, his followers ever *deduced* the permissibility or the forbidden character of a particular thing or action. His rules are based upon the fact that the moral judgments which are embodied in

109. (Pp. 433 f.):

وتفريقه (ابن سينا) بين الحق والجميل هو بحسب اصطلاحه والا فاللغة التي جاء بها القران وتكلم بها الرسول لفظ الحق منها يتضمن النوعين كقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم "كل لهو يلهو به الرجل فهو باطل الا رميه بقوسه وتاديبه فرسه وملاعبته مع امراته فانهن من الحق"

See *Tirmidhī*, faḍā'il al-jihād, 11.

110. Hence the relativity of the number of terms and propositions in an argument. Cf. note 101.

them are susceptible of universal acceptance by mankind. His followers accept those rules (non-deductively), for in so doing they would expose the inadequacy of the logical intermediaries (Wasā'iṭ on which Deduction depends.[111] To them, on the contrary, more reliable Wasā'it are represented by such things as Tawātur (the continuity of History as the record of events) and Ijmā' (Consensus).

The Parting of the Ways

At the end of TF, Ghazālī had summed up his investigations in the form of a verdict upon the infidelity of the Philosophers. The KRM, on the contrary, is not systematic enough to close on such a formal valediction.[112] Moreover, there seems to be an element of truth about the assertion that Ibn Taymiyah avoids making denunciations (in cold blood).[113]

Be it as it may, a summary of KRM can most aptly be wound up with a clear statement of where (and how sharply) its author draws the line between the subject he has criticised and the standard of his criticism. While the foregoing summary of his views has already been interspersed with his strictures on things he considers as repugnant to Islam, let us now conclude with some of his weightier or more trenchant dicta on the same lines.

The problem of History (as the record of events) and the problem of Moral Judgment represent the two points on which Ibn Taymiyah's criticism is heavily concentrated. The Logicians rejected Tawātur as the criterion of the truth of a statement. So far as it goes, this attitude gives expression to a genuine interest in Knowledge. It represents a Rationalistic movement which had set itself in deliberate opposition to the anti-Causality of earlier times. In so doing, Rationalism had also sought to extend its influence to some forces in the contemporary Muslim society as well. In the main, these forces manifested themselves in the *historicism*

111. Pp. 111, 173, 426 ff., &c.

112. As a matter of fact, KRM (p. 545) does close with a denunciation (of the Ṣūfistic interpretation of the Prophet's Ascension). But that does not provide a systematic or premeditated *conclusion.*

113. See *Ibn Taymiyah* by Muhammad Abu Zuhra, Cairo 1952, pp. 219 *et passim.*

of the scholars of Ḥadīth and Fiqh. For in the case of both these Islamic 'sciences', Isnād (or the formal authentication of historical records) had emerged as one of the characteristics of the Muslim community.[114] The principles taught by the Philosophers relegated all these things to a humble and dubious position as the media of Knowledge or means to it. From the cultural point of view, this involved the negation of the belief that the Muslim society was *sui generis* and self-explanatory. Ibn Taymiyah was not slow to seize upon the implication. To clinch the issue, he postulates that the denial of things based on Tawātur is a major cause of all that is irreligious or heretical in Philosophy (pp. 98 ff.). In so far as this view of the matter had historical relevance, Ibn Taymiyah has classified his opponents into: —

(a) those people (e.g., the Jews and the Christians) who (in spite of their opposition to Islam) could take a sympathetic view of the inner constitution of the Muslim mind;
(b) and those who misunderstood this constitution, thinking of it as an anomaly or anachronism that should be straightened out or brought up to date.

The idea of affinities among peoples influenced by the Prophetic tradition in general develops (in KRM) into a conception of their culture as the dominant culture. Since the Philosophers do not form a sufficiently large and independent group (in contrast to the followers or possessors of that culture), however, KRM is led (perforce?) to emphasise the insidious or subversive character of their methods.[115]

As regards the problem of Moral Judgment, Ibn Taymiyah finds it hard to imagine how the philosophical methods could prove the positive or negative *value* of things or actions. For this is determinable either by reference to the general principles which are acceptable (Mashhūr) to all men, or by reference to their actual experience. But the Logicians underestimate both the Mashhūrāt and the empirical judgments. They are unwilling to

114. For explicit and authoritative pronouncements on Isnād (in this respect), see Imam Muslim's introduction to his *Ṣaḥīḥ*, and Qasṭalānī's *al-Mawāhib al-Ladunniyah* (8 vols. Bulaq 1278 A.H.), vol. v. section on "the special qualities of the Muslim community" (by index).

115. This may be contrasted with the effect of Ghazālī's takfīr (in TF) of the Philosophers.

concede that the 'common' character of men's appreciation of a virtue like Justice proves its value. This causes them to revert to the pure intellectualizations in order to prove the value of things like Justice. The conclusions thus reached by them, however, are far from being perfect or satisfactory. For instance, their conception of Virtue[116] (as such), which undoubtedly includes things which also appear in the teachings of the Prophets, fails to accentuate or distinguish the direct from the indirect or secondary means to Happiness. Moreover, their methodological distinction between controlled and uncontrolled experience[117] has prevented them from receiving *instruction* (or drawing a moral) from such manifestations of Justice in history as the recurrent pattern of the ultimate triumph of God's messenger and His faithful servants or of the inevitable discomfiture of His 'enemies' (p. 95).

In any case, the transmission of Greek ethics to the Muslim world does not redound to the credit of those people[118] who had a part to

116. (Pp. 437, 447):
They say: 'It is necessary to reform Appetite and Anger, for (normally) each of them represents either Excess or Defect'. Now, (reformed) Appetite is Temperance, and (reformed) Anger is Courage; and the reforming of the two is Justice. And these three virtues are desirable so that the soul may find its perfection or fulfilment in theoretical knowledge—i.e. Wisdom. Hence they consider Perfection to consist in all these four things—Temperance, Courage, Justice and Wisdom.

117. See note 50.

118. On p. 447 Ibn Taymiyah refers to Ghazālī's "Mawāzīn al-A'māl' i.e. *Mīzān al-'Amal*), the *Rasā'il* of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā, and the works of Muḥammad b. Yūsuf 'Āmirī—as the first fruits of the aforesaid 'transmission'. The puzzled editors of KRM have found it difficult to identify 'Āmirī. But Brockelmann (GAL, S.I, 744) and Ziriklī (*Qāmūs al-A'lām* 2nd ed. Cairo 1954-59, vol. viii, p.21) have fuller particulars to cite on his life and work. (The latter gives 381/991 as the year of his death).

Ibn Taymiyah's evaluation of the Hellenistic ethics in Islam may be contrasted with his verdict on the Avicennian Ilāhīyāt. In spite of his unconcealed abhorrence of some of Ibn Sīnā's views, he thinks that the latter did in some sense 'reform' Aristotle's own metaphysics and (or) theology:—

وابن سينا تكلم فى اشياء من الالهيات والنبوات والمعاد والشرائع لم يتكلم فيها سلفه ولا وصلت اليها عقولهم ولا بلغتها علومهم فانه استفادها من المسلمين وان كان انما اخذ عن الملاحدة المنتسبين الى المسلمين كالاسماعيلية

(Pp. 144, 289, 141).

play in it. For the conception of Virtue which thus came to prevail in some circles (in the Muslim world) allied itself with a number of heresies on the question of Prophecy. It led several Ṣūfīs to believe that Virtue could raise them to the status of a Prophet.[119] Again, it led them to identify the Sharā'i' (revealed laws) with the Nawāmīs (rationally determined laws.) In so far as Justice emerges (from this comparison) as the basis of the Laws, these people thought that all the historical religions stood on par—in the same way as the various schools of Fiqh do in common subservience to the Islamic faith (pp. 282 ff.). Accordingly, they do not consider it necessary for a man to follow any one of the historical religions in particular (although their own preference goes to Islam as the *primus inter pares*). This eclecticism has enabled these people to reinstate the fundamental principle of Greek ethics (namely, its apotheosis of disinterested Knowledge) at the expense of the demands of practical life and Faith. From their disinclination to evaluate the differences among the particular religions, they have come to look upon the practical teachings of those religions as superfluous or nugatory. Hence their conception of Happiness involves no reference to practical conduct. Like the Jahmiyah of old, they consider mere belief in God as sufficient qualification for Happiness (p. 145). This attitude has culminated in their doctrine of the Beatific Vision. This is explained (by Ghazālī in IUD) in terms of the 'rational soul having knowledge of its Lord'. This false doctrine can be traced back to the negative theology of earlier times. How, then, could one regard it as compatible with the practical Wisdom expounded in *Qrn.* and Ḥadīth ? (p. 462).

119. (P. 487):—

ولهذا كان الملاحدة من المتصوفة على طريقتهم كابن عربي وابن سبعين و
غيرهما قد سلكوا مسلك ملاحدة الشيعة كاصحاب رسائل اخوان الصفا واتبعوا
ما وجدوه من كلام (الغزالي) صاحب الكتب المضنون بها على غير اهلها . . .
فصار بعضهم يرى ان باب النبوة مفتوح لا يمكن اغلاقه فيقول كما كان ابن سبعين
يقول " لقد زرب ابن امنة حيث قال لا نبي بعدي " او يرى لكونه اشد تعظيما
للشريعة ان باب النبوة قد اغلق فيدعي ان الولاية اعظم من النبوة .

Chapter III

THE WALĪY ALLĀHĪ SYNTHESIS

Walīy Allāh's HAB is the next 'typical' book to consider in the present work. The context in which we have placed him indicates the principle of selection that should guide us in our approach to HAB—namely, that it is to be viewed in relation to the works of Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyah (among others). Walīy Allāh himself has characterized this relation in terms of Taṭbīq. The thing for us to do, therefore, is to analyse the significance of this term and to show how in fact it represents Walīy Allāh's method. In so doing, the present writer will have to draw upon the material collected in a previous work[1] devoted to the Walīy Allāhī system as a whole.

Taṭbīq

The word Taṭbīq admits of a variety of interpretations.[2] Literally, it is applied to the act of bringing two things together or of making them congruent. In its derivative senses, on the other hand, it acquires some conceptual *nuances* which deserve to be analysed very carefully.[3]

Maulānā 'Ubayd Allāh Sindhī[4] is one of the great disciples of Walīy Allāh who would interpret the master's work in terms of

1. *Con.* (See Bib.). 2. See Appendix VIII.

3. It is remarkable that on the classical interpretation (which has its prototype in the conversation between Ibn 'Abbās and Abū Hurayra), Taṭbīq means some kind of activity that is novel, intense, vigorous, invincible and penetrating. It is not a process in which two previously discordant things should be brought into harmony. On the contrary, it is a catalysis whereby a new force (e.g. a sword, or a cloud, or a rediscovered principle) is brought to bear upon something (e.g. the limbs and the joints, or dry lands, or a vexed question) with such tremendous force that the latter disintegrates or dissolves or disappears under its impact. In contrast to this interpretaton, Walīy Allāh understands by Taṭbīq a process that causes (or constrains) two things (different but equal, and not incapable of existing together) to abandon their tendency towards mutual destruction.

4. In his "Introduction to Walīy Allāh's Philosophy" originally published in the *Furqān* (see Bib.), Bareilly 1352 A.H., pp. 233-320.

Taṭbīq.[5] Among the various elements of the Taṭbīqāt actually made by Walīy Allāh he has mentioned such things as Fiqh and Ḥadīth or Sharī'at and Ṭarīqat. In addition to these things, he suggests that the master's principles also lend themselves to a Taṭbīq of the Semitic tradition of Prophecy and the Aryan tradition of speculative thought.

Sindhī's selection of terms to represent the contradictions which have been reconciled in the Walīy Allāhī system is his own contribution. His analysis, therefore, serves the purpose of a forceful reaffirmation of Taṭbīq as Walīy Allāh's method; but his identification of the contents of the method in question would carry weight if these had been given in Walīy Allāh's own words.

From the *Tafhīmāt* passage cited above it would appear that the elements[6] Walīy Allāh sought to reconcile can be described in terms of the historical development of the Islamic 'sciences'—as set over against some timeless factors with which logical analysis deals. To him, therefore, Taṭbīq means not so much the explication of unsuspected affinities between some apparently contradictory terms (the opposition of whose logical import could be resolved in a higher conception), as it does the comprehension of the various phases of the historical development of the Islamic sciences—*qua* integral parts of an indivisible and continuous whole.[7]

5. On p. 254 (*op. cit.*) Maulānā Sindhī refers to Shāh Rafī' al-Dīn's (and others') interpretations on the same lines.

6. viz.. the ma'qūl (rational), manqūl (traditional) and makshūf (esoteric) sciences which are represented by Kalām, Fiqh and Tasawwuf respectively.

Elsewhere (HAB, i, 8) Walīy Allāh refers to the ma'qūl and the manqūl or the mafhūm and the masmū' (i.e. the meaning and the outward form of words respectively) as the elements he sought to reconcile.

7. He has tried to give a name to the actual process through which such comprehension can be attained. In his *Izālat al-Khafā* (see Bib.), i, 8 he says:—

> Although everything contained herein has been derived from the Kitāb and the Sunnah, and everything is supported by the authority of the great leaders of the Muslim community ... nevertheless, the setting forth and the arrangement of the material, and the progress from Particulars to Universals in the treatment of that material, represent the deductions which have been made by this humble writer.

Walīy Allāh is conscious of a certain difference between his work and the achievements of his great predecessors in Islamic history. To him this difference appears to consist in the fact that he has deduced universal principles from the propositions or beliefs he shares in common with them. Hence that which was implicit in the thought of his predecessors has received explicit expression in his own. To him this efflorescence appears to have been rendered possible by the fact that with his predecessors a stigma attached to rational investigations into certain problems, whereas in his own day those problems had been assimilated with the developing trends of Islamic Thought—so much so that now rational investigations into them might even prove to be an act of devotion or a service to them.[8]

There is at least one major difference between Taṭbīq and the activity of sound vision[9]—namely, in respect of the standard of vision or judgment. The man with sound vision can correct the partial descriptions of the blind either from the immediate perception of a tree (that is present to his senses even as the blind men may be referring to it) or from his *idea* of it (which may be based on previous experience). This means that in the former case, he may not have been previously acquainted with a tree. The object to which the blind refer may be something entirely new or incomprehensible to him. It is by looking at it here and now, therefore, that he may determine the truth or the accuracy of what they have to say of it. On the contrary, a Taṭbīq-maker can only depend on his idea of the Truth which he thinks has been distorted in partial accounts of it. For (unlike a tree) the Truth does not lend itself to inspection by the senses. From this disadvantage of his position arises the necessity of absolute self-con-

8. On Walīy Allāh's principles, the most important problem that illustrates such a transvaluation of the topics of rational inquiry is the question of Creation *versus* the eternity of the world. Ghazālī had found the belief in the eternity of the world to be sufficient ground for Takfīr. On the contrary, Walīy Allāh would exonerate a people whose racial characteristics might have found expression in such a belief. See *Tafhīmāt* (see Bib.), i, 68f.

9. In what follows, an attempt will be made to analyse the implications of Taṭbīq in the same way as our Chapter I summarized the philosophy of Religion that has been expounded in IUD.

fidence on his part. While the observer of a tree may not know the object by reference to which he corrects the blind, the Taṭbīq-maker must either refer to his Criterion with perfect confidence and certainty, or else he must not speak of it at all.[10]

A postulate of primary significance, without which Walīy Allāh could have made no progress in his Taṭbīqāt, must have been furnished by a deep conviction (on his part) that Islamic history forms a unity by itself. Among other things, the idea of such a unity did in fact embolden him to hold that many of those things in Islamic history which had been considered as un-Islamic by some Muslims did none the less continue to belong to Islam.

On this restorative principle, the historic controversies and oppositions which filled the intellectual (as also the practical) life of the Muslim community in the past must have been readmitted into Islam—in all the variety of detail that marked them, and in all the complexity of the multilateral configurations that might have arisen within them.

Once a complete situation (that may be represented by a particular controversy in the intellectual history of the Muslim community) is accepted as Islamic, it follows that the charges (of Innovation or Heresy or Ignorance) which may have been exchanged between its opposite sides cannot be taken at their face value. The invalidation of these charges means the vindication of the Islamic status of the persons subjected to them.

Such vindication represents an attitude that is negative in character. As such, it cannot be sustained very long unless it

10. In relation to the history of the Islamic sciences, such a conception of Taṭbīq involves two things. First, it necessitates that the Taṭbīq-maker should have in his mind (at the very outset) a clear picture of the whole panorama of Islamic history—both as an illustration of the universal laws of historical development as such, and as a particular instance that in its uniqueness may call for a restatement of those laws. Secondly, Taṭbīq requires that its author should be able to discern whether the contradictory beliefs or theories he would employ as the elements of his synthesis are (a) merely contingent material that is likely at its best to serve operational or illustrative purposes, or (b) a source of instruction from which even his understanding of the universal laws of all historical development may directly or indirectly have derived its substance.

should change into a positive attitude. In other words, one who exonerates the victims of censure and anathema[11] must learn to respect and admire them. A respectful attitude towards them will amount to the rejection of the case that had been made up against them.

If, then, Walīy Allāh thought that the case against great Muslim thinkers and authors in the past must be rejected, he must have learnt to make a distinction between its form and its spirit. Dissatisfied with the latter, he may not have found fault with the former. In fact, his respect for the authors of the reproachful words (who had their own share of similar, if not actually reciprocated, censure and abuse) must have taught him to believe that even though they had drawn upon the vocabulary of reproach and animadversion, their arguments could be formally valid, and their methods could be perfect.

From a generalization based on extensive induction, Walīy Allāh may possibly have seen that the formal perfection of methodologies and arguments is available to a people either as a result of the original activity of its intellectual leaders or as a part of an over-all pattern of academic institutions and scholastic traditions. In either case, it is an index to the exuberant and progressive character of widely disseminated knowledge that informs and illumines a people's way of life, and whereby its writers and thinkers are enabled and encouraged to present even their banalities and animosities in an impressive form.

The recognition of this fact must have called Walīy Allāh's attention to the contrast exhibited by the period to which he himself belonged. He must have felt that his time differed from the glorious ages of Islamic history for two reasons. First, the polemicists in his day did not boast of perfect methodologies and flawless reasoning at the back of their banalities and animosities (whereof they had so many)—because recessive trends in the field of academic organization had made it increasingly difficult for their whole society to aim at 'exuberant' and 'progressive' knowledge. Secondly, necessarily connected with the first is the fact that (by way of com-

11. e.g. Ibn 'Arabī (censured by Ibn Taymiyah) or Ibn Taymiyah (censured by Ibn Baṭūṭah).

pensation for its lack of 'exuberant' and 'progressive' knowledge) the Muslim society in Walīy Allāh's time contented itself with such educational principles and processes as persuaded it to believe that Knowledge consists in the assimilation and appreciation of Knowledge (that already may have been attained). In other words, the passion for Knowledge could now feed itself on a report or record of what had been known in the glorious ages of Islam—since the changed circumstances of the life of latter-day Muslims had rendered it difficult for this passion to receive continued sustenance from the primary and universal sources of Knowledge.

Therefore, Walīy Allāh should have felt, the bitterness that permeates the controversies and antitheses of the intellectual history of Islam is not an accidental outgrowth, but an authentic expression of the genius and the spirit of the times in which it prevailed. The next step he could have taken from this realization is to judge that, corresponding to the close connection he had posited between the originality of his predecessors and the thorough-going prosecution of their controversies, there likewise must be a close connection between his contemporaries' mediocrity and the comparative freedom of their controversies from concentrated venom. To make a virtue out of necessity, he now should have come to the conclusion that the mediocrity or unoriginality which prevents Controversy becoming violent and destructive is not such a bad thing after all. In fact, if it be consistently developed, and if its implications be clearly discerned and accepted, it might represent the distinctive contribution of latter-day Muslims to the Islamic traditions.

This, then is a brief reconstruction of the thought-processes involved in the idea of Taṭbīq. Once this method be recognized as a contribution to the Islamic traditions, it would take on the significance of an Ideal; for it could enable its author to give expression to his religious loyalties as aspirations. Not inaptly, therefore, does Walīy Allāh describe it as his 'share out of the benefits of divine mercy'.[12]

Taṭbīq in Walīy Allāh's Opus Magnum

We have selected HAB as a great contribution to Islamic Thought in the post-Ghazalian times. But the emphasis we have

12. See note 2.

laid on Taṭbīq calls for the consideration of his philosophy as a whole. The way to reconcile this general requirement with our specific choice is to treat HAB as a master-piece.

Nor is the honour we propose to do it undeserved by the book. Its author wrote it with the conviction that he had been ordained to do so.[13] Its subject-matter[14] is claimed to represent a distinct contribution to the study of Ḥadīth. In order to document the points he had to make in it, Walīy Allāh has made use of only such Aḥādīth as appear in the most authoritative *codices*.[15] Its first part has been allowed to absorb within itself the contents of an independent work on Fiqh[16] which the author could not afford either to carry on or to abandon.

All these preparations made for the compression of such a high degree of scholarship and wisdom into HAB that it towers above all other products of Walīy Allāh's literary activity. For the same reason, it stands out as one of an extremely limited number of books through which Muslim scholarship in India participated in the catholicity of Islamic Thought.[17]

13. See HAB, i, 4 where (in his introduction) he describes a vision of his investiture by the Prophet's grandsons (Ḥasan and Ḥusayn).

14. i.e. 'Ilm Asrār al-Dīn or the science of the hidden meanings of the Faith.

15. The number of the single or multiple citations of Aḥādīth in HAB may be fixed at a little less than 2,000 (in contrast to 300-500 from *Qrn.*). Most of these are said to have come from the 'sound' collections (i, 162). Those which do not are, therefore, taken with a grain of salt. (ii, 88).

16. Namely, *Ghāyat al-Inṣāf fī Bayān Asbāb al-Ikhtilāf.* With HAB coming to make increasingly heavy demands on his time and energy, Walīy Allāh decided to foreshorten the title of this work (at the expense of the hyperbolic term Ghāyat), and to incorporate its incomplete draft into HAB (i, 140-160). This interpolation has enlarged the scope and the magnitude of the first part of HAB far beyond the author's original plans. (Cf. the puzzled editors' footnote on i, 140). The *Inṣāf* is also available in the form of a separate tract published by Muhammad Ahmad Shami. Manasurah, n.d. 74 pp.).

17. Actually, the present writer is inclined to think that there is no other (Indian) work to compare with HAB in this respect. It is possible to imagine that if Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī had managed to produce a full-length book (in addition to, or in lieu of, his desultory writings) HAB would have found a precursor in his work. That possibility not having materialized, HAB (if not its author) remains unique.

In his introduction to HAB, the author compares it to the literary activity of three great Muslim thinkers—Abū Sulaymān Khaṭṭābī, 'Izz al-Dīn

In his introduction to the book, Walīy Allāh offers a significant explanation of its method and scope. To begin with, he asserts that the science of Ḥadīth is the greatest source of (religious) knowledge that leads to Yaqīn (certitude). As the historical record of the Prophet's precept and example, it is an indispensable guide to the Positive contents of Law which has come down to the Muslim community through revelation (*Qrn.*) and prophecy (Sunnah). As a matter of fact, the division into which the science of Ḥadīth has fallen in the course of its historical development have already covered various aspects of Knowledge—viz., philological, juridical and biographical, &c. However, the most important point of view one could take in one's approach to Ḥadīth consists in *thinking* out the Maṣāliḥ or the *desiderata* to which the laws contained in it have been directed. The discovery of such guiding principles can place Faith itself on secure and stable foundations. Moreover, the urgency of the need for the comprehension of the Maṣāliḥ bears direct pro-

'Abd al-Salām, and Ghazālī. His critics or commentators (in his country) have since laid preponderant stress on his avowed affinity to Ghazālī—with special reference to the latter's IUD. (The present writer is of the opinion that the terms of this comparison remain to be worked out very carefully). Some other writers compare the relationship between Walīy Allāh's doctrine of Fiqh (in HAB *et passim*) and the Ḥanafī school in general to the independent and original work of such great followers of the Mālikī, the Shāfi'ī and the Ḥanbalī schools as Ibn Rushd, Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyah respectively. (See article by Muḥammad Yūsuf on pp. 360-371 *et passim* in *al-Furqān, op. cit.*). The point on which all comparisons like these are agreed is that HAB has a place in the history of Islamic Thought in general.

The reasonably good (if not perfect) Cairo edition of HAB has placed it among the standard reference books in the field of Islamics. Contemporary Arab authors make bibliographical references to it (as they also do to some other Indian classics like the 'Ālamgīrī *Fatāwī* or Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān's *Abjad al-'Ulūm*). See Jurjī Zaidān, *Tā'rīkh Ādāb al-Lughat al-'Arabiyah*, 3rd ed. Cairo 1936-37: Muṣtafa Zarqā, *al-Madkhal ila ...al-Ḥuqūq al-Madaniyah*, 4th ed. Damascus 1956: Ṣubḥī Maḥmaṣānī, *Falsafat al-Tashrī fī 'l-Islām*, 2nd ed. Beirut 1952 (by Index).

In recent years, the HAB and/or Walīy Allāh's writings in general have been the subject of three Ph.D. *theses* at:—

(a) Oxford. By Dr. A. J. Halepota. Published by the Sind University, Hyderabad (Pakistan) beginning 1959.

(b) Shantinekatan (India). By Dr. F. M. Asiri. Published by the Punjab University, Lahore (after 1960?).

(c) McGill University (Canada). By the present writer. (See Bib. "*Con.*").

portion to the length of time between the historical setting of (Muḥammad's) prophecy and the life of a particular generation of Muslims. An almost instinctive interpretation of the Maṣāliḥ was possible in the case of those people who came and lived under the Prophet's personal influence. But the succeeding generations of Muslims have experienced an increasingly unavoidable need for some mediatory factors which would explain the Maṣāliḥ to them. On looking back into the factors of this kind (as they have influenced and shaped many explanatory attempts in the past), one would feel that some of them have outlived their utility, whereas some others have passed into the body of Islamic Thought. In either case, they must be redefined in 'our' own time so that a comparison of 'our' own treatment of the problem of Maṣāliḥ with them may be conducive to the largest measure of fidelity to the subject of Ḥadīth itself. In earlier times, the interstices of the theory of Maṣāliḥ were filled in most often with cosmological speculation (predisposed in favour of Causality or anti-Causality), or Dialectical reasoning, or Mystical eclecticism. While all these things have rendered invaluable service to Islam, no one of them treats the Sharī'ah as an autonomous and self-explanatory system.

On Walīy Allāh's principles, this aspect of the Sharī'ah can be established only on the basis of moral and political philosophy. All the ('rational', 'traditional' and 'esoteric') sciences of the Muslim world must, therefore, allow themselves to be interwoven into the fabric of a theory of ethical and political principles and values so that the emergent scheme may be filled in with the Maṣāliḥ which are presupposed by the Islamic laws.

Hence the first part of HAB is devoted to three problems in particular. In the first place, the author seeks to evolve a theology that may serve as the groundwork of his theories of Virtue and Society. In the second place, he presents his theory of the Irtifāqāt (civilizing 'devices') in a form that surpasses his own treatment of the same problem in some other writings.[18] In the third

18. The Irtifāqāt (devices) are the forms as well as the periods of social evolution. Two other books in which Walīy Allāh elaborates or applies this concept are *al-Budūr* and *Izālat al-Khafā* (see Bib.). But HAB surpasses them by virtue of its systematic character.

place, he tries to determine the relevance of his philosophy to Islamic history.

Incidentally, this (first) part of the book also admits of some remarkable insights into the problem of the classification of all men as moral agents. But this theme is reintroduced in the second part by way of prelude to the problem of Worship (ii. 88 ff.). Apart from this reintroduction, the second part can be described as a commentary upon the laws[19] actually contained in Ḥadīth.

The analysis of the 'hidden meanings of the Faith' is concluded with the remark that it may be considered as the lowest and the narrowest rung on the ladder that leads up to the infinity of the Wisdom(s) and the Purposes of the Laws.[20]

The Days of God[21]

Walīy Allāh's philosophy of History offers a major instance of Taṭbīq—between the divergent conceptions of Causality held in the Muslim world. With the Avicennians he shared in common an invincible faith in the necessity of the connexion between the cause and effect. But he was prepared to recognize that the anti-Cau-

19. (i, 11). These laws are placed under the following heads: (1) Faith. (2) Knowledge. (3) Cleanliness and Purity. (4) Prayer. (5) Almsgiving. (6) Fasting. (7) Pilgrimage. (8) Iḥsān. (9) Contractual Dealings. (10) Management of the Family. (11) Political Organization. (12) Methods of Livelihood. (13) Miscellaneous.

20. (ii, 204):—

> The cognitions God has put together within our heart(s) do not exhaust the contents of the revelation He sent to the Prophet (Muḥammad)...And the cognitions He put together within the Prophet's heart do not exhaust the Wisdom and the Purposes of the Laws as they subsist in His own knowledge. And this can be illustrated from the words of al-Khaḍir who said: 'The knowledge I and you (Moses) possess is as insignificant (in comparison with His knowledge) as (the tiny drops of water) this bird receives from the ocean'. (Cf. note 2.)

21. i.e. History. The phrase comes from *Qrn.* 14:5 where Moses is said to have been inspired to remind his people of the Days of God; and from 45:29 where a 'day' is mentioned as the term of the manifestation of God's universal power. (Cf. The Holy Bible, *Joel* i, 15 *et passim* where 'the day of the Lord' is used in an eschatological sense). In addition to 'reminding' (one) of the Days of God, Walīy Allāh speaks (HAB i, 68) of 'reminders' concerning God's favours or gifts and concerning the day of Resurrection.

sality[22] of the Ashā'irah gave expression to a genuine theological preconception—namely, that in order to *be*, God must be thought to have the power to alter the course of events which constitute the universe; or else the universe itself would be God.

But although he was thus predisposed in their favour, Walīy Allāh could not reconcile himself to the atomistic elements[23] in the teachings of most Ash'arī thinkers. For they thought that the events of the world (or atomized units of reality) could be separated and combined in any form God would give them. This involved the assumption that God creates a particular thing or event in the fullness of its attributes which constitute it independently of any other thing that may precede or follow it. Hence the divine Will fills in the interval between two events in Time just as the Atomists thought the Void is the tertiary factor between two atoms in Space. The idea of a heterogeneous factor that intervenes between two events or bodies makes them discontinuous. It is for this reason that it was unacceptable to Walīy Allāh whose interest in Taṭbīq presupposed continuity in universal existence. On his interpretation, therefore, even the extra-ordinary things fell into a pattern marked by continuity. God could and did alter the natural course of events; but in so doing, He did not allow Caprice or Chance to unmake the greatest and the most revealing thing He has made—viz. the universe. If, then, He makes a *departure* (from the natural course of events), the act of departing is also natural or 'habitual'.[24]

The modern significance of the word 'history' includes some shades of meaning which correspond quite accurately to Walīy Allāh's interpretation of the Realm of Mercy.[25] It is, therefore, possible to say that his Taṭbīq[26] consists in postulating History as something wherein the opposition of the natural sciences and

22. Perhaps anti-Causalitarianism would be a better term to use here.
23. See Appendix I.

24. *Tafhīmāt* i, 99-100: ولذلك اقول خرق العادة عادة مستمرة

25. I.e., in terms of (a) a system in which continuity is not broken by the extra-ordinary character of events; and (b) the necessity for the teleological explanation of such events.

26. I.e., between Avicennianism and the theological substrate of the anti-Causality of the Ashā'irah.

spiritual life is resolved and transcended. To this emergent concept greater depth and richness have been lent by his appreciation of Ṣūfistic anthropology. Taṣawwuf laid stress on a (controversial) tradition in which the Prophet is reported to have said that God created man in His own form.[27] Encouraged and strengthened by the spirit of such utterances, the Ṣūfīs had thought of man as the only point in the universe where infinite Perfection does or can manifest itself *in concreto*. In order to prove the value of the distinction they had thus posited between him and the rest of the universe, they made use of some cosmological notions which actually interpreted it in terms of Progress—from simpler forms[28] of existence to the glory and splendour of the life of humanity.[29] Walīy Allāh seems to have felt that all these ideas could be integrated into an Islamic philosophy of History—if only they could lead a thinker to show their applicability to facts of actually recorded History. But this was too much to ask of the Ṣūfīs. For in spite of their glorification of man, they did not concern themselves with his actual or foreseeable career in the world—between the initial (Azal) and final (Abad) terms of eternity. To Walīy Allāh, on the contrary, that intermediate phase is of the utmost significance, for it is here that individual men realize their Worth or falsify it. If, then, this phase is not taken into consideration, the resultant conception of human Worth is inevitably drawn towards unrealism and amorality.[30]

Civilization and its Devices (Irtifāqāt)

On Walīy Allāh's principles, an actual survey of History in detail (which might have brought Ṣūfī humanism in touch with *facts* of crucial importance) can and should be preceded by a

27. *Khalaq' Allhāhu Ādama 'alā ṣūratihī* (SB, Isti'dhān 1). Bukhārī's Commentators have pointed out that in this tradition 'his form' may be interpreted to refer either to Adam or to God. But they also refer to another version in which 'the form of the Merciful' (al-Raḥmān) has definitely established conformity between Adam and his Creator. See Qaṣtallānī, *Irshād al-Sārī* (Kanpur, n.d. Vol. ix, pp. 104f.) and 'Asqalānī, *Fath al-Bārī* (Delhi 1308 A.H., p. 631).

28. Viz. the inorganic, vegetative and animal.

29. For Walīy Allāh's adaptation of the 'evolutionary' scale taught by the Ṣūfīs, see *Tafhīmāt* i, 122ff. and *Budūr* 51.

30. To be specific, this criticism is directed against the doctrine of Waḥdat al-Wujūd (in Taṣawwuf). See note ?

general characterization of all historical movement and change *as such*. Now, in addition to the principles of History (as set over against the mechanical aspect of Causation) outlined above, his theory of the Irtifāqāt presents such a schematization of all historical change. These Irtifāqāt signify all those things through which man's intelligence and will have influenced the course of events in decisive fashion and in furtherance of his own purposes. In this sense, their collective significance is equivalent to the connotation of the term 'civilization' in modern times. Walīy Allāh has distinguished four periods in the history of Civilization each of which is named after the greatest institution that made its appearance in it. Thus, the first Irtifāq saw the human beings live in accordance with what Walīy Allāh calls al-Madhhab al-Ṭabī'ī (Natural Law). The second coincides with the rise of the Family. The third signifies the political institutions which constitute a city. With the fourth, man learns to regulate the conflict that inevitably divides the cities and turns them against one another.

In general, Walīy Allāh's doctrine of the Irtifāqāt can be described as a theory of Natural Law in the sense the latter term has acquired in Western philosophy. On that interpretation, however, it would be necessary to redefine his term al-Madhhab al-Ṭabī'ī. Obviously, a contradiction is involved in applying the term Natural Law to a 4-phase scheme one of whose phases has already been identified with it. But the contradiction is more apparent than real. Walīy Allāh has distinguished two senses of human nature—viz. as a *fact* (Ṭabī'at) and as an *ideal* (Fiṭrat). If, therefore, he consigns the first Irtifāq to the Law of Ṭabī'at, the doctrine (of the Irtifāqāt) as a whole may nevertheless be placed under the head of Natural Law—in the sense of the Law of Fiṭrat. The significance of this distinction will be realized if, for instance, Walīy Allāh's theory is compared with the one expounded in Hobbes' *Leviathan*. Hobbes applied the term Natural Law to all the phases through which men might have passed *prior to political organization*. Formally, this is comparable to Walīy Allāh's view of al-Madhhab al-Ṭabī'ī as characteristic of the first (if of no other) Irtifāq. Unlike Hobbes, however, Walīy Allāh extends the (*ideal*) significance of Natural Law right up to the highest phase of social development—viz. the fourth Irtifāq which signifies the emergence of international ('multipolitical') Law.

Now to come back to the Irtifāqāt themselves. Walīy Allāh describes the first in terms of those 'devices' whereby men learn to satisfy their primary needs. Of such needs, he names those which are directed towards Food and Drink, Sex, Clothes and Shelter, and Language. Most (if not all) of these needs are experienced by man and beast alike. Indeed, the latter's instincts enable it to satisfy them with greater precision and success than the unaided efforts of man (in the same direction) can possibly achieve. This disparity is of twofold significance to the first Irtifāq. In the first place, it occasions a struggle on man's part to get rid of his inferiority. In the second place, the resultant struggle changes into positive strivings after superiority; for the use of human reason whereby man's superiority to animals is proved must have begun as a means to the removal of inferiority. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things that, on the whole, the first Irtifāq should be described in terms of man's effort to use his reason in such a way that his actions whereby he satisfies his primary needs may be superior to similar actions on the part of the animals. The imperative that emerges from this statement is the subject-matter of the revealed books which have been received by mankind in various times and places, and the simplicity of whose teachings (which is derived from their relation to the primary needs of the human race) makes them acceptable to mankind in universal fashion. No other system of imperatives to which men may be asked to submit (during the later Irtifāqāt) can lay pretensions to the universality that characterizes the Scriptural style; for the problems of all other Irtifāqāt (whence imperatives are derived) are limited and localized in character.

In specific terms, man learns to satisfy his primary needs in the first Irtifāq—in healthy and comfortable ways. He cooks his food and maintains the supply of water so that the effects of drinking and eating upon his physical constitution may be controlled, and he may not have to put himself to discomfort by looking for food and water only when the need arises. Again, the sexual relations among human beings tend towards regularity and permanence so that the rivalries to which promiscuity leads may be eliminated, and the children to whom such relations give birth may be able to trace their parentage. As regards Clothes and Shelter, things that protect the human body and make it comfortable satisfy the need for them. Finally, Language makes its ap-

pearance in the first Irtifāq as and when useful sounds give way to meaningful words.

Walīy Allāh's description of the first Irtifāq implies that in that period human beings may be living together, but that the life of each one of them must none the less have been self-centred. They were not solitary, but unrelated to each other. To each the preservation of his own being was an end—in accordance with al-Madhhab al-Ṭabī'ī. But if men were unrelated *inter se*, the human race was not unrelated to other species. In order to satisfy his primary needs, man had learnt to make use of the indispensable services (or even to consume the physical substance) of those animals which are not too unclean or ferocious to tame or drive (or to eat). The ensuing relations between man and the animals tended to sustain and direct themselves in accordance with al-Madhhab al-Ṭabī'ī. For his part (which happens to be the only one to describe), man found it imperative to be kind and generous to the animals—in the sense that he should not deprive them of subsistence or life unless he found it necessary to sacrifice them to his own primary needs.[31]

Walīy Allāh describes the second Irtifāq by reference to three things—Taraffuh (enjoyment), Tadbīr al-Manzil (*oikonomia*) and Mu'āmalāt (contractual dealings). In all these cases, a man has to judge the quality of certain actions which influence his own character or his conduct towards fellow-men. Accordingly, we have chosen to place the problems of the second Irtifāq under the head of Morality.[32]

Now, Taraffuh denotes man's enjoyment of the successful completion of the techniques evolved in the first Irtifāq. It results both from the refinement of those techniques and from substantial additions being made to them. Some aesthetic elements[33] now enter into the devices directed towards the satisfaction of man's primary needs. He needs food in order to satisfy hunger; and he likes it to be *delicious*. Similarly, the house where he wants to live must be an *impressive* building. This refinement leads to the differentiation of things he used in his devices. For instance, some varieties of food and drinks (e.g. the flesh of unclean or ill-

31. *Con.* (*The Iqbal*, Lahore, January 1963).

32. Just as those of the first (which form the subject-matter of Scriptural guidance) can be placed under the head of Religion.

33. Represented in Walīy Allāh's terminology by Ẓarāfat (Wit).

natured animals, or intoxicants) now come to be treated as unwholesome and unfit for consumption in ordinary circumstances. The houses are no longer a mere shelter, but change into homes where one can spend one's leisure. The various parts of a house are also differentiated according as the manner of living in them is intimate or casual. Similarly, the human body is now clothed in such a way that the covering of the private parts comes to be treated as indispensable, whereas the covering of all other parts is a matter of convenience. Moreover, men's dress is now distinguished from women's dress (and the incidental display of the feminine charm); and it now becomes a hateful sight to see a man dressed like a woman or *vice versa*. Again, the problems of sexual relations lead to the institution of Marriage.[34] Finally, in the case of Language, usage and idiom emerge as normative concepts for the evaluation of linguistic performance or capabilities.

Reference must also be made in this context to Travel and local Custom. When men go away from their homes, they scarcely can hope to enjoy the same comfort and security as they do at home. Nevertheless the home serves as a model for all those things which can make travels comfortable and safe. Hence their desire to travel together and to live even in far-off places in ways to which they are used. In this sense, their separation from the scene of their usual living makes them conscious of the Customs which govern their lives.[35]

The moral problem to which Taraffuh gives rise involves an examination of the value of Civilization itself. Man finds his fulfilment in the Irtifāqāt, but the immoderate perfection of the devices which make life secure and comfortable is also a symptom of Egotism and Decay. The way to resolve this contradiction is to aim at the Mean (of the excess and defect of Taraffuh).[36]

34. Which it will be more proper to describe in the context of the Family or the Mu'āmalāt.

35. On Walīy Allāh's interpretation, Custom emerges from the contiguity of several homes whose inmates are brought together on such important occasions as a person's sickness or death or the birth of a child, &c. Custom is interpreted by the leaders of a group (cf. the Ḥukamā in Ibn Taymiyah: Note 96, p. 103) who may belong to such types as the naturalistic, the astrological, and the ethico-theological (HAB, i, 41).

36. See Appendix IX.

With the organization and development of the Family begins the round of men's relations *inter se* which constitute the second Irtifāq. Walīy Allāh points out that the word[37] (family) in question must be understood in the extended sense of a system of relations[38] whereby men advance from the first to the second Irtifāq. This system includes three different patterns of relationship—those between the husband and wife, between the parents and children, and between the master and slave. The fundamental principle of the organization of the Family under the second Irtifāq is that the need for sexual relations causes a man and a woman to live together. Once relations of this kind have been established, human nature demands that access to the female partner be denied to all other suitors. (For that is the only way to circumvent the necessity for the use of force that arises out of the rivalry of the male suitors living in promiscuity in the animal kingdom). This leads to the institution of Marriage. In order to be successful, Marriage must be based on the consent and co-operation of the female partner. Such consent, and the consequent benefit of sexual relations on the basis of permanent and monoandrous union, can be obtained only when a man places himself under a twofold obligation. In the first place, he is supposed to celebrate his formal assumption of conjugal status in the presence of witnesses. In the second place, he is supposed to hold sexual intercourse in secret—'as though apparently it never took place'. Organized in this way, married life runs its course on the basis of permanence and stability unless the husband and wife should come to the realization that mutual love and co-operation are no longer possible. In that case, they let it be known (again in a formal manner) that their relations come to an end. (In the interest of a child who is conceived at the time of Divorce, it is considered necessary that the divorced woman should be able to remarry only when a specified period has elapsed since the dissolution of marriage, and that her former husband should support her or contribute towards her maintenance in this period).

37. I.e., al-Manzil (homestead or household). Walīy Allāh's own explanation will justify our preference for the term 'family'.

38. *Budūr* 62:—

For it is this system (Niẓām), and not such things as the walls or doors or houses, that we call al-Manzil.

While Marriage largely depends upon the personal choice of the parties concerned, the second Irtifāq places restrictions upon marriage within the prohibited degrees. These are explained by the instinctive distaste of mankind for the sexual commerce of the near kindred. Moreover, they can be justified as necessary means to the protection of the women concerned. For instance, if a woman could be married to her husband or father, the latter would be in a position to beat all other competitors—so that either she would be married under duress, or would be deprived of the opportunities the free exercise of her exogamous choice could bring her. Again, a woman's father or brother is the person to protect or defend her. But who would protect her if her (incestuous) father or brother had turned against her?

As regards married life itself, the devices perfected during the second Irtifāq include the following rules:

(a) In contrast to men, women regard it as improper to be solicitous of sexual intercourse.[39]

(b) In contrast to women, men find little time for such domestic chores as cooking, sweeping the floors, and bringing up the children.

(c) Because of the comparative weakness of their hearts and the flaccidity of their constitution, women develop greater attachment to the home.

The pattern of the parent-child relationship is comparatively simple. All men love their children. The second Irtifāq determines the form in which this love should express itself—so as to help the children where their nascent and small resources would prove to be inadequate. This leads to the formation of definite rules for the training and education of the children. Moreover, the second Irtifāq also extends its influence to such devices as would enable the children (on growing up) to repay the debt they owe their parents who had helped them in the hour of need, but who themselves may now have been reduced to infirmity and helplessness.

The master-slave relationship completes the system of relations which constitute the second Irtifāq. In a family, each mem-

39. This explains the origin of such customs as Betrothal, the giving-away of the bride, the wedding feast (held by the bridegroom), and the bequest of dowry to the bride (*ibid.* 61).

ber holds a position in accordance with the substance and value of his (or her) contribution to the common 'livelihood'. The differentiation of these positions is necessitated by the fact that some men are dominant by nature while some other men are servile. Neither of these types can live independently of the other. Disease, danger and other emergencies make sympathy and co-operation between them absolutely indispensable. Accordingly, their relations are based on mutual attraction and attachment. The devices of the second Irtifāq are directed towards the maintenance and endurance of this relationship, or towards the resolution of such conflicts as may pervert or destroy it.

In contrast to the relationship of the *naturally* dominant and servile people, some accidental circumstances may produce a situation in which a person can impose his will upon others. This brings into a family some persons who may be dominant by nature but who are slaves by constraint. It will be impossible for the master of the family to control them—unless he should happen to be a political leader as well. The best thing for him to do, therefore, is to treat them as assistants rather than servants. For their relation to the family in the latter capacity may generate such disruptive forces as might threaten the very existence of the second Irtifāq.

In any case, the master-slave relationship in the second Irtifāq gives rise to the practice of Manumission. Unlike the relationship created by Marriage, this one is recognized to be inherently susceptible of dissolution. Unlike Divorce, therefore, Manumission comes to be regarded as a happy climax—if only care should have been taken to offer a price for freedom or some valuable compensation for the loss incurred by the master.[40]

40. Walīy Allāh's summary of the problems arising out of the organization and governance of the Family under the second Irtifāq includes:—
(a) the priciples involved in Marriage;
(b) the annulment of Marriage;
(c) qualities (e.g. good health, gentle manners, intelligence, capacity for useful and regular work) to be possessed by the husband;
(d) qualities (e.g. physical health and charm, chastity, trustworthiness, attachment to the family and capacity for its management) to be possessed by the wife;
(e) settlement of disputes in the family;
(f) determination of the period that must elapse before the second marriage of a widow or a divorced woman;

Exchange (mubādalah), collaboration (mu'āwanah) and various forms (aksāb) of work for gain are the three main forms of contractual dealings (mu'āmalāt) that appeared in the second Irtifāq. The necessity for these things arose out of the fact that the members of a single family soon discovered that their increasing needs could not be satisfied from the limited resources of the family, and that therefore they had to depend upon the assistance of the members of other families. Those who sought assistance in this way were also willing to assist in return. For those very circumstances which made them lack something possessed by others conferred upon them certain benefits which were not possessed by others. For instance, if the members of a family possessed super-abundant quantities of water, they sought to give it in return for foodstuffs which might be available in like manner to some other family. In order to attract more and more food, they increased and enlarged their own water resources. When they had acquired super-abundant quantities of food, they could now offer this secondary possession in exchange for some other needful things besides food and drink. When exchange had thus become a regular practice, it was found necessary to use Money (Naqd) as a medium of exchange so that barter could change into a transaction of sale, and that the parties concerned could take care of needs not actually felt at the moment. Hence people agreed to use mineral substances for this purpose. Of all such substances, Gold and Silver were found to be the most suitable. For they are not too bulky, nor do various pieces of either look heterogeneous; and they can be used as ornaments for the human body. Hence they are Money by nature, while any other thing can be so only by convention (Iṣṭilāḥ).

(g) the upbringing of the children;
(h) ways of dealing (Siyāsat) with the slaves and servants;
(i) Manumission;
(j) relations to kinsmen;
(k) relations to neighbours;
(l) relief for the poor and the needy;
(m) inheritance;
(n) preservation of genealogical records;
(o) the office of the Naqīb al-Qabīlah who (as a general Observer in a tribe) is supposed to keep in touch with the circumstances of a particular family and with the relations among various families living together (HAB, i, 42f.).

In addition to things (A'yān) or commodities, utilities (Manāfi') or services were also in demand through channels of exchange. (It is important to distinguish these two; for the possession of a certain commodity is not a definitive characteristic of its possessors; whereas a man's skill that enables him to offer a particular service belongs to him in an essential sense). Men's skill (which enables them to serve others) is acquired both under the influence of the physical constitution and in response to some accidental circumstances—e.g. heredity, local traditions, &c. In general, the objects to which it is directed, or the fields in which it is exercised, are Land, Sea, Animals, Plants and the inorganic substances. A skilful use of Land during the second Irtifāq constitutes the agricultural profession; the use of what men can obtain from the rivers or the ocean forms such occupations as Fishing; the tending of flocks of animals developed into various forms of the pastoral activity; and from the skilful use of Plants and the inorganic substances originated the Arts.

It was for two reasons that men specially qualified to work in any one of these fields were prepared to offer their services to others. In the first place, those who were not so qualified wanted professional experts to solve their problems for them lest their own meddling with such problems should make a mess of them. *In the second place, the experts wanted to make their services* available to others lest unemployment should force them into situations or activities for which they had no aptitude. This equilibrium of needs and benefits led to the organization of the Professions. The specially qualified workmen worked either on the basis of pro rata payments in cash or in kind (Ijārah); or on the basis of partnership; or under a contract of hire (Ijārah); or in return for commodities (Muḍārabah) or land (Muzāra'ah) invested by an inactive partner. Corresponding to this differentiation of Work, the uses of Money came to be differentiated as well. Thus, *in addition to all those instances in which Money* was given to pay for something, there were cases in which it was given away as a gift or charity—from such motives as fellow-feeling or natural affection. Secondly, it also came to be required and supplied by way of a loan. Thirdly, there were cases in which the incompetence of a person necessitated the appointment of an agent to do business on his behalf, or of a guardian to take care of his property.

In order to work out these elaborate arrangements satisfactorily and justly, men found it inevitable to lay down rules—e.g. rules of Evidence, and rules for the drawing up and preservation of title-deeds, and for Mortgage or Guardianship or Deposits. The adoption of these rules was not possible until after men had experienced the harmful and disorderly consequences (e.g. Embezzlement, and the injury caused by the indolent omission or the untruthfulness of a person who had incurred a liability on a voluntary basis) of having no such rules. Hence the most fundamental principle that came to be accepted by them was that no co-operative endeavour or contractual relationship was to be undertaken by a number of persons unless it rested on a prior agreement and on well-defined conditions and mutually acceptable methods.

The organization of the human society under the second Irtifāq was accompanied by the emergence of certain imperatives which aimed at strengthening this organization or at eradicating the causes of a state of affairs contrary to it. The first imperative of this kind was that no person shall avail himself of the commodities or services which belonged to others—unless he should offer a proportionate value in return for it, or unless his weakness or disability entitled him to spontaneous affection on the part of his benefactors. Consequently, (with the exception of gifts and alms) all benefits acquired without Work or through pseudo-Work (e.g. Theft, Gambling, Bribery, &c.) came to be censured as unwholesome. It was recognized that the laziness or dishonesty which led people to such unwholesome methods must be a product of unwholesome ways of living; for Work and Living influence each other reciprocally. Another imperative to which men learnt to submit was that they should first acquire a clear understanding of their needs, and then choose Work that will enable them adequately to meet those needs. Finally, a third imperative was that an ambitious and honourable person should look for a sort of work that involved no self-debasement.

Walīy Allāh's analysis of the second Irtifāq emphasises the distinction between Religion and Morality in the form of the dual or ambivalent tendencies of Taraffuh. In this period begins an infinite variety of mutually beneficial contact and collaboration among men. All such dealings depend on the deliberate acceptance

of the two parties, and it is not conceivable that in this period any other thing (than mutual acceptance or Contract) should control or sustain them. If, then, they are allowed to run their course and eventually to produce beneficial results, such results become a criterion for one's moral judgment upon other persons. This judgment is bound to derive its contents from a man's particular actions or omissions in respect of a particular device or transaction. Hence it will be possible to say that a man is good as a master or a slave or a neighbour or a husband. Such a specialization of the moral judgment is indispensable to the science of Ethics.

The third and fourth Irtifāq are devoted to the problem of political organization—in the local sphere or on a larger scale. Walīy Allāh believes that (although all men have known the first and second Irtifāq in one form or another) the devices of the third and fourth Irtifāq do not figure in the universal experience of mankind. As a matter of fact, only a few of the numerous regions of the world have been the scene of a continuous political history. This has divided the world into the Ṣāliḥ (sound) and Qāṣir (deficient) societies. Even so, the former have allowed the most influential members of the group to preside over the destiny of all others (and, therefore, of mankind as a whole). For instance, the Sasanid and the Byzantine empires were (at the time of the advent of Islam in the seventh century A.D.) the two *colossi* bestriding the whole world whose ways of living represented Civilization itself, because the nations under their (direct) hegemony or subordinate to them in some remoter sense constituted the 'sound' societies of the world.

All political devices revolve around the city. Now, a city is not necessarily a place where you find a market and a fortress and lofty walls. To be sure, it must be defined in terms of the personal factors and the conceptual principles which enter into it. Thus, the best thing to do in order to define it is to call it "a group of men—drawn from several families—who are held together by their interdependent needs, and who are consequently dealing with each other in formally organized transactions" (i, 44). On such a definition, a city can be seen to be an entity by itself which consists of (a) the individuals in it, and (b) of the *form*

under which the latter are united into it. Hence it can consist of several local units which are geographically contiguous but distinct, but where there are groups of men who enter into formal transactions with each other.

Once a city had come into being,[41] it must have found itself beset with the same possibilities of disintegration as beset all composite things—viz. the decay of the *matter* or the loss of *form*.[42]

41. At a time when the foundations of the City are being laid, the Naqīb (preceding note) must make arrangements for:—

(a) construction of walls or ramparts to enclose the city;
(b) a market-place in a central position;
(c) distribution of population in accordance with the interrelations of the trades or arts pursued by the people;
(d) a forum (Thaqīfah) where at the time of extra-ordinary developments people would meet, and where those prominent among a certain group could speak on behalf of it;
(e) setting aside of certain lands adjacent to the city as pasture-grounds for the cattle;
(f) a place of worship in each local division of the city;
(g) appointment of leaders of Prayer and instructors of children (Budūr 83 f.).

42. The following must soon have been perceived to be the causes of the disintegration of a city:—

(a) disunity of the citizens (either on questions of Faith or on practical questions) as a result of which some of them may try to hurt or dispossess or even destroy others;
(b) such clandestine activities or practices as black magic; the homicidal use of poison; the dissemination of false or subversive notions among the people; and the incitement of a slave against his master, or of the subjects against their ruler;
(c) actions directed against person or property—e.g., homicide with or without the intent to kill; the infliction of grievous injuries; grave provocations (such as the attempt to seduce one's daughter or sister); theft or robbery or usurpation;
(d) actions (e.g., homosexual relations between men or between women, or the impersonation of the character or the appearance of the opposite sex) which lead to the perversion of the human character, or actions (e g., adultery, gambling, usury and the addiction to the use of intoxicating liquor) which endanger the established institutions on which the well-being of the human society depends;
(e) slanderous actions—i.e., those which impute unchastity to a married woman or illegitimacy to a child;

The elimination of all the causes of disintegration was a prerequisite to the establishment of a city as it is a necessary condition for its continued existence. If a city were to be fairly large, it would be impossible for all its citizens to come to an agreement upon the rule of justice (al-Sunnah al-'Ādilah) necessary for its organization and continuance. Nor would it be possible for one citizen to challenge another (who defied the rule of justice)—unless the former had been placed in a position of authority. The method which places a person in such a position of authority constitutes the problem of Imāmat.

Imāmat, then, is the position of authority whence one citizen can challenge another in the name of the rule of justice. It came to be occupied by a person to whom most of the Ahl al-Ḥall wa al-'Aqd (i.e. the most influential citizens) agreed to accord allegiance. In direct proportion to the great importance of this office, it was immaterial whether its incumbent was one or more than one person. (Of course, in the former case, the term Imām would be applicable to him in the apparent and literal sense). The manner in which the Imām could be inducted into office was direct if the Ahl al-Ḥall wa al-'Aqd could themselves judge his qualifications in comparison with those of some other claimants to Imāmat. But it was indirect in those cases in which some one else[43] recommended a name (or names) for them to approve and accept.

As regards the Imām's qualifications, it was considered necessary that he should be a male free in status, ripe in years, and in full possession of mental and physical powers. Courage, wisdom

(f) uncitizen-like actions through which some persons *may try:*
  (1) either to rest contented with the first Iratifāq and thus to prevent or defeat progress towards a higher Irtifāq;
  (2) or to desert their city;
  (3) or to upset the balance of forces in their city by over-crowding in a particular line of work—e.g., agriculture or trade or the military profession;

(g) and the presence of pernicious insects or ferocious animals in a city (HAB i. 44: *Budūr* 77 f.).

43. i.e., most often, an Imām already in office, but under the expectation of death, or looking forward to retirement.

and forbearance were considered to be qualities worthy of special importance in this connexion.

On assuming office, an Imām was supposed to take measures to win his people's loyalty and love. In the beginning, therefore, he could treat the stabilization of the general situation as the end of his policy. But when stability had been achieved,[44] he was in a position to devote his time and energies to the essential problems and responsibilities of his office.[45] In so doing, he found it necessary to possess certain powers and privileges. For instance,

44. In so doing, the Imām should have convinced the people that it is in the interest of the whole city that he should do what he is doing (viz. the demand for the fulfilment of his power and authority); that his office exists for their sake, not as something directed against them; and that as an individual (occupant of the Imāmat), he may be hard to replace (HAB i, 45 f.).

45. Of these, Walīy Allāh describes the following:— First, the Imām should be aware of the conditions of people's daily lives and of the direction in which their mind works. Secondly, he should not allow himself to be held in low esteem as an individual. Thirdly, he will find the citizens divided into three classes—the slaves, the freemen at large, and the freemen in the employ of the state. His authority will not extend to the slaves as such (or it will be represented by their master's authority over them). To the second class of persons (who for all practical purposes are represented by the Ahl al-Ḥall wa al-'Aqd) he will be related in so far as the major principles of his policy must carry conviction with them. As regards the freemen employed to act as his assistants, he must have the power to increase or decrease their rank or emoluments of service according as they perform their functions efficiently or inefficiently, and deserve or fail to deserve the privileges conferred upon them. The number of such assistants has to be flexible; for it bears direct proportion to the magnitude and importance of the organisation of a city. (Walīy Allāh grades cities in accordance with the composition and strength of their fighting forces. A militia of 4,000 men is the minimum required of a viable city. A regular army of 12,000 men changes the city-state into Khilāfat. A regular army of 100,000 men raises the political leader concerned to the status of 'the supreme Caliph'). The most important distinction between the private citizens and the assistants of the Imām consists in the fact that the former have to be taxed in order to remunerate the latter.. (Walīy Allāh names the following heads of Taxation:—

(a) on treasures or riches possessed by individuals;
(b) on livestock;
(c) on agricultural produce;
(d) and on trade and commerce.

Should these sources prove to be inadequate, the income of the Kāsibīn or the individual citizens working for gain might also be taxed). (HAB i, 46).

he was in need of means to supervising the work of his assistants. Again, he was in need of greater amenities (Yasār) than those enjoyed by the people in general—provided these should not prove to be excessive. Thus, he could reclaim waste lands or develop remote regions in order to facilitate the performance of his functions.

The institution of Imāmat was a means to the preservation of the form under which the individual members of a city were to be united. As regards the subject-matter of civic life (i.e. the problems faced by the citizens almost every day), the necessary means to its preservation could be devised only after the establishment of Imāmat. For such means were bound to place certain restrictions upon some citizens; and it is undesirable that restrictions should emanate from any other source than the Imāmat.[46] In specific terms, these means included the five political offices of the Judge, the Police, the Magistracy, the Commander of the Armed Forces, and the religious or moral Instructor.[47]

The problems of ordinary politics (i.e. for the most part the third Irtifāq) lead to those of 'high' politics (i.e. the fourth Irtifāq). When there comes into being a large number of independent city-states, each with its own Imām, then all those states stand in need of some principle whereby the relations of their Imāms could be regulated. Without any such principle of overriding force, the independent city-states are bound to remain entangled in interminable conflict with one another.[48] Walīy Allāh visualizes three distinct forms of (multipolitical) government which may be based on such a principle—viz. the despotism of a world Conqueror, the nominal authority of a Caliph, and the effective rule of a 'supreme' Caliph.

46. This is Walīy Allāh's own view which has been used as the criterion of the 'perfect' and 'imperfect' forms of civic organization (*Budūr* 72).

47. See Appendix X.

48. The causes of conflict among city-states are (a) the corrupting effects of power and authority on the mind or the nature of the Imāms; (b) lawlessness within a city; (c) intrigues or overt aggression against another city; (d) disputes over territories or assets; and (e) the personal animosities of the Imāms (*Budūr* 86).

A world Conqueror makes his appearance at a time when the cities of the world may have been weakened by internal strife and the consequent disruption of their normal functions. Engrossed with infinite passion and fury, such a person rallies round himself hordes of men marked by courage and discipline in a superlative measure. Then his armies overrun the powerless and disunited city-states all over the world. Such a catastrophic development is not too readily amenable to a teleological explanation. For the persons acting or suffering in the course of it are not doing so in a measure commensurate with their own purposes and problems. (The purposes and problems of any group of men are centred in the Irtifāqāt; but the phenomenon of world Conquest involves the overthrow of empires, the destruction of cities, and the extermination of populations). In this sense, therefore, the phenomenon of world conquest is lifted above the plane of ordinary Morality. For in and through it the Author of the universe is Himself at the helm of universal affairs—placing the human *dramatis personae* under a sort of necessity, and postponing the method of Tadbīr (merciful direction) to the method of Khalq (necessary causation: i, 17). As a world-historical event, therefore, the authority of a Conqueror forms no part of the Irtifāqāt. Hence it is necessary that the solution of the problems of the fourth Irtifāq by means of a world-shaking Conquest should be ruled out as an act of God, and that men should instead cling all the more tenaciously to peaceful devices for the establishment of 'supreme' (multipolitical) authority.

In the second place, the 'nominal' authority of a Caliph may be instituted as a result of the agreement of cities torn by opposition and conflict—viz. to submit their conflicting claims to arbitration. This makes the Caliph in question a nominal head of all the cities that may agree to submit to his authority.

But if the Caliph is competent or able to assert his authority beyond the arbitral functions, it will change into the effective rule of the 'supreme' Caliph. Such a development is bound to involve the extinction of the sovereignty of the local Imāms who will now rule over their cities in the name of the Caliph. In order to bring the internecine conflicts of the cities (in his jurisdiction) to an end, the Caliph will take away from every person (in the

Caliphate) the right to use the Sword. Thus, the judges, the magistrates, the police, the tax-collectors, &c. (in various parts of the Caliphate) will all be required under an oath to seek the assistance of the Commander-in-Chief in all those cases in which the use of the Sword may be necessary. The Commander will in turn be under the strictest supervision of the Caliph himself. Therefore, all decisions with regard to the infliction of grievous or mortal injury upon the human body will emanate from the supreme Caliph. This is the reason why "the problem of the establishment of the supreme Caliphate is the most difficult as well as the most important problem, and why it is necessary that the incumbent of this office should possess moral qualities which are complete and perfect".[49]

49. It is to be noted here that Walīy Allāh's description of the Iratifāqāt alternates between various tenses and moods of grammar in order to show how (in the case of Politics in particular) a historical analysis changes from a statement of facts into an exposition of Ideals.

CONCLUSION

The four books with which we have been concerned in this work represent the most important moment in the history of Islamic Thought. The ideas expressed in them make their appearance under such congenial circumstances that each book seems to possess the originality and splendour of a discovery. What raises them far above any other intellectual effort in Islam is that they illustrate an uninterrupted movement of *thought*. In what follows, therefore, we shall try to emphasise and explain the continuity that runs through them. In this sense, the following discussion may be described as a mathematical analysis rather than a historical review.

In order to illustrate the movement of thought between TF and HAB, one might even draw a diagram as follows:—



Place the points *a, b, c* and *m* as the vertices of a possible parallelogram. Join *a* and *b, a* and *c, c* and *m*. Produce *cm* to *d*. Join *b* and *d,* and *b* and *c* (in dots).

Suppose that *a* is the starting point of *original* contributions to Islamic Thought. From *a* Ghazālī goes to *c* (in TF) which presents him as an exponent of Islamic Thought, and which represents an activity that comes to rest at *m*. But *md,* which is an extension of *mc,* nevertheless presents him as an exponent of the philosophy of Religion in general, which is the subject-matter of IUD.

Again Ibn Taymiyah goes from *a* to *b*. The line *ab*, therefore, represents the activity that led him to his position in KRM. Although it can be extended further below, the extension would not differ from the principal line (*ab*) as markedly as does *dm* from *mc*.

Now *b* and *c* can be regarded as contraries; whereas *b* and *d* must be regarded as contradictories. Further, the lines *ab*, *ac* and *cd* are firm and continuous, because they represent original contributions to Islamic Thought. On the contrary, Walīy Allāh aims at a Taṭbīq of *b* and *c*, and *b* and *d*. In so far as Taṭbīq can be distinguished from original contributions, the lines *bc* and *bd* are only dotted lines. Of these two, *bd* is larger because a Taṭbīq between contradictories (KRM and IUD) is more difficult than one between contraries (KRM and TF). Moreover, his attempt at Taṭbīq causes Walīy Allāh himself to cut (cf. *e*) through Ghazālī's position in TF.

Again, the emergence of the triangle *bcd*—as opposed to the triangle *abc*—illustrates the elements of permanence and change present in the Muslim world between the eleventh and the eighteenth century (A.D.).

Finally, the subdivision of the triangle *bcd* into the two smaller triangles *bce* and *ced* represents two different aspects of Walīy Allāh's own thought—viz. the orthodox or conservative, and the rationalistic.

In concrete terms, the movement analysed above can be described as follows:—

First, Ghazālī's TF appears as the anti-climax of speculative activity in the Muslim world. But the author soon realizes that his comprehensive catalogue of the philosophical theories he sought to refute included many things with which Islam is not concerned at all, and that the manner in which he had attacked Philosophy represented at its best only an ambiguous service to Islam.

In the second place, therefore, Ghazālī's self-criticism reaches its climax in IUD. Unlike TF, this book does succeed in showing exactly where Islam and Philosophy are confronted with each

other. In so doing, however, IUD reveals that he who examines into such confrontation no longer can be an exponent of his particular religion; for now he becomes an exponent of Religion in general.

In the third place, the radical form in which the exponent of Religion in general expresses his insight provokes violent reaction. For the affirmation of the universal principles of Religion is in one sense a confirmation of particular religions; but in another sense, it is a challenge to them.[1] Hence Ibn Taymiyah's powerful counter-blast (KRM) to IUD purports to be a vindication of the Islamic *particularity*. This has been done with the utmost thoroughness. For Ibn Taymiyah advances from the concept of Particularity to that of Singularity,[2] as also his understanding of the principle of Universality takes the form of a *reductio ad absurdam*. Incidentally,[3] his attention is claimed by a question that involves an analysis of the fundamental principle of Islamic Thought—viz. the elements and the function of the Muslim mind.

Ibn Taymiyah's reaction to Ghazālī revives the classical spirit or restores the classical heritage to a position whence it might claim to be a rival to philosophical theology. In the fourth place, therefore, his reaccentuation of this rivalry finds its nemesis in Walīy Allāh's bold denial (in HAB) that, in the event of rivalry between various interpretations, Islam could be represented by one rival to the exclusion of the other. The concept of Taṭbīq is thus employed not only to dissociate Islam from the conflict of ideas held by great Muslim thinkers, but also to place its essence far above the teachings of those who participated in such conflicts.

Let us now consider whether this movement of thought can be explained by reference to factors within itself. It is obvious that its three phases (TF-IUD, TF & IUD-KRM, TF & IUD &

1. Cf. the Ṣūfī dictum (cited by Ghazālī in *Kitāb al-Imlā*, p. 4): "It is an act of Heresy or Disbelief to divulge the mysteries of Godhead.

(افشاء سر الربوبية كفر).

2. i.e., the historically unique character of Islam.
3. As realized in the philosophy of Religion.

KRM-HAB) cannot all be depicted in the same measure or on the same scale. In the first phase, the movement takes the form of an effort by one and the same person to outgrow his earlier attitudes. In the second, it takes the form of an effort by Ibn Taymiyah to refute two different attitudes of one and the same person (Ghazālī). Although Ibn Taymiyah attacks Ghazāli's attitudes at once, he does not do so with equal intensity. From the varying degrees of intensity in this case must be explained the new dimension acquired by his criticism—in its presentation of the case for Induction, and in its adumbration of the contents of Islamic Thought.

The complexity that marks the second phase becomes still deeper in the third. For in order to accept several books as equally important expressions of Islamic Thought, Walīy Allāh has first to absorb into his own system all the differences that divided them from one another. Having thus absorbed the differences (whence arises the complexity of his contribution to Islamic Thought), he transvalues them in two ways. First, he arrives at the conclusion that these differences are not so bad as to contradict or destroy a man's loyalty to Islam. Secondly, he seeks to derive from the (absorptive) operation he has performed the same kind of satisfaction as his predecessors' *original* achievements might have afforded them.

From the increasing complexity of these phases, therefore, one could assume that the laws of the activity or the movement they represent must be contained within itself. One of these laws can be stated as follows:—

> Namely, that Ibn Taymiyah's opposition (in KRM) to Ghazālī's IUD bears direct proportion to the latter's attack on his own TF.

Thus, in the diagram given above, the line *ab* will have to be extended further below in exact proportion to the length to which one might extend the line *cd* further above. This means that Ibn Taymiyah considers Ghazālī's progress from TF to IUD as an instance of the intensification of the Hellenistic influences on Islamic Thought, and that therefore the formal aspect of TF (as a Refutation) regains in Ibn Taymiyah's eyes an 'Islamic character whence (Ibn Taymiyah would feel) Ghazālī ought not

to have proceeded towards IUD, and which is good enough to serve as a model for Ibn Taymiyah's own Refutation. On this showing, TF occupies the central position in the movement of thought so far completed; and the progressive element in Ibn Taymiyah's criticism (on Ghazālī) consists in the double standard by which he judges TF.

Another law that may be inferred from the facts under consideration can be stated as follows:—

> Namely, that in Walīy Allāh's Taṭbīq, Ibn Taymiyah's and Ghazālī's views on Islamic life and history are admitted only as personal opinions, and that the extent to which the difference of each opinion (from what Walīy Allāh considers to be the objective facts of Islamic history) is reflected in its passivity under criticism from the standpoint of the other opinion, determines how far in his Taṭbīq Walīy Allāh would rehabilitate the latter.

According to this law, the central position in the present phase is occupied by the outlook on Islamic life and history. The secret of Walīy Allāh's Taṭbīq lies in his acceptance of the topics of KRM—which, however, he develops as rationally (on universalistic lines) as Ghazālī had developed his topics in IUD. (What is common to HAB and KRM is the thesis that the primary and essential problem of Islamic Thought turns on the fundamental character and the motive force of the mission of the Prophet of Islam. On the contrary, the similarity between HAB and IUD arises out of the fact that the former develops the afore-said thesis on the basis of a theory of Civilization, and places it in the context of the historical tradition of Prophecy).

APPENDIX I

(See I, note 23)

I. In a survey like the one on which we are embarking, a beginning must be made with *Qrn.* This has been done in the Introduction above, sections VIII *et seqq.*

II. The time between the historical appearance of *Qrn.* and I'tizāl is marked by the perfection of two symbols or conditions of cultural growth—viz. political power, and enrichment of the life of the Muslim community. In the beginning, the latter activity was co-extensive with the career of the Companions of the Prophet as a class by themselves.

Soon after the Prophet's death, the Companions began to have influence in so far as some of the most prominant members of the class were the (political) leaders of the community. The existence of an aristocracy in its midst had both beneficial and harmful consequences for the class. When in the later part of the 'pious' Caliphate the community was engaged in civil war, the part played by the Companions on one side or the other caused their privilege or the fact of their association with the Prophet to sink back into a *suppositio materialis.* If one Companion supported A while another supported B, the ferocity of the conflict between A and B proves that the privileged 'association' of the Companions was not a factor to reckon with.

When the situation had been stabilized later on, the Companions moved into comparatively remote and uninfluential parts of the Muslim empire. Their increasingly ineffectual but edifying role in their new abode has ingratiated the knowledge propagated by them with the Muslim mind as the first rung on the ladder that leads up to the transcendental realm of the divine Truth. In transmitting this 'knowledge', some of them gave expression to their classical orientation or interests. Having divested it of its *sympathy* with the Jewish and Christian traditions, they reconciled it to the traditions of the Arabs. In so far as this knowledge

was well-suited to the need of an ascendant culture for self-expression, it provided a *theoretical* basis for it. On the other hand, it was *practical* in proportion to its divergence from some partisan or contentious groups which had taken their stand on questions of Dogma.

The standard biographical dictionaries (e.g. Ibn Athīr, *Usd al-Ghābah*, Tehran 1342 A.H., vol. i, p. 127: "Anas b. Mālik" & vol. iii, p. 96: "Abū al-Ṭufayl 'Āmir b. Wāthilah") offer various estimates and reports concerning the last Companion to die. However, the end of the first century (Hijra) may be considered as very near to being the physical limit for the longevity of those who had seen the Prophet. The ages that followed belonged to the Companions' successors (Tābi'ūn). These can be subdivided into the various generations of Muslims of *all* times. For the name that has been given to them signifies the end of the period in which one lived under the aspect of Revelation. Once that aspect had been withdrawn, it made no difference whether the secularity of one's life was ancient or modern. Any way, the first few strata of this class are responsible for the organization of the Islamic humanities. These include Ḥadīth and Fiqh and all the allied 'sciences'.

Imām Shāfi'ī (150/767-204/820) and Imām Bukhārī (194/810-256/870) are the two persons who delved into the theoretical presuppositions of this whole system. The former distinguished the Prophet's example as the source and the goal of all that is Islamic. In contrast to all other institutions recognized by the Muslim community, he attributed authority to this example because of its charismatic character. In contrast to the *Qrn.*, he still attributed final authority to the Prophet because of the fuller and definitive character of his example. He gave pointed expression to the Muslim belief in the ideality of the Sunnah, whence he proceeded to assert that the Sunnah and the Good are commensurate and mutually convertible. For he maintained (in his *Risālah* in particular) that your belief in God binds you in obedience to the Prophet, and that your obedience to the Prophet proves you to be a Believer (in God).

Bukhārī, who belonged to the school of Fiqh founded by Shāfi'ī, has combined in his collection of traditions his own under-

standing of the theoretical presuppositions of the Islamic humanities with by far the most authentic and famous record of what the Prophet taught "by word of mouth, or deeds, or silent approval". The former aspect of his work is interpreted in terms of problem of his own *apparatus criticus* in his collection. In a monograph (*Tarājim Abwāb Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Hyderabad-Deccan, 1323, A.H. pp. 2-3) on the subject, Shāh Walīy Allāh says:—

> At first, the scholars of Tradition had divided that subject into four branches. (i) Sunnah or Fiqh, e.g. in Mālik's *Muwaṭṭā* or Sufyān's *Jāmi'*. (ii) Tafsīr, e.g. in Ibn Jurayj. (iii) Siyar, e.g. in Muḥammad b. Isḥāq. (iv) Ascetical or pious exhortation, e.g. in Ibn Mubārak. Bukhārī decided to comprehend all these varieties in his book (hence called al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Musnad) which in this respect represented a follower's rather than a pioneer's job. However, he also made an effort to work out the implications of the traditions and to show their bearings upon a very large number of problems. In this respect his contribution was original. In so doing, he found it necessary to draw a line between the traditions and his own inferences therefrom, so that the former fall into the substance of a chapter, while the latter have been confined to its trappings (Tarājim).

Thus, the 3450 'chapters' of *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* (cf. M. Z. Siddiqi, *Hadith Literature, op. cit.*, p. 94) have been placed under headings, or furnished with notes, which form a system by themselves, and which give expression to Bukhārī's own idea of 'knowledge'. In some cases (e.g. chapters 6-7 in Kitāb al-Maẓālim in the *Ṣaḥīḥ*), these headings or notes occur without there being any text (Ḥadīth) for them to explain or introduce. This curious omission may be explained on the assumption that the super-abundant notes have been allowed to stand because they form an integral part of a scheme or an independent piece of research. (Bukhārī is said to have worked on the Aḥādīth at Mecca, whereas the Tarājim were composed between the Pulpit and the Tomb in the Prophet's Mosque at Madinah. See 'Asqalānī, *Hady al-sārī*, Cairo 1347 A.H., vol. ii, p. 202).

The achievements of the two Imāms belong to a historical tradition in which they had been preceded by many other things of the same kind, as also many other things succeeded to them. They have been equalled by very few of those things, while no one has surpassed them. In this sense, they stand out as the

primus inter pares in the post-Revelation history of Islamic Thought. Between themselves, they gave powerful expression to the self-defining and all-inclusive trends of that subject. With them, the Islamic humanities take on the significance of a super-science. Centred in the Prophet's life and work, this magnified subject drifted away from the Quranic setting in which the Muslim community appeared as one of many things under the sun, and in which God reserved the right not to shape its destiny in accordance with its own aspirations. But now the community was prosperous enough to confine its experience and aspirations to the circumstances of its own life, and the success of its political leaders seemed to have won it divine favour or to have put it on the (desirable or obligatory) way to doing so.

III. A systematic study of Islamic Thought must include an adequate assessment of I'tizāl. There is confusion in the traditional interpretation of the movement. If in modern times we seek to identify it in terms of Muslim (or Islamic) philosophy (cf. Nadir Albert, *Falsafat al-Mu'tazilah, Falāsifat al-Islām al-Asbaqīn*, Alexandria 1950), we must remember that the applicability of these terms has been called into question. Ibn Sīnā, Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd refused to call the Mu'tazilah 'philosophers'. Ghazālī (in the conclusion to TF) classes them among 'the Innovators'. The two great Aristotelians, on the other hand, call them Aṣḥāb al-Jadal (cf. II, note 85). The terms of this judgment have been transposed by Ibn Taymiyah who would give them credit for Philosophy, but who denies that any philosophy can be Islamic (see II, note 95). For their own part, the Mu'tazilah gave themselves the proud name: Ahl al-'Adl w'al-Tauḥīd (People of Justice and Unity). But the facts of their career give the lie to this grand epithet. Justice is contradicted by the fact that the Mu'tazilah degenerated into an Inquisitorial role. On the other hand, Unity is contradicted by the fact that the Mu'tazilah thought of it as their *differentia* in relation to the Muslim community at large, whereas the principle of Tauḥīd is a unifying factor or a generic attribute, not a divisive force, in the life of the Muslim community.

The problem of the divine Being and its attributes, and the moral implications of Causality, were the two most important

questions on which the Mu'tazilah took a stand against the Islamic humanities. Indirectly, these questions can be viewed in the light of an attempt to expose the contradictions inherent in the latter's pre-occupation with Prophecy and their architectonic predilections (which led to the formation of loosely organized systems). In essence, I'tizāl was motivated by its preference for the *via media* (al-Manzilah bayn al-Manzilatayn)—i.e between the denunciation and the exculpation or even glorification of a sinful Believer (in principle) and (in point of fact) of the Companions who had taken an active part in the civil war. Such a happy mean had also been the object of the reconstructions attempted by the humanists in their own way. The outcome of their endeavour had been a liberal judgment upon the sinful Believer and a retrojection of their own ideals into the lives of the Companions which somehow continued to keep the superimposed essences (Ideals) rooted to history. With the Mu'tazilah, on the contrary, the emergent mean involved the total rejection of both the extremes. This abstraction has proved to be the source of the rationalism which came to be attributed to them.

IV. Much of what I'tizāl stands for is revealed in its confrontation with Ash'arianism which represents an attempt to defeat the former on its own ground. Many important things are common to the two schools, although some of them have been turned upside down in the course of transmission. Both the Mu'tazilah and the Ashā'irah use Dialectical reasoning. But the former believe in the method—as something the mere acceptance of which could alter the complexion of the Muslim mind. On the contrary, the latter thought of it as an indifferent method for them to use in their attack on the Mu'tazilah. Again, the Mu'tazilah had an incipient but clear consciousness of the rational principle of Causality as the criterion of the validity of the humanities. The Ashā'irah reduced this principle or postulate to absurdity in such a way that their antithesis soon developed into a positive conception or doctrine (anti-Causality). Finally, both these schools were interested in what may be called comparative theology. The interest was developed in the context of the differences among the Muslim sects. But the Mu'tazilah took an *a priori* view of the right thing to believe in. Once they had apprehended it, they attributed superlative merit to it, and hurled it as a chal-

lenge in the face of all other sects. In contrast to them, the Ashā'irah reviewed the position of the various sects empirically and in greater detail; wherefore their idea of the right thing to believe in coincided with the lesson Islamic history had to teach, or with attitudes which had proved to be the most enduring and acceptable in the course of it.

Ash'arianism has had a long history. As the source of a respectable and persuasive version of Islamic theology, it has been a part of the Islamic heritage in all the subsequent ages. Buttressed with elements drawn from Taṣawwuf and Avicennianism, the Ash'arian theology is so firmly embedded in the life of the Muslim mind that only a new world-view, based on the latest advances in the physical sciences, can possibly weaken its hold. (And it is debatable whether Islamic Thought *as such* should aim at this kind of change).

Its long history explains why the elements of Ash'arianism should have been represented by the teachings of various thinkers in different times and places. In the very beginning, the movement took shape in accordance with the exigencies of its opposition to I'tizāl. Later on, its confrontation with the Islamic humanities (which in turn had imported the Dialectical method into their own teachings) forced it to reconsider its basic attitudes which heretofore it had tended to identify with the essence of Islam. Again, Taṣawwuf and Avicennianism facilitated its reorientation towards forces in the intellectual life of the international Muslim community. In response to such amplifying influences, the comparative theology of Ash'arianism which had been based on a survey of the Muslim sects gradually began to obtain its data from a comparative study of the religious communities of the world (cf. Ash'arī's *Maqālāt* in contradistinction of Shahrastānī's *Kitāb al-Milal*). A notable change within the structure of the movement found expression in Ghazālī with whom Ash'arian anti-Causality (which had so far been expressed in the form of an atomistic conception of Being) enters upon a new phase, in which the critics of Causality would rather attack the subjective elements in the idea of the cause and effect. In very recent times, Ash'arianism managed to fall in line with the characteristically integrative trends in Islam, in that its followers (e.g. Shāh Walīy

Allāh?) found it possible to disabuse themselves of anti-Causality altogether, so that the theology in which they believed could be rebuilt on the foundations of the Avicennian concept of the strict necessity of the causal connexion.

V. We have chosen to introduce Taṣawwuf at a point between Ash'arianism and Avicennianism. This is merely to emphasise the significance of Mysticism as one of the factors which had an influence on Ibn Sīnā. As far as Ash'arianism is concerned; Taṣawwuf may be conjoined with it to represent an intellectual force against which the leaders of the Islamic humanities had directed their criticism. These critics did not only make use of Isnād as an integral part of Ḥadīth, but had also developed a theory of the value of this institution as one of the distinctive features of Islamic life (see II, note 114). This theory presented a challenge to the indolence of the Ash'arian (Mutakallim) on the one hand, and to the romanticism of the Ṣūfī on the other. In particular, it tended to denounce the Mystical representation of the character of the Prophet of Islam in metahistorical terms. This particular aspect of Taṣawwuf could be traced back to Shāfi'ī who had taken an idealistic view of the Sunnah. But the latter had turned to this supreme norm by way of refuting the idealization of all that was unrevealed. On the contrary, this kind of idealization was implicit in what the Ṣūfī thought of the Prophet—namely, as 'the perfect man' or the concentrated essence of humanity. In spite of this basic difference, however, the two instances agree in respect of their tendency towards metahistory. In Shāfi'ī, this came to the fore in the comparative lack of circumspection in his use of Isnād. In Taṣawwuf, it finds expression in the increasing awareness of the antithesis of Form and Meaning which has come to be regarded as characteristic of the Ṣūfīs—both in respect of the degradation of the first term (form), and in that of the neologism represented by the second. On this principle, the institution of Isnād and, indeed, the larger question of the historical framework of Revelation, came to be viewed as an unnecessary or even misleading accretion.

It was none too easy for the Ṣūfīs to prove that the Meanings in which they believed formed the solid core of Prophecy. The dichotomy they had sought to establish was hopelessly lost in

adventitious and naive ontological speculation. It could be saved if only its authors could integrate it with what they had to say of Fiqh. That system had been criticised by them (somewhat confusedly but uncompromisingly) because in its positive elements they found the source of the perversion of Ideals or the debasement of Values. This amounted *to a criticism* of Law *on moral grounds*. Now, Law is an index to what constitutes History. If the Ṣūfīs had recognized its significance in this respect, their interpretation of History would have been an equally (if not more) adequate expression of the moral consciousness. But they failed to view these subjects in close co-ordination and interdependence, wherefore they conceived of historical movement and change in terms of an unbridgeable gap between Form and Meaning. Thus, the 'core' and the 'shell' in Ḥadīth (literature) were distinguished ontologically; whereas the spirit and the letter of the Law had been interpreted from an ethical point of view. The former distinction involved the assumption of an inner aspect of reality which transcended the limitations of its phenomenal appearance, and which could be apprehended only by a correspondingly esoteric kind of 'knowledge'—viz. Prophecy, &c.

VI. The unsystematic charactēr of the insights possessed by the Ṣūfīs called for a more disciplined approach to the questions in which they had been interested. This was undertaken by the philosophers who may roughly be classed as Avicennians. These philosophers deserve much more sustained and sympathetic attention in a study of Islamic thought than they have received. The founder of the system to which they belong has been one of the most important thinkers in the universal history of the complicated relationship of Faith and Reason. In the Muslim world, his influence is discernible in the subsequent development of almost any form of intellectual expression. Scholasticism, theology, and poetry have all made use of his words and ideas which appeared obscure and bizarre in his own deliberately mystified or de-popularized writings, but which were presented by his critics and commentators in reasonably lucid and successful adaptations. More especially, *his conception of the* Necessary *Being* has cast Islamic theology in an Artistotelian mould which it cannot outgrow without radical change or a complete metamorphosis.

Unlike the Ṣūfīs, Ibn Sīnā believed that History (and indeed Existence as a whole) represented a movement towards divine perfection in accordance with the necessity of the universal Sunnah of God, and that the Nawāmīs (Laws) signified Revelation not only to the Muslim community but to all other sections of humanity as well. On such an idealistic view, the actual unfolding of Islamic history in infinite detail appeared to be a short-fall or a back-slide. Turning aside from such deficiency and imperfection, Ibn Sīnā confined his attention to *Qrn.*—more especially, to those parts of it which speak of the laws of Nature and human destiny. In his interpretation of all such lofty themes consists his contribution to Islamic Thought.

In general, Ibn Sīnā placed the Mu'tazilah and the Ashā'irah on the same footing—as the 'people of Dialectical reasoning'. He was dissatisfied with the whole theory behind this method. He thought that the confrontation of different minds, and the heat generated by the clash of their views, militated against the spirit of philosophical inquiry. In his own view, the fulfilment of such an inquiry would be possible if it was sustained on its unhindered course by the spontaneous activity or the genial flow of Thought, or by the gracious and stimulating influences which radiate from the conversation of like-minded men.

The Avicennian concept of necessary Being has been criticised from different points of view. Ibn Rushd considered it as a distortion of Aristotle's teachings on the subject. Ghazālī (in TF) thought of it as an unnecessary and unsuccessful bridge between Faith and Reason. Ibn Taymiyah held that the idea of the Necessary Being is not veridical, whence he concluded that the philosophical enunciation of this idea and (the act of) Faith or Belief (in God) are not one and the same thing. However, all these critics realized that their criticism would not be justified unless it could be balanced with a certain amount of appreciation for the doctrine in question. It is for this reason that Ibn Rushd chose to defend Ibn Sīnā against many of Ghazālī's objections to his teachings in particular. In like manner, Ghazālī was led in his later writings to take a more appreciative view of Avicennian philosophy (which has led many of his critics to doubt his own

sincerity). Last but not the least is Ibn Taymiyah's concession that Aristotelianism had acquired new dimensions in Ibn Sīnā who had received his new interests from the Islamic *milieu.*

Apart from all such criticism and reappraisal, and in spite of Ibn Sīnā's protestations to the contrary, the idea of the Necessary Being has found favour with Muslims as a continuator of the problem (of God's being and His attributes) which had been debated by the Mu'tazilah and the Ashā'irah. Its dependence upon Ibn Sīnā's highly individualized conception of Causality proves its unmistakable affinity to I'tizāl and Ash'arianism. Ibn Sīnā was great enough as a philosopher to reduce a problem to its fundamental principles. Such a penetrating analysis had helped him transcend the limited categories with which the contending attitudes of the humanities and Taṣawwuf had been conceived. The achievement seems to have been repeated in his treatment of Causality. He realized that the differences among his predecessors did not prevent them from lending credence to a cause that shared nothing in common with its effect or effects. Hence the Mu'tazilah had found Tanzīh (absolute independence of the divine Being) to be compatible with (a modicum of) causal efficiency in the divine attributes. Similarly, the Ashā'irah had conceived of the divine Will as a heterogeneous causative force that enveloped a given substance or action on all side. In either case it was assumed that a cause has a self-contained existence of its own which is only intermittently punctuated with a spurt of causative efficiency. The time-lag thus admitted was very naturally supposed to work both ways. From the idea of an effectless cause the Ashā'irah arrived at the notion of an uncaused effect. In order to refute both these abstractions, Ibn Sīnā produced the famous doctrine of the simultaneity of cause and effect. Just as he found it impossible that something should be effected without a cause, so did he deny the possibility of a cause that is not causing forth its effect. Once the conditions of the causal function should have been fulfilled, he thought it was necessary that the cause should go into action and the effect should come into being. On this interpretation, the cause and effect were reduced to being the back and front of a single, homogeneous and indivisible process—i.e. an *influxus physicus.*

Ibn Sīnā applied this notion to Theology. God is the Cause and the world is His effect; and it is impossible that empty time should separate the existence of the one from that of the other. Hence the world is subordinate to God as His effect from eternity to eternity. The subordinacy of the effect in this case was determined by the fact that it had been necessitated by an 'Other'. On the contrary, the Cause excelled by virtue of His being the first and absolute principle of all that exists. Since Ibn Sīnā attributed a homogeneous character to the causal process, he was not prepared to assign any positive contents to his idea of the first Cause. Over and above His causal productivity, therefore, God was supposed to have no other residuary character. That He *is* was good enough as an affirmation to answer any questions concerning even *what* He is. For He is the Necessary Being which *is* and causes others to *be*.

VII. Now to pass on to Ghazālī. Let us consider his anti-Causality, to begin with. He was not slow to perceive that the development of the Islamic humanities had taken a course which precipitated naturalistic attempts to rationalize them on the basis of Causality. As an adherent to (Ash'arī) reaction to these attempts, he believed that anti-Causality was in some sense essential to Faith (in God). In order to be at all, God must be recognized to have the power to alter the course of events in the world. Otherwise, the world itself would be God.

However, Ghazālī was not happy with the way the Ashā'irah had sought to establish anti-Causality as a positive doctrine. There was but an implicit awareness of the meaning the Ash'arian enterprise had for Faith. At its worst, therefore, the enterprise looked like sheer horse-play. The Ash'arian denial of the 'natural properties' (into which the Ashā'irah might have been inveigled by their opponents) called forth the powerful Avicennian retort (in terms of the simultaneity of cause and effect which are related to each other in a process constituted by an *influxus physicus* —i.e. the transference of natural properties). Ghazālī took a critical view of both these positions. He rejected the Ash'arian thesis that natural properties do not influence or limit the operation of the divine Will. The one limit, he thought, that is to be set even to the divine Will is that it acts meaningfully. God does

not will absurdities and contradictions. If He were to do so, He would not be willing at all. For instance, if we say that He wills black to be white, we do not ascribe an act of Will to Him, but simply fail to use words meaningfully.

It is interesting to observe how Ghazālī made use of the Law of Contradiction not only in his criticism on the Ashā'irah but also in his objections to Ibn Sīnā. It occurred to him that the Avicennian doctrine of the simultaneity of cause and effect was based on the assumption that the idea of an ineffective cause or an independent effect involves a contradiction in terms. To this he took exception. He maintained that two terms may be related to each other in different ways. In some (and only in some) cases, their relation is such that if you affirm one of them, the affirmation is bound to involve the affirmation that the other also exists. For instance, if you speak of man, you will have affirmed rationality by implication. If you seek to avoid this implication, a contradiction will arise. For you cannot think of man without rationality, and *vice versa*. But this kind of relationship does not subsist between a cause and its effect. As terms of a (causal) judgment, these two do not involve the existence of each other. On the contrary, each remains quite intelligible in itself. That which places them in sequence is something other than their intelligible essence. It has an empirical basis. It is not a necessity of thought.

Having thus established a dichotomy (between what Aristotle called Explanation and Definition or what in later times came to be called 'synthetical' and 'analytical' judgments) where Ibn Sīnā had recognized no difference, Ghazālī proceeded to argue that the empirical basis of a causal judgment changes it into a subjective interpretation; for all experience is subjective. It is we who observe one thing to precede or follow another. Distinguishing them as 'cause' and 'effect', we proceed to anticipate the continued occurrence of this relationship between them in the future. From the practical point of view, such anticipations are very useful and reasonable. But they do not amount to an adequate apprehension of the nature of things. If they are not borne out, we must not disbelieve what happens in spite of them; nor should we assume that the natural properties of things have been modified or

neutralised. All we can say is that we had calculated in accordance with what 'habit' had taught us to believe. The recalcitrant actuality now calls upon us to outgrow that 'habit'. In or through the former, natural properties of things have been manifested in more profound and subtler ways. A new causal judgment, or a better insight into the nature of things, that may spring from reformed 'habit', is obviously the one needful thing to help us to understand the progressive realization of the future. In such an attitude of the mind did Ghazālī find the basis of one's faith in divine Power. God acts freely and exercises Power—in that our knowledge follows the product of His activity, not *vice versa.*

In addition to what he had to say in refutation of it, Ghazālī rejected the Avicennian concept of Causality as the methodological basis of the rationalization of the Islamic sciences. Causality or, indeed, the first principles of natural science in general, he thought, could not be employed as the criteria of the validity of the Islamic sciences. For the latter had their *raison d'être* within themselves. In fact, the Ṣūfi version of their 'meanings' had illustrated how one's prepossession with external factors could end in futility. Of course, the actual structure of the Islamic sciences could hardly constitute its own meaning—wherefore it was necessary that the latter should be derived from that structure as a universal principle is derived from the experience of many particular instances. By so doing, one may reduce the (Islamic) subject to a general notion like Tauḥīd (which is simple enough to represent Religion as such). The distance covered in the course of this operation may be so long that its initial and final terms might appear to stand in opposition to each other. However, if such a relationship (of opposition) has to be assumed, it must be recognized to provide an instance of inner growth. It cannot be accidental to the subject—as is the case with the friction arising out of the superimposition of Mystical 'meanings'.

In thinking of the Islamic sciences as a system with its reason within itself, Ghazālī sought to 'revivify' them. (In proportion to his success in that direction, it is not unfair to charge him with a destructive genius whereby he brought the Āge of Reason in the Muslim world to an end). He took practical steps to match conviction with deeds. He made a strenuous effort to draw the

humanities into the vortex of his own cognitions. This (significantly belated) move has changed IUD into an architectonic achievement comparable with those of Imām Shāfi'ī and Imām Bukhārī in earlier times.

The line of development that may be seen to join Shāfi'ī, Bukhārī and Ghazālī may conceivably be defined with reference to the varying interpretations of such terms as 'Ilm (Knowledge), Dīn (Faith) and Fiqh (Law). In the beginning, these terms signified moral ideals (or the moral Ideal) to which the Muslim community dedicated itself—after the manner of the righteous servants of God *all over the world.* At that time, all these words meant one and the same thing or slightly different aspects of one and the same thing—viz. Islam. Hence it would not be very intelligible in that period to speak of 'the sciences of Faith'. Faith could be (identified with) Knowledge, but it could not *have* the latter. In the ages that followed, the genitive relationship became admissible. On the other hand, the universal ideality of these terms seems to have been pared off in so far as they were supposed to dwell in the Muslim world. As a result of the latter development, an expression like 'the sciences of Faith' came to mean some ascertainable bodies of Knowledge in that *habitat.* Ghazālī rearranged the various elements of these interpretations into the idea that the 'sciences of Faith' represented such intangible qualities or functions as Gratitude (to God), Patience, (abstinence from) Pride, &c. These were not 'meanings' to be given to the ascertainable bodies of Knowledge in the Muslim world, but universals to be derived from their positive contents.

VIII. The most important part of the teachings of our historically minded authors is fairly well known. What is not so readily recognized, however, is that the secondary interests cultivated by them (with or without any deliberate and systematic reference to the main currents of their intellectual activity) must be taken into consideration if they are to have a place in the context of Islamic Thought. On this principle, Ibn Rushd's contribution to Fiqh (in his *Bidāyat al-Mujtahid*) and Ibn Taymiyah's theory of Logic must be correlated with the part played by each thinker in some other field (of specialization). As far as Ibn Khaldūn and Shāh Walīy Allāh are concerned, each has made an issue of the

commingling of various elements in his work as a whole. It is only when light may have been thrown on such *marginalia* that we can hope to treat all these thinkers as a single phenomenon (Historicism) wherein we can discern the modalities of the Islamic response to the multitudinous force which had found consummate expression in the life and work of Ghazālī.

It is not possible here to do much more than indicate how our estimate of these thinkers can be revised and enlarged. To begin with, let us revert to the point that Ghazālī can be considered as an Avicennian who took exception (on ultimate analysis) not so much to the theoretical foundations of the Avicennian philosophy, as to the absence of emotional identification on the part of its founder with the concrete totality of the Islamic sciences. In order to demonstrate how Avicennianism could and should have been integrated with the latter sciences, Ghazālī forced the two into juxtaposition in his own work. Now, Ibn Rushd's position can be explained in terms of a reaction to Ghazālī. In order to silence all criticism, he began exactly where Ghazālī thought Ibn Sīnā should have begun—namely, from the historical point of view. He sought to correct Ibn Sīnā's misrepresentation of Greek philosophy to which the latter's excessive originality and his failure to use methods of historical research had led him. Moreover, Ibn Rushd's own philosophy was fortified with a fuller grasp of the Islamic tradition (than the selective or monochromatic vision Ibn Sīnā had come by through his interpretation of snippets from the Quranic verses). He was a scholar and a practitioner of Fiqh (which involved a thorough understanding of the legalistic part of the Scripture and Ḥadīth). In perfect consistency with the principle of such corrective measures, Ibn Rushd's interpretation of the cosmic insights expressed in *Qrn.* became much less functional and enthusiastic (than Ibn Sīnā's contribution to Tafsīr).

Once he had thus depreciated Ibn Sīnā in order to show that Ghazālī's criticism on him did not necessarily apply to Philosophy as such, Ibn Rushd changed his role—from an apologist to a critic (of Ghazālī's own teachings). He did not take IUD much too seriously; for he thought that the problem of Law had not been sufficiently well integrated into the plan of that work. In his own

view, one could not make use of the data of Islamic jurisprudence in order to deduce therefrom any scheme of the 'sciences of Faith'. On the contrary, he thought, the laws which had been accepted by the 'masses' in the Muslim society should be taken as they are —without their recipients being treated to visions of the universal Ideas implicit in them. For a popular version of such profound matters will amount to charlatanism that may have disastrous consequences for the 'masses'.

To the 'popular' category of laws Ibn Rushd opposed the one which can have value in proportion to its *disinterestedness*. This division involved the rejection of the Ghazalian idea of *continuity* in the realms of value where Fiqh or any other Islamic science can be grounded. More important than this rejection, however, is the fact that it does not bring Ibn Rushd back to the position taken by Ghazālī's predecessors. Ibn Rushd does not seem to accept the principle that if you criticise me, any person whom I might have criticised earlier should find favour with you. His disagreement with Ghazālī does not reconcile him to the conception of Law that had been held by the Ṣūfīs or the Avicennians. In this sense, it marks a new development in the history of Islamic Thought.

As a new development, however, it would seem to have no place to belong to. The anomalous thing about it was that it could be but was not a contribution to the Islamic sciences. It attributed preponderant significance and even autonomy to Law; but the division of the whole subject into 'popular' and disinterested activity had been conceived from an epistemological rather than a juristic point of view.

In this context, one can appreciate the significance of Ibn Taymiyah's teachings. The historiographical tradition that has been handed down to us offers little in the nature of an inducement or justification for the comparison (between Ibn Rushd and Ibn Taymiyah) to which we are calling attention. This seems to imply that, although the latter makes many an explicit reference to the former in his writings, Averroism has not had the same kind of impact on his mind as had been produced by the writings of Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā. Plausible as it is, this view of the matter needs to be modified in the light of the requirements of a subject

like Islamic Thought. In relation to that subject, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Taymiyah can readily be seen to provide between themselves an example of a progression of ideas. Of course, their interest in the problem of Law is the most important thing they share in common. It is with a vengeance that Ibn Taymiyah agrees with Ibn Rushd on his classification of the Laws as 'popular' and disinterested. However, the one reservation made by him is that these two kinds of Law do not have to be assigned to more than one society. To him, on the contrary, the Muslim world is large enough to have both of them.

In other words, Ibn Taymiyah granted that there were two legal traditions in the Muslim world which represented a 'popular' and a disinterested approach to the subject. Once again he found himself in agreement with Ibn Rushd who thought of the former ('popular') conception of Law as indigenous to Islam or characteristic of it. On his reinterpretation, therefore, the 'popular' legal tradition of the Muslim world could be traced back to the Prophet himself, whereas its disinterested counterpart had entered upon its tumultuous career in 'newer' times —viz. the Ghazalian era. Ibn Taymiyah assigned an epoch-making role to Ghazālī in this respect because he looked upon the Ghazalian amalgam of Fiqh (Aristotelian) logic as a scheme that forced Islamic jurisprudence out of the channels in which the genial current of its essence hitherto had run its course.

Ibn Taymiyah reemployed the Averroesian dichotomy, but he transvalued its terms. His interpretation of the 'popular' legal tradition of the Muslim world is one of the greatest contributions ever made to Islamic Thought. In contradistinction to Ghazālī, he maintained that Fiqh is *the* 'science of Faith' which had its own logic. (Whereas Ghazālī had thought of this explanatory principle as implicit, to Ibn Taymiyah it is explicit and self-conscious). His definition of this autonomous and objective *reason* gives expression to a conviction that Islamic history, which is a self-explanatory phenomenon, has a 'cognitional' basis. The Islamic 'cognitions' are centred in History, their form is synthetical, and in essence they are normative. If the thought-processes which enter into them do not conform to the rules laid down by Aristotle, so much the worse for the latter. For Islam or any

other comparable tradition that is based on Prophecy teaches men how to make an affirmative response to life and the world, whereas the Aristotelians tend to pass into the nothingness with which their megalomaniac abstractions have already familiarized them.

Ibn Taymiyah had sought to furnish the Muslim mind with a clear idea of what constitutes its own being and its characteristic interests. Such an idea can be recognized to be objective only when it is a part of a theory of Civilization. In this sense, Ibn Khaldūn's philosophy of History and Shāh Walīy Allāh's theory of social development (Irtifāqāt) form the necessary complement to Ibn Taymiyah's interpretation of the Islamic Weltanschauung.

As Professor Gibb has pointed out, "the Islamic background of Ibn Khaldūn's political philosophy" (pp. 166-75 in *Stud. on Civiliz. of Islam*: see i, note 29) needs to be studied with much greater care than traditional or even modern critics would seem to have devoted to it. The great Arab philosopher of History continues and enlarges the Averroesian method of the naturalistic interpretation of things hitherto analysed from the standpoint of Theology. As he tells us in the introduction to his *Muqaddimah,* it was his intention to inquire into the 'terrestrial' or natural causes of history which it was customary for (many of) his predecessors to interpret in terms of transcendental causes or *ends.* In essence, this line of investigation is comparable to Ibn Rushd's interpretation of 'the differences among the Jurists' (Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā), although the two thinkers remain distinguishable by reference to the subject-matter each had to dwell upon. Again, Ibn Khaldūn follows the Ghazalian method of a super-scientific survey of the phenomenology of Islamic Thought. He takes all (Islamic) 'knowledge' for his province. But the distinctive feature of his comprehension of this subject is that it is traceable to the educational methods which had made of traditional Islamic scholarship an integral part of the intellectual equipment of an author in his time. Much of what he knows of the Islamic sciences comes by way of 'analytical' rather than 'synthetical' judgments. The self-consciousness that is involved in the former enables Ibn Khaldūn to reconcile himself to the *differentia* of the Islamic character. For instance, he can recognize the Muslim peoples' "obli-

gation" to assume a victorious or dominant role (al-Mukallafīn b' al-Taghallub) in a manner that would remind one of "the white man's burden". The realism with which he can appropriate things of this kind is to be contrasted with Ibn Taymiyah's idealization of those very things. Finally, the educational system whence Ibn Khaldūn derives his orientation towards the Islamic sciences also symbolizes the decisive victory of the humanities in their contest with natural science.

For all practical purposes, the teachings of the thinkers who have been discussed so far have their roots within the Muslim world. This does not mean that they had not been exposed to influences from any foreign sources. Such influences did come, but the (Islamic) substrate that was there to receive them was strong enough not to be shaken, but strengthened, by them. This kind of support was not available to Shāh Walīy Allāh whose contribution to Islamic Thought is the last *personal* factor to be included in the present survey. In general, Walīy Allāh's theory of the Irtifāqāt is by no means more exotic than Ibn Khaldūn's philosophy of History had been in his time. But the former thinker belongs to a decadent society which had lost its capacity for the assimilation of foreign influences into its own metabolism. What is still more significant is the fact that the foreign sources whence influences could come to this society had grown and prospered in inverse proportion to its weakness. It is, therefore, a tempting conclusion that Walīy Allāh's social and political philosophy might have been influenced by the tradition of Natural Law thinking in the contemporary Western world. Should it be possible for historians in the foreseeable future to demonstrate such influences, a Muslim admirer of the theory of Irtifāqāt would do well not to feel disappointed or antagonized by the discovery. Indeed, the newly established connexion will only add to the significance and vitality of Walīy Allāh's contribution to Islamic Thought. However, in the present stage of knowledge, the discovery may be long in taking shape. Its occurrence is bound to depend upon careful and thorough-going into the modalities and directions of the Western impact upon the Muslim mind in the eighteenth century. Failing such an enterprise, it remains to Walīy Allāh's critics in the mean time to turn to his sources within the Muslim world.

These are not far to seek. In most of his writings, Walīy Allāh refers to numerous authors and books. An analysis of all such cases can be of the greatest help to us. In general, however, his Irtifāqāt can be related (almost off-hand) each to a particular *genre* or problem of Muslim scholarship. Thus, the first represents his elaboration of the traditional Muslim belief in the common denominator of the Prophetic teachings of all times. The second shows him to have been *en rapport* with the problem of Contract which had been debated by the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Moreover, there is close correspondence between his account of the 'devices' of this period and some of the classified chapters of almost any standard work on Fiqh. The third and the fourth Irtifāq harken back to expositions of the problem of Imāmat and Khilāfat by the jurists, the historians and the philosophers of the Muslim world.

Within the framework thus constructed from material supplied by his predecessors, Walīy Allāh has incorporated profound value-judgments. He makes a clear distinction between those 'devices' which are, and those which are not, capable of universal acceptance by mankind. He is aware of the difficulties and contradictions that beset political organization in the fourth Irtifāq. The leader of mankind in this period is either a figure-head or a despot. In the latter case, his rise may be an act of God—i.e. an event of world-historical dimensions and of transmoral significance. Or his authority may depend on less catastrophic or even constitutional 'devices'. Although in any case it will involve the extinction of local sovereignties, it may receive final justification from its success in minimizing the destruction of one man's life by another. And that would be no mean achievement.

Walīy Allāh has made use of the theory of Irtifāqāt to explain the historical development of the tradition of Prophecy. On the other hand, this theory is in turn explained by a higher principle—namely, the idea of human nature which in essence had been derived from Taṣawwuf, but through whose reformulation by Walīy Allāh Taṣawwuf had also been criticised for the inadequacy of its moral orientation. Much of Walīy Allāh's criticism on Taṣawwuf hinged upon its opposition to the historicism of the scholars of Ḥadīth. In upholding the latter, Walīy Allāh found

his vocation as an exponent of Islamic Thought. This particular subject appeared to him (as it had appeared to Bukhārī long ago) to be susceptible of a *rapprochement* between the universalism taught by Ghazālī and the *autognosis* practised by Ibn Taymiyah. The articulation of the terms of such a *rapprochement* formed one aspect of the method of Taṭbīq into which Walīy Allāh's mind had found its way. Another aspect of the same method consisted in the vindication of the Avicennian concept of Causality. The (Islamic) humanities now were not only reconcilable to the naturalistic criterion, but they were also prepared to make use of it in their own activity. Ever since Ghazālī had attacked Philosophy, the Age of Reason had departed. In Walīy Allāh's time, however, its impetuous successors were prepared to identify themselves with its fundamental principles. It took them long to make such a concession; for it is only from a position of strength that concessions can be made, whereas one moves into such a position by slow degrees.

IX & X. The problems of Westernization and 'the New Meanings' have been set forth elsewhere in the present work. It may here be added, however, that the present writer's personal opinions need not place any restrictions upon the essential requirements of a systematic study of Islamic Thought. Notwithstanding his objection to Muslim authors' obsession with the West (which is made all the more oppressive by the ignorance and pusillanimity they express in their representation of it), he is unwilling to deny the importance of this subject as a part of the recent history of Islamic Thought.

Again, although this writer has visualized a situation in which the consciousness of the disintegration of (Islamic or Democratic) Ideals will be a source of Wisdom, he finds it necessary to assume that such imaginings will not cast a shadow upon a systematic study of Islamic Thought. Indeed, the exhilarating effects of intellectual activity can change such a study into a positive expression of Joy and Hope.

APPENDIX II

(See I, note 1)

Following are some of the assertions (made in TF) which represent Ghazālī's positive contribution to the problems in hand:

1. Number as such is bound to be odd or even. It makes no difference whether one conceived of it as actual or potential (Etf., p. 21).

2. The principle of choice between two similar things (which appears to be a cognitive function) is implicit in the Will itself (p. 24).

3. Space and time must be explained on the same principle. Empirical data predispose the imagination to anticipate an infinite extension in space and time. But the clear evidence of reason allows the supposition of a body with which space comes to an end, and of an event that was preceded by no other event (pp. 46ff).

4. In *being,* a genus that is not accompanied by a difference does not exist. But it does exist in the mind—as a universal. The universals have no existence without reference to particular objects. For a universal is only a form under which a manifold is subsumed. The apprehension of the universals is not generically different from sense-perception. If the latter is to be recognized as an index to the percipient's imperfection, the same must be true of intellectual knowledge. In either case, there is dependence upon an external datum (pp. 51, 219, 148).

5. There is an essential difference between the beginninglessness and the indestructibility of the world—namely, that the past does in some sense enter into *being,* whereas the future is entirely outside of it. (Hence if an infinite past be denied, the assertion would be borne out on a reference to the fact that the present determines the supposed infinity of the past by carrying it over into itself. On the contrary, if an infinite future be denied, the present would afford no clue as to whether the assertion is true, or not (pp. 54f).

6. 'To perish' means 'to cease to exist'. It does not mean 'to be succeeded by a contrary' (p. 62).

7. That which is done is bound to have been willed—as that which is willed is bound to have been known (pp. 65ff).

8. The contact between the simple and the composite does inevitably give rise to plurality (pp. 73ff).

9. The Necessary Being is a necessity of thought. But the mere idea of it is not sufficient ground for any qualities to be attributed to it. Any method, whether theistic or Materialistic, whereby an infinite regress of causes is brought to an end fulfils the conceptual demand for a Necessary Being (pp. 92, 112).

10. Whether positive or negative, no attributes can be described as attributes *per se* or *per causam*. If a red thing were coloured *per se*, a black thing could not be described as coloured. On the other hand, if a red thing were coloured *per causam*, there could be a red thing that was not coloured (pp. 97ff).

11. The knowledge of a multiplicity of things is incompatible with the unity of essence. Like any other attribute, Knowledge resides in the essence (not as an effect of the essence), and it cannot be identical with the latter (p. 43).

12. Otherness is not determined by the occurrence of an attribute to the essence, or by the co-existence of the former with the latter. The definition of that which is *one* is that the imagination cannot affirm and deny the same thing of it at the same time (pp. 123, 116).

13. An attribute is other than its subject. But the species is not other than the genus. It is the genus *plus* an additional factor (p. 128).

14. Like pure non-being that is not the non-existence of any thing, existence without quiddity or essence is incomprehensible (p. 134).

15. He who believes in the eternity of *body* is in consistency bound to deny the existence of the Creator (p. 141).

16. The connection between causes and effects is not necessary. The effect is not produced of necessity by the nature of the cause (p. 185).

17. Our experience teaches us to expect the effect when the cause begins to operate (p. 189).

18. The development of a thing means the realization of its natural capacities. But this process can vary in its duration. Development into opposite qualities which would reverse the tendencies inherent in a thing is not possible at all (pp. 194ff).

APPENDIX III

(See II, note 73)

Proportion or the identity of relation is represented by a mathematical formula (A:B::C:D) which includes four terms. Joseph (*Intro- to Logic, op. cit.*) distinguishes it from those arguments in which Analogy means resemblance between things—as set over against resemblance between *resemblance* (s) or *relations.* (Such an argument can have only three terms). However, he concedes that the latter argument can change into an argument from the identity of relation when a four term is supplied—i.e. deduced from the three in the original formulation. Such an argument ('A resembles B in certain respects x. A exhibits the character y. Therefore, B will exhibit the character y also') represents Ibn Taymiyah's conception of Analogy. Joseph evaluates such an argument as follows:

> Has argument from analogy any value? ... We must remember that the argument rests altogether on a belief that the conjunction we observe discovers to us a connexion... If we definitely thought that x and y were irrelevant to one another, it would be foolish to expect B to exhibit one because it exhibited the other. But though the argument thus presumes a connexion between x and y, it makes no pretence of showing that y depends on x rather than on some other property z in A, not shared with A by B. There is no elimination. If, however, there were any implicit, though not formal, elimination: or again, if there were anything known to us which seemed to support the hypothesis of a connexion between x and y: we should attach more weight to the argument. Hence if the ascertained resemblance between A and B is very great, we may think the argument from analogy stronger. For there must be something in A to account for the presence of y; and if y is not connected with x, we must look for that something in the remaining nature of A; but the more we include in x (the ascertained resemblance), the less there is that falls outside it, and the fewer therefore the alternatives open to us, to account for the presence of y in A. Still it must be admitted that so long as we rely merely on this sort of consideration, it remains to the end possible that y is unconnected with x, and therefore that y will not be found in B. Of much more weight is the consideration, that the connexion between x and y implied in the argument is one for which our previous knowledge prepared us... It is of some importance to realize that a general principle is always in-

volved in such an argument, because it has been contended (ref. to Mill's *System of Logic* and Bradley's criticism on it in his *Principles of Logic*) that all inference goes really from particulars to particulars. There may be phychological processes in which a man's mind passes direct from A to B, and he predicates of the latter what he was predicating of the former, without grounding it on anything recognized to belong to them in common... But this is not inference (pp. 541-42).

APPENDIX IV

(See II, note 75)

The convertibility of Qiyās al-Shumūl and Qiyās al-Tamthīl does not mean that the circumstances in which the two can profitably be used may not differ. Of the differences thus posited, some have been noted by Ibn Taymiyah.

Thus, in the case of the divine Being, both Qiyās al-Shumūl and Qiyās al-Tamthīl are inapplicable. But the argument which *is* applicable in that case is closer to Analogy than it is to Demonstration (pp. 150ff).

Again, in so far as the strength or the weakness of Qiyās al-Shumūl lies in its universal premises, this kind of argument would be preferable in those cases in which the universal premiss might have been incontrovertibly established (on the Revelational authority of an infallible teacher). (p. 245).

Reference may here be made to a controversy on the comparative merits of an argument and its initial or final terms ('root' or 'branch'). Ibn Taymiyah says (p. 366) that some great thinkers (e.g. Imām al-Ḥaramayn Juwaynī, Ghazālī, Rāzī and Ibn Qudāmah) have distinguished philosophical inquiries from all other subjects (e.g. the Islamic 'sciences' in particular)—in that the former are concerned with an argument *as such*, whereas the latter are interested in (and therefore venture to attribute value to) its 'root' and 'branch'. To this Ibn Taymiyah's rejoinder is twofold. First, he admits that the distinction between the 'roots' and 'branches' is relative—in the sense that the starting point of an argument may become its goal (conclusion), and its goal the starting point (premises), from different points of view. Secondly, he points out (p. 384) that in many cases, the Logicians' own

speculation falls short of the Apriorism and *disinterestedness* which are commended by them. At any rate, they make use of Qiyās al-Ghā'ib 'ala al-Shāhid or inference from facts of experience ('root') to transcendental things ('branch'). For the four instances in which theological judgments are based upon such inference, see p. 367.

APPENDIX V

(See II, note 78)

The points of comparison between Qiyās al-Tamthīl and Qiyās al-Shumūl can be set forth as follows:

Qiyās al-Tamthīl

1. Wine is an intoxicant *and* it is forbidden.
2. Nabīdh
   (a) is an intoxicant
   (b) and is *therefore* forbidden.

In this argument:

Wine = Aṣl (root)
Nabīdh = Far' (branch)
Intoxicant = Manāṭ (*nexus*)
Forbidden = Ḥukm (rule)
al-Muṭālabah bi Tāthīr al-Waṣf (al-Manāṭ) fi al-Ḥukm = a question concerning the validity of the word 'therefore' in 2(b).

Qiyās al-Shumūl

1. All that intoxicates is forbidden.
2. Nabīdh is an intoxicant.
3. Therefore, it is forbidden.

In this argument:

Intoxicant = Middle Term = Manāṭ (in Analogy)
Nabīdh = Minor Term = 'Branch'
Forbidden = Major Term = Ḥukm (in Analogy)

An inquiry concerning the relation of the Middle and the Major Term in (1) = al-Muṭālabah bi Tāthīr al-Waṣf fi al-Ḥukm.

It must be noted that the word 'All' does not occur in the first argument, and the word 'Wine' in the second. In Qiyās al-Tamthīl the omission (of 'All') is made good in that the question that may be directed against the word 'therefore' is precisely the same thing as an 'inquiry concerning the relation of the Middle and Major Term' in Qiyās al-Shumūl. But the omission (of the word 'Wine') that occurs in Qiyās al-Shumūl is absolute and definitive (pp. 209, 349, 354).

The probative force of the reference to 'Wine' in the first argument makes it preferable in general (p. 121).

However, the second argument would be preferable if the relation between its Middle and Major Term were to be posited on indubitable authority—e.g. Revelation (see II, note 75).

All that is true of Analogy is also true of Induction—except that in inductive reasoning, the 'branch' must represent a whole class (p. 209).

APPENDIX VI

(See II, note 91)

The Logicians' criticism (on methods used by the Muslim scholars) is directed against the first (Ṭard & 'Aks) and fourth (Sabr & Taqsīm) method in particular. As regards the first Ibn Taymiyah tells us (pp. 235ff., 12) that there may be instances in which the incommensurability of the Ground and the Consequence ('rule') may not vitiate the latter. (Hence the Logicians' criticism can be turned against themselves). As regards Sabr & Taqsīm, some of the important points made with regard to it can be stated as follows:

(a) It may be objected that the enumeration on which Elimination is to be based may not show whether an attribute belongs to a subject under the influence of internal or external causes. In so far as the implication here is that externally conditioned attri-

butes may not be relevant to a causal explanation or to an argument from analogy, this objection cannot be upheld. For the attributes of a thing are either generic or specific, and the former are external to it—in the sense that they are specific to a superordinate entity (see II, note 39). But who would deny that generic attributes can be relevant to Explanation or Analogy?

(b) It may be objected that even if Enumeration is exhaustive, the resultant complex of attributes (i.e. the concrete totality of a subject) may not be broken up into parts. In other words, if A possesses the attributes a, b, c, ... z, it may not be possible to judge whether a rule is causally determined by a or b, &c., or whether it is determined by $a + b + c$, &c. Ibn Taymiyah resolves this objection into the problem of the causal connexion between the concrete totality of a subject on the one hand and its *differentiae* or its generic attributes on the other. (For instance, it may be questioned whether man's being is causally determined by animality or rationality). For his own part, he thinks it is impossible to consider that which is proper or peculiar to a subject as the cause of its being. (If man be considered as causally determined by his rationality, he would be what he is by virtue of what he is).

(c) Suppose A and B are two individuals. A possesses the attributes x and y. B possesses x and some other attributes. In analogical reasoning, it is concluded that B must possess the attribute y also. This involves the assumption that if x is given, y must follow; in other words, there is a causal connexion between the two. (Cf. Joseph: see II, note 73). Now it may be objected that if Elimination has shown y to be causally determined by x (and if the other attributes that may be possessed by A have been shown to be alienable and therefore accidental), the resulting equation $x + y = A$ will be too narrow for B to be substituted (in place of A) in it. For B may possess the complex attributes $x + y$; but it already does possess some other attributes (e.g. k, t, z). The new equation would therefore be $x + y = A = B - (k + t + z)$. In concrete terms, this means that Elimination may probably be a self-defeating process; for the residuary factor it helps us to identify as the cause may either be too much of an abstraction to play that part, or its causal efficiency may be so localized (Qāṣir) that it may not be transferred to the 'branch'.

Ibn Taymiyah's answer to this criticism can be represented by a distinction he has introduced (p. 408) between Luzūm (non-reciprocating causal relation) and Talāzum (reciprocating causal relation). The attributes of one and the same subject are related among themselves by Talāzum; whereas each and all of them are related to the concrete totality of the subject by Luzūm. (For instance, in the divine Being, the attributes of Knowledge and Power have Talāzum. But it would be false to say that divine Knowledge should therefore be considered as the cause of divine Power. For the cause of Power or Knowledge or any other attribute that may be is to be found in the divine Being itself). If, therefore, in the foregoing illustration, x emerges as the cause of y in A, it follows that x and y are related to each other by Talāzum, and that both of them depend upon A by Luzūm. Now if B has x but is not known to have y, B has too few (rather than too many) Lawāzim in comparison with A. It is in order to supply this deficiency or to redress the balance, that analogical inference is necessary.

APPENDIX VII

(See II, note 94)

Ibn Taymiyah has examined some of the 'basic postulates' of Metaphysics at considerable length:

(a) *Being.* The Philosophers divide all being into substance and accident. (In this scheme, the ten Categories are regrouped as substance and non-substance—i.e. accident, under which the remaining nine are placed). Some people have tried to reduce all accidents (i.e. Categories with the exception of substance) to quality, quantity and relation (p. 132). Substance is subdivided on the basis of its relations to a subject—into form, matter, body, soul and the intellect. Metaphysics which is defined as a science of things independent of matter both in mind and *in re,* is nevertheless claimed by them to be the science of all being. In so far as this phrase includes any being (and therefore those which may not be independent of matter), some people have taken exception to it. For instance, Ibn Muṭahhar Ḥillī objected that, on this interpretation, Metaphysics should concern itself with the most particular or accidental thing that *is* (p. 126). But this objection

misinterprets the word 'all' in the sense of a whole that can be divided into parts. There is another sense in which 'all' can be applied to a genus which is not divided into species, but finds its realization in and through them. (This is comparable to a question debated by the Grammarians of the Arabic language—namely, whether the noun and the verb, &c. are parts of speech, or whether they are its species. The classical Grammarians take the former view; the modern, the latter). In this sense, it is possible to speak of Metaphysics as the science of all being—without necessitating that it should treat of all particular things that may be.

But if being is to be described as a genus (which is a universal), it must be recognized that it is only a mental determination. For a whole (Kull) that is composed of parts does have verifiable being, whereas a universal (Kullī) that is represented by particulars is but a conceptualization of their manifold being (p. 128).

(b) *Composition.* The word tarkīb is used in various senses. First, a body is said to be composed because it has parts which (prior to its existence) were separate, but which have united in it. Secondly, one speaks of tarkīb in the sense that there are two things one of which is fixed in another by an external agent, but which do not intermingle. Thirdly, a composite thing may be such that some of its parts might be separable from it or from some other parts of it, without destroying its character. All the intelligent people agree that all these senses of tarkīb are true, but that no one of them can be applied to the divine Being. In contradistinction to these senses, the Muslim philosophers (e.g. the Avicennians in particular) have hit upon a new interpretation of tarkīb. They think that an entity is composed of:

1. existence and quiddity (Māhiyah);
2. general and peculiar qualities, e.g. the generic attributes and the differentia;
3. and essence and attributes.

Again, they consider body as composed of (4) form and matter, or (5) of indivisible atoms. Having thus defined tarkīb, they condensed to deny the possibility of its being attributed to the divine Being.

Of these five senses, the last may or may not be considered to be true. If it is, its being inapplicable (to the divine Being) will not be hard to prove. Again, the first, second and fourth senses involve arbitrary assumptions. They are, therefore, not only inapplicable to the divine Being, but also false in themselves. Lastly, the third is not only false and inapplicable to the divine Being, but it also represents a spurious element that has been super-imposed upon Philosophy. It has no basis in Aristotle or in ancient philosophy in general. (Its inauthenticity will be borne out on a reference to Abū al-Barakāt Baghdādī's *Kitāb al-Mu'tabar*). Actually, it is one of the notions the Avicennians have received from the Mu'tazilah—without candid acknowledgment, and without sufficient discrimination from the teachings of the philosophers of antiquity (pp. 223ff., 313ff.). (According to Saiyid Sulaymān Nadwī's introduction to KRM, Ibn Taymiyah's appreciation of *Kitāb al-Mu'tabar* deserves monographic treatment. For other references to it in KRM, see pp. 232, 336, 370 and 463. Also see S. Pines "Abū al-Barakāt", *Ency. of Islam,* New Edition).

APPENDIX VIII

(See III, note 2)

The *Qāmūs* and the *Lisān al-'Arab* define the word Taṭbīq (*s.v.*) as follows:

(a) In Islamic prayer, it means the congruent position of some parts (e.g. the hands) in relation to some other parts (e.g. the thighs). [For instance, Book XII in *Sunan al-Nasā'ī* is called Kitāb al-Taṭbīq in this sense.]

(b) Muṭabbiq is the word for a sword that hits a joint and cuts off the limbs.

(c) In relation to rain-bearing clouds, Taṭbiq means the widespread character of the rains.

(d) "Ibn 'Abbās asked of Abū Hurayra the rule about a woman divorced three times before the consummation of her marriage. Abū Hurayra said: Her former husband cannot lawfully remarry her unless she should have married another person (and been divorced by him). Ibn 'Abbās said: You have made

a Taṭbīq... By this word he meant the comprehension of the way of answering a question" (*Lisān al-'Arab*).

(e) On the authority of Ibn Ma'rūf (*Kanz al-Lughat*), Lane (*Lexicon*: *s.v.*) gives an additional explanation of Taṭbīq—viz. as the "making a thing to suit, match, tally, conform, correspond, or agree, with another thing".

(f) In the light of these explanations, one might appreciate the proper significance of Walīy Allāh's own interpretation of Taṭbīq which deserves to be reproduced in full:

> FROM WALĪY ALLĀH DIHLAWĪ TO EFENDI ISMĀ'ĪL B. 'ABD ALLĀH AL-RŪMĪ... I have received your letter wherein you make enquiries concerning the doctrines of Waḥdat al-Wujūd or the Unity of Being (as expounded by Ibn 'Arabī) and Waḥdat at-Shuhūd or the Unity of Appearance (as expounded by Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī). You ask me whether it would be possible to effect a Taṭbīq between the two... Now, you must know that in every age a certain number of men receive and possess a certain science that is their share out of the benefits of divine Mercy... Consider the early history of this blessed (Muslim) community—i.e. the history of those times when the sciences of the Shar' and the methods of Adab had not been reduced to a definite form; when in fact not much thought had been devoted to such problems; and when, accordingly, God's inspiration came down to the blessed community in the form of one science after another... Now, in our own times, our share out of the benefits of divine Mercy is that all the sciences (rational, traditional and esoteric) of the blessed Muslim community have been brought together within our hearts in such wise that one of them fits in with another, and the discrepancy that used to hold them apart wears out, and the teachings of each science are established in its proper place. So this is the principle that applies to such sciences as Fiqh, Kalām, Taṣawwuf, &c.... You must know that the activity of apprehending the Truth is...like a vast ocean which never had a beginning, and which never will come to an end. Those who seek after the Truth are like...tiny birds which drink out of the ocean only as much as will satisfy their thirst. When these investigators come back to describe the Perfection or the Beauty with which their investigations have acquainted them, what each one may have to say is only one of many perfections or beauties... Those who hear these descriptions soon split up into different classes. Some know... what a certain part of the description points to. Hence they assign to each part its proper place, and lend credence to the description as a whole.

> Some other hearers are bewildered by the diversity of expressions and the multiplicity of significations. It is not possible for them to forge ahead through such diversity—towards a sphere where diversities and contradictions do not exist. Such people must always labour under bewilderment.

Walīy Allāh explains this whole situation to the experience of a group of blind men each one of whom (upon his first acquaintance with a tree) came out with his own description which in fact referred to only one of the many qualities of a tree. Then came a man who possessed sound vision.

> He said: Your words are true in so far as they refer to something that does exist; but in so far as each one of you thinks that he has given an exhaustive description, you are wrong. Then this man reapplied each description only to the thing to which it was applicable. Finally, as regards those people who bring together the external as well as the internal aspects of Knowledge, sometimes their intuitions are correct, as also sometimes in their interpretations of the words of their predecessors they may be mistaken. But this does not vitiate their understanding of God, nor does it detract from their merit. For after all, the interpretation of words is (*qua* a certain kind of Ijtihād) extraneous to intuition (Kashf) itself. (See *Tafhīmāt* ii, 216 ff.)

Further on in this letter (pp. 218f.), Walīy Allāh gives his own explanation of the doctrines of Waḥdat al-Wujūd and Waḥdat al-Shuhūd. He does so from two different points of view—viz. the ethical and the ontological. From the former point of view, Waḥdat al-Wujūd tends to obliterate the distinction between Good and Evil, whereas the doctrine of Waḥdat al-Shuhūd seeks to evolve a higher synthesis between (i) the concept of the distinction between Good and Evil, and (ii) the concept of some basic similarities between these two principles. From the ontological point of view, Waḥdat al-Wujūd postulates Being as an inseparable, generic attribute of the Eternal and the temporal things alike; whereas in Waḥdat al-Shuhūd, Being is not an inseparable attribute of the temporal things, which could therefore *not*-be at a certain time (i.e. before Creation).

On Walīy Allāh's *simile* of the tiny birds and the ocean, cf. the story of Moses and Khaḍir in SB (iii, 44). Also see A. J. Wensinck, "al-Khaḍir", (Shorter) *Ency. of Islam.*

On the *simile* of the tree and the blind men, cf. Ghazālī's description (in IUD) of how some blind men represented to themselves the shape of an elephant. To the latter simile a reference is made by T. W. Rhys Davids: . "Does al-Ghazālī use an Indian metaphor?" (JRAS, London 1911, pp. 200f.).

APPENDIX IX

(See III, note 36)

Perhaps a student of Islamic ethics would find it most instructive to analyse the differences among the various interpretations of the Mean in the Muslim world. Let us explain Walīy Allāh's interpretation in compārison with two other—viz. the Quranic and the Ghazalian.

(a) *The Quranic Doctrine of the Mēan.* In 85:4-6 it is said: "We have indeed created man in the best of moulds. Then do We abase him (to be) the lowest of the low—Except such as believe and do righteous deeds". These verses speak of two extreme positions in very clear terms. But the question is whether the class in whose case an exception is made stands in the middle, or whether it continues to occupy the highest position. Perhaps the latter explanation is to be preferred. But that would point to the conclusion that (in the present case) there is no Mean.

This may be contrasted with 35:32, "Then We have given the Book for inheritance to such of our servants as We have chosen. But there are among them some who wrong their own souls; some who follow a middle course; and some who are, by God's leave, foremost in good deeds; that is the highest Grace". These verses do speak of a 'middle course'. But they attribute excellence (Virtue) or 'the highest Grace' to one of the two extreme positions, which shows that the thing describable here as the Mean is only a tolerable thing.

From these two illustrations it may be concluded that *Qrn.* opposes Good to Evil, placing the Mean somewhere above the middle (if not exactly on top) of the line that goes up from the

latter to the former. This interpretation is supported by those verses which divide all Ways into one that is straight and others which are devious (16:9), or which speak of the Mean (5:92 or 2:38) in the mathematical or positive sense of the term.

In spite of this evidence, however, it would be wrong to suggest that Dichotomy represents the only method used in the Quranic classifications, and that the Dialectical movement of moral ideas is completely foreign to them. Let us take some other illustrations. In 2:143 it is said: "Thus We have appointed you a middle nation, that ye may be witnesses against mankind, and that the messenger (Muḥammad) may be a witness against you". It is to be noted here that the word 'against' is not a good translation of the Arabic preposition 'ala; for the latter may also imply general supervision, without there being any conflict or contrariety between the parties concerned. On this interpretation it would be possible to argue that the Mean described in this verse is logically prior to the upper end which continues or extra-polates its function.

Another illustration will make the point clear. In 13:17 it is said: "He sends down water from the skies, and the channels flow, each according to its measure: but the torrent bears away the foam that mounts up to the surface. Even so, from that (ore) which they heat in the fire, to make ornaments or utensils therewith, there is a scum likewise. Thus doth God (by parables) show forth Truth and Vanity. For the scum disappears like froth cast out; while that which is for the good of mankind remains on the earth. Thus doth God set forth parables". Here the emergent Mean is again logically prior to the extreme of excess in the sense that it is the *final* cause of the movement attributed to the latter.

In the light of these (latter) illustrations, it is possible to define the Quranic conception of the Mean as follows:—Namely, that the Holy Book invariably represents the Mean to be generically different from the lower extreme. As regards its relation to the upper extreme, on the other hand, all depends on whether the latter constitutes it, or *vice versa*. If it is a by-product of the upper term, its own character must be insignificant, and its value correspondingly low. For it points to the degradation of its principle. On the contrary, if it is real and effective enough to generate

the upper and from its own being, excellence (Virtue) must be attributed to it in its own right.

(b) *The Ghazalian Interpretation.* There is a passage in IUD in which Ghazālī says:—

اعلم ان المطلوب الاقصى في جميع الامور والاخلاق الوسط اذ خير
الامور اوساطها وكلا طرفي قصد الامور ذميم وما اوردناه في فضائل
الجوع ربما يومئ الى ان الافراط فيه مطلوب وهيهات ولكن من
اسرار حكمة الشريعة ان كل ما يطلب الطبع فيه الطرف الاقصى و
كان فيه فساد جاء الشرع بالمبالغة في المنع منه على وجه يومئ عند
الجاهل ان المطلوب مضادة ما يقتضيه الطبع بغاية الامكان والعالم
يدرك ان المقصود الوسط لان الطبع اذا طلب غاية الشبع فالشرع
ينبغي ان يمدح غاية الجوع حتى يكون الطبع باعثا والشرع مانعا
فيتقاومان ويحصل الاعتدال

الكتاب (كسر الشهوتين) الثالث من ربع المهلكات —
بيان اختلاف حكم الجوع

> The Mean is the most desirable thing in all cases....Both the extreme positions between which a moderate quality or thing is to be placed must be condemned....The points we had to make in favour of Hunger may perchance lead to the assumption that excess with regard to this quality is desirable. By no means (will that be a true assumption)....It is of the mysterious essence of the wise methods of the Sharī'ah that its laws over-emphasise a prohibition if that which is prohibited be an unwholesome thing of such character as would make it extremely attractive to human nature. From this over-emphasis ignorant men imagine that they are required to counter their natural inclinations with as much vigour as they can bring to bear upon the task. But those who possess knowledge can see in this case that they are required to aim at the Mean. In so far as man is by nature inclined to take his fill (when he eats), it is proper that the Law should express itself in favour of excessive Hunger—so that Law would repel while Nature impelled a man, and from the conflict of these two would Equilibrium arise.

Ghazālī's conception of the conflict that leads to the emergence of the Mean is purely Dialectical. The substance of this interpretation of the Laws may be unacceptable to classical Fiqh; but the mode of conception it employs is not unknown to the latter. According to Ṭabarī (*Commentary on Qrn.* 2:70), several (sub-Prophetic) traditions (Khabar) explain the exacting nature of the Commandment addressed to Banī Isrā'īl (concerning the sacrifice

of a cow) as proportioned to the inquisitiveness their insolence and undutifulness led them to display (cf. HAB i, 91). On this view, the Mean would have been realized if the persons concerned had sacrificed a cow without much ado.

(c) *Walīy Allāh's Conception of the Mean.* From what we had to say in explanation of Taṭbīq as his method it can be seen that the Mean ought to represent a Dialectical principle or force in the Walīy Allāhī system. In this sense, therefore, he is in agreement with Ghazālī. On the particular question of Taraffuh, however, he would seem to have placed himself under an obligation to take a more serious view of the rejection of Taraffuh. In the problem considered by Ghazālī, 'ignorance' characterizes the attitude of a man who thinks that the natural desire for food can and ought to be suppressed in order to make a man religious. In the case of Taraffuh, on the contrary, *barbarism* would be the attitude that corresponds to 'ignorance'. For the tendency towards Taraffuh is not the expression of natural Appetite, but the consummation of the best and the noblest forces or elements of human character.

As regards the relation between the last two interpretations and the Quranic conception of the Mean, it should be noted that the Holy Book speaks of qualities or principles (Good and Evil) which are different in kind, and in whose case therefore one cannot easily deduce the common factor from their own substance. In the Ghazalian or Walīy Allāhī interpretation, on the contrary, the opposite factors are of the same substance. Hence the variation of their degrees leads to the Mean which partakes of the substance of both of them at once.

For Walīy Allāh's remarks on Taraffuh, see *Budūr* 55f. and HAB i, 52 *et passim.*

APPENDIX X

(See III, note 47)

Walīy Allāh's description of the political offices can here be presented (in extremely brief fashion) as follows:—

(a) *The Judge*

In general, a judge must be guided by the following universal principles of judicial activity:—

First, he who receives a benefit must be prepared to incur the liabilities it entails.

Secondly, between two parties to a contract or transaction, each and every condition attached to the same is binding, and each and every interpretation placed upon it by the parties is relevant. But if there is no evidence as to conditions having been attached, or to interpretations having been worked out, a particular contract follows those customary or conventional rules which govern all contracts.

Thirdly, between two parties to a contract, all benefits sought to accrue in favour of a persons must be made to accrue in his favour, and all obligations accepted by a person must be caused to devolve upon him.

Fourthly, if the two parties to a dispute were related to each other as members of a family or as parties to a contract or as partners in a certain activity, then in the event of the judge's inability to determine their respective claims, it is necessary to terminate (by means of a judicial decree) the relations existing between them prior to the dispute.

Fifthly, the methods of interpreting admissions, claims and all kinds of evidence must follow the 'Urf or the prevailing standards of interpretation. Ambiguous expressions must be reduced to an explicit and definite form—unless it appeared from the circumstances of a case that such a process would assign unwarranted meanings to those expressions (*Budūr* 76f.).

(b) *The Police Force*

The police is entrusted with the task of executing or applying the sanctions (Istīfā' al-Ḥadd) only when it has been proved that a crime has been committed by a person or persons. If there is only a possibility or likelihood that it is going to be committed, sanctions cannot be applied. All that can be done in such a situation is that the police would take precautionary measures—e.g. rendering a person unsuccessful in committing or unwilling or unable to commit an intended or anticipated crime.

(c) *The Magistrate*

This is perhaps a problematical translation of Walīy Allāh's terms Mutawallī and Naqīb. At any rate, the office includes the following functions:—

First, the demarcation of boundaries and the construction of out-posts at convenient or suitable places;

Secondly, the organization of the market-places;

Thirdly, the construction of bridges and the collection of tolls;

Fourthly, arrangements for the marriage of orphans and for the custody of their property;

Fifthly, distribution of charitable gifts among the poor and the needy;

Sixthly, distribution of proper shares among those who inherit from a deceased person;

Seventhly, collection of information about those living in a city, and the preparation of the response to those communications which may be addressed to the community as a whole;

Eighthly, collection of receipts and payment of dues in the name of the whole community (*Budūr* 83).

(d) *The Commander of the Armed Forces*

Wherever men live together in large numbers, their relations come to be exacerbated by mutual rivalries and animosities. As a result, large and well-organized groups of men sometimes begin to take strong and concerted action to redress their own grievances. Allowed to go unchallenged, such a thing may annihilate the whole organization of civic life. For such a crisis would be too big and far-flung for a judge to handle. On the other hand, its violent rejection of the necessity for peaceful settlement of all disputes would also make it impossible for the police to intervene. Therefore, the City organized a third force to defend it at the time of such a crisis. This was a standing *corps* of strong and well-trained men. In some cases, this device proceeded on the basis of a Standard (Sunnah) in which the citizens reposed implicit faith. In some other cases, it arose as the secondary effect of the general submission (by the citizens) to the authority of a person who excelled in the art of warfare by virtue of his courage and wisdom (*Budūr* 72).

In addition to the problem of the recruitment and maintenance of the forces under his command, the Commander of the Armed Forces has a twofold function to perform. First, in times of peace, it is his duty to appoint spies who will inform him of what happens in various parts of the city, and as to whether the spies of an unfriendly city are at work in it. Secondly, at times when peace and security may be disturbed or threatened, it is necessary that the Commander must realize what exactly he aims at through military measures. He must determine whether he is going to lead his forces:—

(i) against certain felonious persons or groups in the city;
(ii) or with a view to vindicating or reasserting the authority of the city;
(iii) or in order to retrieve certain property or lands possessed by force;
(iv) or to win back the confidence and allegiance of some terrorized subjects;
(v) or to destroy dangerous criminals, or to crush their strength and spirits by means of captivating them, or confiscating their possessions, or decimating their leaders.

Military operations ought not to follow one and the same pattern in all these cases. For instance, if (iii) is the object of military operations in a certain case, the Commander should try to avoid bloodshed as far as possible (*Budūr* 79ff.).

(e) *Religious or Moral Instruction*

A city found it imperative to counteract the evil influences of selfish desires and depraved tendencies which lead many a person to oppose that which is right. The way to get rid of such tendencies and desires could be shown by means of persuasive exhortations or stern warnings. The *teachers* of mankind undertook to show the Way, and taught men to aim at the right ordering of family relations and of contractual dealings and social intercourse.

It is necessary that such teachers should possess some kind of excellence (Tafawwuq)—e.g. superb religiosity, or profound knowledge, or some exceptional quality which is seldom (if ever) possessed by other persons (*Budūr* 81f.).

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